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This issue of the Netherlands Institute for Law and Governance Series is the result 
of an international conference on the theme ‘Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Indepen-
dence’ held on 25 May 2012 in Groningen, the Netherlands.
We are grateful to the speakers from France, the United Kingdom, Sweden and 
Canada, as well as from the Dutch universities of Amsterdam, Utrecht, Tilburg 
and Groningen, who accepted to take part in this conference and generously 
accepted to make their essays available to a wider audience by contributing to this 
publication.
In addition to the debt we owe to our contributors, we wish to express our gratitude 
to the Groningen Centre for Law and Governance and the Department of Administra-
tive Law and Public Administration of the University of Groningen for financing 
this project. Finally, we would like to thank Jasper Wesselman, graduate student at 
the University of Groningen, for his assistance with the logistics of the conference 
as well as the members of the peer review committee for their meticulous work, 
which resulted in numerous constructive comments for the authors.
It has been a pleasure to edit these essays and we trust that this new issue of 
the Netherlands Institute for Law and Governance Series on judicial and quasi-
judicial independence will contribute to a better understanding of the competing 
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On Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Independence: 
Introductory Remarks
Suzanne Comtois
Principles of Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Independence are fundamental to all 
democracies. Yet, despite the acknowledged importance of these principles, the 
notion of independence in the judicial and quasi-judicial contexts is still elusive. 
What is judicial or quasi-judicial independence and why is it important? Who and 
what are the judiciary and quasi-judicial bodies to be independent from? What 
legal safeguards are appropriate or necessary for the protection judicial or quasi-
judicial independence? Are there, and if so, what are the sociological pre-conditions 
needed to allow courts or quasi-judicial bodies to be shielded from inappropriate 
pressures or influences? How do we define what is inappropriate in that respect? 
How do we measure or compare the sufficiency of the independence guarantees 
granted to individual judges, higher courts, constitutional courts, quasi-judicial 
bodies and administrative decision-makers? To what extent can courts, especially 
constitutional courts, make law without crossing the separation divide between 
law and politics? If they do cross that threshold, can judges – who are indepen-
dent – also be held accountable? If so, what are judges to be accountable for? Is the 
expansion of the judiciary’s power a threat to judicial independence?
Quasi-judicial and administrative decision-makers’ independence is also the 
source of an important debate. To what extent should principles of independence 
apply to quasi-judicial bodies such as tribunals (the so called ‘adjudicative branch 
of government’1), regulatory and policy-making authorities, advisory committees, 
enforcement bodies and other administrative decision-makers? What is meant 
by independent regulatory and enforcement bodies? How much independence 
should they have? To what extent should agencies, tribunals and other administra-
tive bodies be independent from the branches of government that have created 
them or the industry they are charged to regulate? How should their degree of 
independence be determined?
It is the objective of this book, as of the conference that preceded it, to bring emi-
nent judges and scholars, from various jurisdictions to reflect on the fundamental 
principles of judicial and quasi-judicial independence, to help clarify the concepts 
and to discuss the threats and challenges that perhaps call for different safeguards 
* Prof. S. Comtois is Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, the Nether-
lands, and Professor at the Faculty of Law, Université de Sherbrooke, Québec, Canada.
1 This is the term used by the Supreme Court of Canada in Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. Colombie- 




or solutions. Within those parameters, the essays in this collection have been 
grouped into four sections:
– Independence and the Rule of Law;
– Independence and Accountability of Judges and Adjudicators;
– Independence of Regulatory Agencies, Supervisory and Enforcement Authori-
ties and
– Independence of Advisory and Complaint Committees and Final Dispute 
 Resolution by the Administrative Courts.
1. Independence and the Rule of Law
The essays included in this section explore the historical, cultural, sociological 
and legal-theoretical dimensions of judicial independence. Guy Canivet’s histori-
cal perspective in Effective Protection of the Independence of the Judiciary in France 
provides valuable insight on the specifically French conception of the principle 
of judicial independence and the transformation of French law in that respect. 
As he points out, the notion of an autonomous Judicial Power does not exist in 
the French constitution. The text refers instead to the Judicial Authority of which 
the President of the Republic, assisted by the High Council of the Judiciary, shall 
be the guarantor of the independence.2 However, the lack of an explicit judicial 
independence norm has not prevented the recognition of a strong principle of judi-
cial independence. Guy Canivet’s essay shows how, in the specific historical and 
cultural context of France’s legal structure not specifically conductive to the devel-
opment of a strict and absolute conception of judicial independence,3 substantial 
guarantees giving effective protection have nonetheless been set up. He shows 
how the Constitutional Council has built an efficient apparatus for protecting the 
independence of the judiciary by reconciling the special treatment of the power 
to judge in the French political tradition with the fundamental guarantees set 
forth in the preamble and body of the Constitution in order to establish a require-
ment of judicial independence consistent with international standards. He notes, 
as examples, the convergence of the decisions of the French constitutional judge 
with, on the one hand, those of the European Court of Human Rights based on 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, on the other hand, 
those of the Court of Justice of the European Union based on fundamental princi-
ples of European law. And he concludes that such a convergence is indispensable 
in a European framework which requires that justice be rendered in all European 
Union member States according to identical standards of quality in order to be 
mutually recognized and executed throughout the European territory.
2 Article 64 of the French Constitution
3 Namely, the absence of an autonomous Judicial Power, the division of the jurisdictional function 
into three distinct orders (judicial, administrative and constitutional) and the place of the public 
prosecutor in the courts.
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Introduction
In The Coming of Age of Review of Administrative Action in the Netherlands: A Battle 
of Effectiveness and the Rule of Law, Willem Konijnenbelt traces the evolution of 
the system of review of administrative action in the Netherlands. In the first part 
of his essay, he analyses the slow evolution from a long-standing approach where 
control over administrative action was exercised mostly by the Crown towards an 
independent and impartial process of review by an administrative court. He notes 
that this shift was necessary to comply with the rule of law and the requirements 
of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, following the 1985 European Court of Human Rights 
decision in the Benthem case.
In the second part of his essay, Willem Konijnenbelt, discusses the impact of replac-
ing administrative review by judicial review. He submits that the administrative 
courts might be ill suited to tackle the non-legal, policy aspects of administrative 
decisions, given the broad remedial power conferred upon them in the General 
Administrative Law Act, and he questions whether, or to what extent, the require-
ments of review by an independent court and the search for effective review are 
compatible.
Martine Valois’ article on The Function of Judicial Independence in Modern Legal 
Systems: Preserving the Boundaries of Law focuses on the sociological conditions 
required for securing judicial independence in a modern legal system where the 
court’s ‘law making’ role over social and moral issues is increasingly important. 
The main purpose of her essay is to explore the consequences of the transforma-
tion of the judiciary’s role in the light of the theoretical framework of Niklas Luh-
mann’s systems theory. In the first part of her essay she explains the conceptual 
underpinnings of systems theory and how it can be used to elucidate the legal 
system’s functioning. In the second part, she concentrates on the role of the courts 
in modern legal systems and, in the last part, she explains how judicial indepen-
dence contributes to law’s organizational closure as one of the essential conditions 
for the preservation of the rule of law.
Acknowledging the threats to judicial independence even in legal systems 
where both principles are constitutionally guaranteed, she concludes that certain 
sociological conditions are required for judicial independence to be really effective. 
These sociological requisites are: ‘the preservation of the conditional programmes 
of law and the limitation of the judges’ responsibility for the consequences of their 
decisions in the social system.’
Following on a similar theme, Mauro Zamboni’s article on ‘Markers’ vs. ‘Makers’: 
Are Constitutional Courts Legal or Political Actors? explores further the relation 
between law and politics in the light of the debate on judicial activism taking place 
in constitutional courts and highest courts in western democracies. He addresses 
the concerns often voiced about the extent to which constitutional courts’ activ-
ism is compatible with the very idea of democracy. To this end, he proceeds to 
evaluate whether these courts should be considered as legal actors simply enforc-
ing the statutes and constitutions written by political actors or as ‘makers’ of the 
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 constitution, i.e. institutional actors whose predominant role is political: deter-
mining what the law should say.
After having stressed the importance of constitutional court ‘activism’ inside the 
general issue of judicial activism and the reasons why constitutional courts in 
established Western democracies can be seen as occupying an ‘in-the-middle’ 
position between the legal arena and the political arena, he explains why, from a 
legal theoretical perspective, constitutional courts and higher courts are primarily 
legal actors from an institutional, structural and functional perspective. Using a 
distinction between ‘outcome’ and ‘output’, he notes that while ‘these Courts play 
without any doubt a role in the political game; their location as an institutional 
actor should be based upon the direct effects of their decisions (‘outputs’) within 
the legal arena rather than on the indirect consequences (‘outcomes’) on the politi-
cal arena’. Thus, courts being understood as legal, not political ac tors, he con-
cludes that judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation is compatible with 
democracy. Finally, to help preserve the legal nature of the constitutional courts 
and make them more ‘compatible’ with Habermas’s ideal of a democratic form of 
political organization, Mauro Zamboni suggests a shift of focus from ‘democratic’ 
constitutional court decisions to ‘democratic’ constitutional courts procedures.
2. Independence and Accountability of Judges and Adjudicators
This section offers a structural analysis of the constitutional framework within 
which judicial independence is secured in Canada and the United Kingdom, 
two countries with a long tradition of judicial independence. The essays by John 
Evans and Robert Hazell enclosed in that section describe how these two systems 
are structured internally, then they examine current issues involving tensions 
between judicial independence and accountability.
John Evans’s essay on Adjudicative independence in Canada addresses both judicial 
and quasi-judicial independence. In the first part, he gives a brief account of the 
Canadian constitutional arrangements for protecting the independence of the 
judiciary and he compares, in that respect, the situation of judges and members 
of administrative tribunals. He notes some of the complications that arise in a 
federal constitutional structure and certain decisions of the Supreme Court of 
Canada that have extended the scope of judicial independence beyond the express 
provisions of the Constitution by drawing on underlying constitutional values. 
In contrast, he observes that the Court has so far declined to draw on these same 
values to find, in the constitution, similar guarantees of independence for admin-
istrative decision-makers, even those performing jurisdictional functions analo-
gous to those of courts. However, in the absence of constitutional protection, he 
notes that some legislatures have addressed the issues and statutorily reinforced 
the independence of some of their administrative tribunals.
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In the second part of his essay, he identifies three current issues involving tension 
between judicial independence and notions of accountability: the judicial appoint-
ment process, judicial compensation, and the discipline of judges. He notes that 
these three examples show that judicial independence is not an absolute value 
and that it must be balanced against other constitutional principles. To achieve 
an appropriate balance, he suggests that regular review and recalibration might 
be required.
Robert Hazell’s essay on Judges and the Executive in Britain: an Unequal Partner-
ship? examines the impact of the United Kingdom’s Constitutional Reform Act of 
2005 on the division of powers between the executive and the judiciary. He first 
notes that the adoption of this important reform has led to a greater separation 
of powers between the judiciary and the executive in England and Wales: “The 
Lord Chief Justice became head of the Judiciary, in place of the Lord Chancel-
lor, the Justice Minister; an independent Judicial Appointments Commission was 
established; and the Courts Service has become an independent Agency, run as 
a partnership between the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice”. After a brief 
description of those changes, he explores the consequences of this new constitu-
tional order for the relationship between the executive and judiciary, namely its 
impact on their respective responsibilities for upholding judicial independence 
and ensuring proper judicial accountability. He asks questions such as: might 
judges have become more powerful? If so, in what ways? Are they sufficiently 
accountable in the exercise of their new powers? He applies a Rhodes resource-
dependency model of power, in which power is a function of the resources avail-
able to the different actors, in this case, the judiciary or/and the executive. He uses 
‘resources’ in a wide sense to include not only financial resources and staff but also 
elements such as autonomy, authority, information, and influence. His analysis 
strives to deduce the balance between judicial independence and accountability 
that might be achieved as a result of the 2005 Constitutional Reform.
His findings lead him to the conclusion that despite greater formal separation, the 
partnership still relies on the executive and judiciary working closely together. In 
that respect, he notes that in several areas (the Courts Service, judicial appoint-
ments, complaints and discipline) they have a mutual veto. The judiciary has 
become more powerful, especially with regard to appointments. Judges have 
more resources under their control and the executive struggles to be an intelligent 
partner, because it has lost so much of its staff to the judiciary. Thus, judicial 
independence has been strengthened but the accountability of the judiciary to the 
executive (i.e. the Lord Chancellor) and to Parliament remains strong.
3. Independence of Regulatory Agencies, Supervisory and Enforcement 
Authorities
Section III and IV focus on the independence of administrative and quasi-judicial 
authorities, including those performing functions such as provision of expert 
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advice, enforcement, surveillance, control and regulation. These organizations are 
variously called regulatory agencies, enforcement bodies, advisory committees, etc.
How much independence should these administrative bodies enjoy? To what 
extent should agencies, administrative law enforcers, tribunals and other adminis-
trative bodies be independent from the branches of government who have created 
them and from the parties (market or industries) they regulate? Moreover, how 
should that degree of independence be determined?
Given the diversity of mandates and functions performed by these administrative 
authorities, no single model of independence, not even a model designed for the 
judiciary, is likely to be always appropriate.4 For instance, in policy-making cases 
where some form of workable ‘general’5 interactions between political and admin-
istrative accountability mechanisms are called for, complete independence might 
even conflict with democratic principles.6
However, even if one does not aim for uniformity nor for the highest degree of 
judicial independence standards, in some cases (perhaps most) a minimum of 
independence may be required, to allow for legal, impartial and autonomous deci-
sions in individual cases and to help preserve the public’s and the parties’ confi-
dence in administrative justice. It is the purpose of section III to give an account 
of the legal framework under which specific administrative bodies operate and to 
show the extent to which guarantees of independence conferred upon them meet 
the threshold of independence called for in theses specific contexts.
In her essay on The Different Levels of Protection of National Supervisors’ Independ-
ence in the European Landscape, Annetje Ottow focuses on the independence of 
national supervisory authorities engaged in various regulated sectors, such as 
market supervisory authorities. She first discusses the legal requirements, foun-
dations and importance of safeguarding the independence of these national super-
visory authorities at a European level. Then, using five published cases related to 
regulated sectors drawn from the Netherlands, Germany, France and Hungary, she 
assesses the practical impact that various European independence requirements 
might have on the independence of national supervisory authorities. These exam-
ples, as Professor Ottow explains, show that the independence of national super-
visors is fragile. However, she notes that the European Commission’s proposals on 
independence requirements have since been incorporated into various directives 
and that their importance has been acknowledged in the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice. In her conclusion, she acknowledges that in defining 
4 Laverne Jacobs, Caught between Judicial Paradigms and the Administrative State’s Pastiche: 
‘ Tribunal’ Independence, Impartiality, and Bias, in Colleen M. Flood & Lorne Sossin (eds.), 
Administrative Law in Context (2nd edition), Emond Montgomery, Toronto, 2012, p. 233-278.
5 In the form of abstract guidelines, as opposed to direct interference in a specific record.
6 On this point see Jerry L. Mashaw, Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Reflections on Bal-




the appropriate level of independence, a distinction between government involve-
ment in individual cases and government involvement in general instructions 
may be relevant (even essential in some cases) for democratic reasons, but she 
notes that the line between the two is not always easy to draw. She therefore sug-
gests that policy considerations emanating from the legislator must be balanced 
against independence, to make sure that the national independent supervisors 
have sufficient discretion within this framework to be able to take autonomous 
decisions in individual cases, in conformity with the provisions of European law.
Heinrich Winter’s essay Regulatory Enforcement in The Netherlands: Struggling 
with Independence focuses on the independence of regulatory enforcement author-
ities. After discussing the three main causes underlying the current debate over 
the independence of these authorities the public demand for more effective, less 
burden some law enforcement; the reaction to inappropriate political and adminis-
trative interferences in the enforcement process; and the incentive to comply with 
European law – Heinrich Winter gives a brief account of the framework, threats 
and constraints within which inspectorates and authorities operate in the Nether-
lands. Among the constraints and threats facing the inspectorates and authorities’ 
independence, he notes the risk of capture, the status and close relationship of the 
inspectorates and authorities with the minister (considered under the umbrella of 
ministerial responsibility), the overlapping functions of the inspectorate as both 
law enforcer and expert advisor on policy-making and the minister’s concerns 
with the indirect consequences of its decisions (political, economic or social).
He notes that in some cases the legislation provides for administrative forms of 
organization and legislative safeguards that reinforce inspectorates and authori-
ties’ independence throughout the process, from information gathering to the final 
decision. But he concludes that these organizational forms and safeguards cannot 
simply be transposed to all such inspectorates and authorities. Acknowledging 
the constraints that are inherent in regulatory enforcement, such as the need for 
information and cooperation between the regulator and the regulated party and, 
to a certain extent, between the regulator and the minister, he concludes that the 
standards of independence of inspectorates and authorities should be viewed on 
a continuum, where the appropriate level of independence fluctuates according to 
the characteristics of the function and the context.
In A Call for Independent Environmental Law Enforcement, Gustaaf Biezeveld 
focuses on the status of environmental supervisory authorities in the Netherlands. 
The first part of his paper provides an overview of environmental supervision in 
the Netherlands. The second part discusses what he considers to be the major 
cause of the shortcomings of environmental law enforcement in the Netherlands: 
the political stance of supervisory authorities. His central point is that a level of 
independence analogous to those enjoyed by economic supervisory authorities 
under European Law is a prerequisite to effective environmental enforcement.
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In his reasoning, he acknowledges that following serious cases of non-compliance, 
such as the 1982 Uniser case, considerable efforts and money have been expended 
in the Netherlands over the last 30 years to strengthen environmental law enforce-
ment capacity and expertise in both, the administrative and the criminal sectors. 
However, he questions the effectiveness of those reforms. Reading from those 
non-compliance cases and the reports of the independent commissions that fol-
lowed, he suggests that there is a direct link between the structural inadequacies 
of enforcement supervision in the Netherlands and the political position of the 
supervisory authorities. He therefore concludes that so long as the environmental 
supervisory authorities lack independence, the reforms in question offer only a 
partial solution.
4. Independence of Advisory and Complaint Committees and Final Dispute 
Resolution by Administrative Courts
Section IV addresses issues of independence at the pre- and post-decisional stages 
of the administrative decision-making process. The first essay, by Jan Jans and 
Annalies Outhuijse, examines the involvement of an external expert advisory 
committee in internal review by an administrative authority of its own decisions 
(the objections procedure). The second essay, by Dick Lubach, deals with inter-
ventions by external advisory committees in cases involving claims for damage 
compensation resulting from legal decisions pertinent to zoning law. The third 
essay, by Kars de Graaf and Bert Marseille, concentrates on external review by 
administrative courts over administrative decisions, more precisely on the courts’ 
role in final dispute resolution under the Dutch General Administrative Law Act 
(GALA).
Following the restructuring of various Dutch administrative authorities into a new 
organization to be known as the Consumer and Market Authority (ACM) and the 
proposed abolition of the objection procedure, Jan Jans and Annalies Outhuijse’s 
paper on Advisory Objection Procedures in the Netherlands: A Case Study on their Use-
fulness in Dutch Competition Law explores the relative merit of GALA’s objection 
procedure in the enforcement context of the Dutch Competition Act. The first part 
of the paper describes the objection procedure and the role of the Advisory Com-
mission on Competition in that procedure. The second part analyses the reasons 
and potential consequences of the proposed abolition of the objection procedure 
in relation to ACM decisions imposing fines. From a functional perspective, the 
authors note that the objection procedure is very similar to the procedure before 
a first-instance administrative court, both in terms of procedure and grounds for 
review. Although the statute allows for a full review, they note that for various 
reasons such as complexity, delays, and the highly factual or discretionary nature 
of the issues, the Advisory Committee tends not to get involved in the merit of the 
decision nor reassess the severity of the sanction. They also note that the proce-
dure may add significant costs and delays. Nonetheless, they observe that in the 
context of the ACM’s decisions imposing fines, a multi-level decisional structure 
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presents advantages that should not be overlooked. Among others, they note that 
an external expert and independent Advisory Commission plays a major role in 
structuring the debate. Thus, the objection procedure enhances the capacity of the 
Competition Authority to make legitimate, coherent and effective decisions. And 
they worry that the abolition of the objection procedure might prove burdensome 
on the administrative courts, given the large caseload.
In Advisory Committees on Damage Compensation in Zoning and Infrastructural 
Planning: A Quest for Independence, Dick Lubach discusses the extent to which 
external advisory committees have to function independently from the politi-
cal authorities to whom they give advice. Using the example of Dutch advisory 
committees on damage compensation in zoning and infrastructural planning, 
he notes that neither the legislation nor the jurisprudence make clear whether, 
and if so why, these advisory committees ought to be independent. Based on his 
 experience with several external damage compensation committees, he suggests 
that the need and the level of independence that should be required from such 
external advisory committees depend on a wide variety of factors such as the con-
text, the nature of the enabling statute, the reasons for which the committee was 
created in the first place, the way it is structured, the extent to which the authority 
is bound by the committee’s advice and whether the decisional authority may be 
held accountable for its decisions.
Following this approach, he makes some observations on the context and legal 
framework within which external advisory committees on damage compensation 
in zoning and infrastructural planning operate. Among other relevant character-
istics, he notes that in disputes about damage compensation taken under article 
6.1 of the Wet ruimtelijke ordening the lawfulness of the initial decision alleged to 
have caused the damage is not at stake. The committee is asked to give advice for 
damage compensation claims resulting from a per se lawful decision. Therefore, 
the issue before the committee is beyond the strict question of conformity to the 
law. Then, distinguishing his views from those expressed by his colleagues De 
Graaf and Marseille in a previous article, he discusses the reasons why such exter-
nal advisory committees are important and why they should be independent from 
the public authority to whom they give advice.
Kars de Graaf and Bert Marseille’s essay on Final Dispute Resolution by Dutch 
Administrative Courts: Slippery Slope and Efficient Remedy, discusses the role of 
Administrative Courts in final dispute resolution under the Dutch General 
Administrative Law Act (GALA). In the first part of their paper, the authors give 
a brief account of the evolution of the Dutch Administrative Courts’ statutory 
powers to bring about final dispute resolution. Then, using empirical data derived 
from case law, they examine the extent to which those powers have been used and, 
in such cases, the criteria applied by courts in deciding whether to make the final 
resolution or return the case to the public authority for decision. They note that 
for various reasons – such as GALA’s recent amendment providing administrative 
courts with broader powers for bringing about final dispute resolution, complaints 
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about the functioning of the administrative jurisdictions in the Nether lands and 
the Higher Administrative Court’s emphasis on securing effective final dispute 
resolution – there has been a significant increase in the percentage of cases in 
which the administrative courts, at all levels, have tried to bring about final dis-
pute resolution. They fear that increased pressure on the courts to decide issues 
that were previously left to the administrative authorities might open the door 
to undue infringement on administrative power, especially in cases involving 
administrative discretion, and that it might even threaten the independence of the 
administrative Court from the executive.
In conclusion, this book, like the conference on which it is based, is an opportu-
nity to revisit the concepts and safeguards of judicial and quasi-judicial independ-
ence and to thereby reflect on our commitment to the independence of courts and 
administrative decision-makers and the need to reconcile it with other core values. 
We are pleased to present this collection of essays and we trust that you will find 
it useful and stimulating.
I – Independence and the Rule of Law
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1 – The issue of the independence of the judiciary is raised from time to time 
in France. Whether it be alleged government interference in the hearing and 
judgement of cases involving political figures, the procedure for appointing and 
transferring judges and prosecutors or more generally government influence on 
the operation of justice, the media reports on suspected interference periodically, 
giving the public a biased and distorted view of the requirement of good legal 
gover nance. The result is a great disparity between the principle of judicial inde-
pendence as proclaimed by the Constitution and reality as perceived by public 
opinion.
2 – The principle of judicial independence is nonetheless inherent in any democ-
racy. It appears in all charters of rights and freedoms in one form or another and 
is reproduced in all international, regional and, of special interest to us, European 
human rights conventions. It is a central aspect of the right to a fair trial stem-
ming from Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights reiterated in 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union under 
the guarantees of the proper administration of justice. The words are very famil-
iar: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law”.
3 – Deeply rooted in the various legal traditions, judicial independence is none-
theless diversely regulated by member States. As a result, it is a recurring theme 
in comparative judicial law and the subject of many international meetings of 
judges. In both the civil law and common law traditions, although the ideologi-
cal, political and institutional foundations of judicial independence may vary, it 
is nonetheless an essential component of the Rule of Law. From this comparative 
perspective, it can be shown that, although the organisation of the French legal 
system is unique, it comprises the international doctrine of the protection of the 
independence of the judiciary.
*
* G. Canivet is a Member of the Constitutional Council, Paris, France, and First Honorary Presi-
dent of the Court of Cassation in France.
32
I – Independence and the Rule of Law
4 – This will be the focus of the following brief review which will endeavour to 
show how, in the specific historical and cultural context of France’s legal structure, 
which was not conducive to the development of a strict and absolute conception 
of judicial independence, substantial guarantees giving effective protection have 
nonetheless been set up. This analysis will show that there is a specifically French 
conception of the principle which is the subject of this international symposium, 
which I would like to thank the organizers for having invited me to attend.
2. The French Context of Judicial Independence
5 – French law has traditionally been subject to two types of constraints — those 
relating to the specificities of our legal structure and those relating to the place of 
judges in the national institutional environment.1
A. Judicial Independence and the Specificities of the French Legal Structure
6 – The two essential characteristics of the French legal structure are the separa-
tion of powers and the place of the public prosecutor in courts of law.
1. The Separation of Powers
7 – Prevalent throughout the complex legal structure of the Former Regime, the 
separation of powers was systematized by the Revolution.2 As a reaction against the 
resistance of high-level bodies (the Parliaments) to orders from the royal authority, 
the 1791 Constitution considerably curtailed judges’ authority and prohibited them 
from interfering in affairs of the State. This political principle at first reduced 
contentious dealings between citizens and the State to a recourse to hierarchical 
authority. However, over two centuries it has allowed the progressive building of 
an administrative justice protective of public freedoms which has resulted in the 
setting up of a complete set of courts totally separate from the judicial branch 
that is made up of administrative courts, administrative courts of appeal and the 
Conseil d’État (Council of State). This pyramidal structure was completed with the 
overhaul of administrative justice in 1987.3
8 – Constitutional justice came about much later. For a long time, the dogma of 
the Rule of Law, the expression of the general will, which also stems from the 
political principles of 1789, prevented a constitutional review of the law from being 
set up. It was finally introduced half-heartedly during the 1958 constitutional 
reform which instituted the review of a statute’s constitutional compliance before 
its enactment. After a long maturation, the 2008 constitutional reform completed 
1 Serge Guinchard et al., Institutions juridictionnelles (10th Ed.), Dalloz, Paris, 2009.
2 Jean-Pierre Royer, Jean-Paul Jean & Bernard Durand, Histoire de la justice en France, PUF, Paris, 
2009.
3 Act No. 87-1127 of 31 December 1987 governing reform of administrative litigation (1).
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this process by setting up a true forum for challenging the constitutionality of 
statutes promulgated by referral from the judicial or administrative branches. 
Constitutional justice was henceforth entrenched.4
9 – For these historical reasons, in each of these branches, the protection of the 
independence of judges is treated differently, which prevents a clear,  unambiguous 
and unconditional view of a notion which is nonetheless the existential guarantee 
of justice.
2. The Place of the Government in the Judicial Branch
10 – The combining of judges and prosecutors into a single body should be added 
to this separation of the judicial branch.5 The existence of an attorney represent-
ing the executive branch before the courts is a French tradition that dates back to 
feudal times,6 but it was the Napoleonic reforms that turned it into a means of the 
government controlling the courts. This control was carried out in three ways.
11 – First, a public prosecutor was set up for each court of law:7 a prosecutor of 
the Republic for the lower level courts [and] a Chief Public Prosecutor for each 
second-level court and the appeal courts. These prosecutors and their substitutes 
are organized hierarchically and are subject to the central authority of the execu-
tive branch — the Minister of Justice. The Cour de Cassation [Supreme Court] also 
has a public prosecutor, assisted by advocates general, so there is a public prosecu-
tor for each court who is based within the court. Public prosecutors are specific 
to courts of law, as they are not found in either the administrative courts or the 
Constitutional Council.
12 – Like judges, prosecutors are members of the judiciary. The Constitutional 
Council has entrenched this principle of unity within a single body while noting 
that judges and prosecutors perform different roles:8 the first are responsible for 
prosecuting offenders while the second judge them. With only a few exceptions, 
notably that of the guaranteed irremovability of judges, they have the same status. 
They are hired and trained the same way, they follow the same career path, and 
they can shift back and forth from being a judge to being a prosecutor without 
restriction. The result of this interchangeability is a unique esprit de corps among 
members of the judiciary who are sometimes subject to the authority of the execu-
tive branch and sometimes not. The statutory lack of differentiation applied to 
different functions, which is harmful to the professionalization of both these legal 
4 Pierre Pactet & Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien, Droit Constitutionnel, Sirey, Paris, 2012.
5 Roger Perrot, Institutions judiciaires (13e ed.), Montchrestien, Paris, 2008.
6 Jean-Marie Carbasse, Histoire du parquet, PUF, Paris, 2000.
7 Guinchard et al. (2009) supra footnote 1.
8 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 92-395 DC of 21 February 1992; Decision No. 93-926 DC of 
11 August 1993.
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vocations, hinders the building of a culture of independence of judges that is as 
solidly established as in common law.
13 – Lastly, the intervention of these prosecutors is indispensable in all penal mat-
ters. They refer matters before the courts, even when public action is initiated 
by the victims. This is one of the essential features of an inquisitional system. 
In certain civil matters, such as those involving civil status, they also act as par-
ties. They also intervene as joined parties in certain matters of public order, such 
as corporate bankruptcy, and they submit conclusions in all matters where they 
deem it necessary. They have a right of appeal, the right to have the legitimacy of 
Cour de Cassation judgements reviewed and the right to submit the constitutional-
ity of a statute to the Constitutional Council.
14 – In trials, especially in penal matters, prosecutors have special prerogatives. In 
penal investigations, they can have people suspected of breaching a penal statute 
arrested and held in police custody. It is therefore not surprising that their position 
in the courts and the powers they are given in terms of infringing on fundamental 
freedoms raise certain problems in terms of the fair trial standards stemming 
from the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council or imposed by that of the 
European Court of Human Rights, based on Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. With respect to Article 5 of the Convention, there is also the 
question of the prosecutor’s ability to deprive a person suspected of committing a 
crime of his freedom. Several decisions of the national constitutional court have 
corrected certain aspects of the system but recent cases rendered by the European 
Court of Human Rights9 require the French legislature to choose between a body 
of public prosecutor judges with independent status that likens them to a judicial 
authority, which public prosecutors would like to have, or a body of prosecutors 
subject to the instructions of the executive branch, separate from the courts and 
without the power to order suspected offenders to be detained. Most legal systems 
around the world have opted for this latter solution. In most systems which have a 
public prosecutor, he does not have judicial authority.
15 – Although the issue of the public prosecutor’s status is the subject of debate in 
France today,10 even if the law ends up choosing to give prosecutors independent 
status11 there will still be confusion in the French system between two very dif-
ferent aspects of independence — on the one hand the statutory independence of 
judges with special terms for those who are also public prosecutors, and on the 
other hand the independence of the courts in rendering judgements, which is very 
different.
16 – The issue of the public prosecutor does not arise for the other levels of courts. 
There is no prosecutor for the administrative courts or the Constitutional Council. 
9 CEDH, Moulin v. France, 23 November 2010.
10 Guinchard et al. (2009) supra footnote 1.
11 Le Monde, Jean-Claude Bécane, 9 December 2011.
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From this perspective, the judicial order is treated differently, which is also the 
case for the place of judicial judges in institutions.
B. The Place of Judges in the Institutional Environment
17 – With respect to the independence of the judiciary, the place of the judge in his 
institutional environment raises two series of questions — career management for 
judges and the separation between the judicial branch and the other two branches.
1. The Existence of a Judicial Civil Service12
18 – In France, two-thirds of judges are hired through competitions open to law 
graduates as soon as they complete their studies and the other third are confirmed 
lawyers with a few years of practice. Both judges and prosecutors are appointed by 
decree signed by the President of the Republic and their transfer, change of duties 
and promotion in the three levels of courts follow the same rule. Throughout their 
career, such judges are evaluated by the Chief President of the court and, based 
on their evaluation, they may be promoted to the next court level. A judge’s career 
progresses from the first-level courts to higher courts through successive deci-
sions of the administrative authority, which raises the question of the influence of 
the executive branch in managing a judge’s career and the other political or union 
influences that come to bear on it.
a. The Influence of the Executive Branch
19 – The influence of the executive branch on judges’ careers is measured by the 
government’s impact on their training, the management of their careers and their 
discipline.
Judges’ training13
20 – The training of judges is entrusted to a school, the Ecole nationale de la magis-
trature, which has the status of a public establishment with relative administrative 
and management autonomy. Its board is chaired by the Chief President of the 
Cour de Cassation but the other members are designated by the Minister of Justice. 
The school is also under the tutorship of this member of the government who 
chooses its director and appoints the instructors. Lastly, the school’s budgetary 
autonomy is relative — the budget is drawn up and submitted to Parliament by 
the Minister of Justice.
Career management14
21 – The power of the executive branch in managing judges’ careers is broadly 
tempered by the intervention of the constitutional body guaranteeing their inde-
pendence, the High Council of the Judiciary. For basic positions, appointments 
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are proposed by the Minister of Justice but they must be confirmed by the High 
Council of the Judiciary. For the positions of President of the court and appoint-
ments to the higher court, i.e. the Cour de Cassation, the High Council of the 
Judiciary appoints the judges directly.
Disciplining judges15
22 – The High Council of the Judiciary is also the body responsible for disciplin-
ing judges. When a judge breaches the duties of his office, the Minister of Justice 
has a disciplinary investigation conducted by an inspection service, the ‘judicial 
services inspectorate’, which answers directly to the Minister. The same minister 
then refers the matter to the High Council of the Judiciary. Proceedings can also 
be taken by the Presidents of the appeal courts on which the judge sits. Discipli-
nary sanctions for judges are decided by the High Council of the Judiciary. For 
prosecutors, the High Council only issues an opinion, although it is generally 
followed by the Minister. These sanctions can include removal from office.
23 – Two issues in particular have arisen regarding disciplinary matters. The first 
was the possibility of an administrative authority, the Ombudsman, in charge of 
defending the rights of citizens regarding the various government departments, 
intervening in the taking of disciplinary action against judges. The Constitutional 
Council16 has held the provisions of a 2007 statute which provided for such an 
intervention contrary to the principle of independence of the judiciary and the 
separation of powers. The second issue involves the possibility of holding a judge 
liable for a fault in rendering a judgement where he commits a serious and inten-
tional breach of a rule of procedure. On this point, the Constitutional Council 
has held17 that in this case the judge could only be prosecuted if the breach was 
confirmed in a final judgement, which means that the judge’s fault must be estab-
lished by court judgement, not by the disciplinary body.
24 – Treating this second issue differently, a 2010 statute18 gave every person the 
possibility of referring a disciplinary complaint against a member of the judiciary 
to the High Council of the Judiciary through the petitions committee. The Con-
stitutional Council did not consider this provision unconstitutional but it held that 
when a complaint relates to a matter which is still before the judge, a procedure 
must be provided for which respects the impartiality and independence of the 
judge in question vis-à-vis the parties.
15 Guinchard et al. (2009) supra footnote 1.
16 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2007-551-DC of 1 March 2007.
17 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2011-611-DC of 19 July 2010. 
18 Institutional Act No. 2010-830 of 22 July 2010 respecting the implementation of Article 65 of the 
Constitution.
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The composition of the High Council of the Judiciary19
25 – The career and discipline of judges are broadly subject to the guarantee of 
the High Council of the Judiciary, which raises the issue of the composition of 
this body and in particular its freedom from political influence. In this regard, the 
series of statutes which have defined the status of members of the Council of the 
Judiciary contain specific provisions protecting their independence. The jurispru-
dence of the Constitutional Council pays particular attention to the effectiveness 
of this guarantee.
26 – From this point of view, it has been difficult to find a balance in the com-
position of the High Council of the Judiciary between the influence of political 
institutions and that of the representation of judges. This body was created by the 
1946 Constitution. It was completely transformed by the 1958 Constitution and 
since then its composition, power and rules of procedure have been changed three 
times. The latest constitutional reform was that of July 21, 2008, implemented 
by an institutional act of July 22, 2010. The most notable change was that the 
President of the Republic, who was its President, and the Minister of Justice, who 
was its Vice-President, no longer sit on it. The President of the High Council of 
the Judiciary is henceforth the Chief President of the Cour de Cassation, which 
without question increases the independence of the High Council of the Judiciary 
and indirectly that of the judges.
27 – By symmetry, there is a section of the High Council of the Judiciary for public 
prosecutors. However, it only issues opinions about appointments proposed by 
the Minister of Justice. The two sections may also meet in a plenary session at 
the request of the President of the Republic or the Minister of Justice to examine 
certain general questions common to the two categories of judges.
b. The influence of unions20
28 – In 2010, during the latest reform, one of the most debated issues was that of 
the proportion of judges on the High Council of the Judiciary. As recommended 
by various international reference texts, and in particular those of the Council of 
Europe, the judges wanted to be in the majority. The opposite solution prevailed 
for appointment decisions: the council has eight outside members designated by 
the government and the Conseil d’État and seven judges at various levels. How-
ever, in disciplinary matters, the judges are in the majority. The issue is that of 
the power of judges’ unions over the mechanisms for controlling judges’ careers. 
They had greater influence before the 2008 constitutional reform, leading certain 
commentators on the workings of the legal system to criticize the ‘corporatist’ 
management of the judiciary.
29 – Paradoxically, the issue of maintaining independence in the management of 
judges’ careers comes up less at the administrative court level. Institutions created 
19 Guinchard et al. (2009) supra footnote 1.
20 Guinchard et al. (2009) supra footnote 1; Institut Montaigne, Pour la justice, 2004. 
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within the Conseil d’État, the highest level of this type of court, suggest appoint-
ments and promotions to the Executive, which generally ratifies them.21
30 – These issues come up even less frequently for the Constitutional Council, 
where members are in office for a nine-year, non-renewable term. Appointments 
are divided into three and made by the President of the Republic and the Presi-
dents of each house of Parliament, the National Assembly and the Senate, and are 
subject to confirmation by the Houses themselves. During their term of office, 
members of the Constitutional Council cannot be removed unless they breach the 
incompatibility rules as determined by the majority.
31 – Finally, for each category of judge there are incompatibility rules designed 
to prevent conflicts of interest and guarantee their freedom from any outside 
in fluence, and in particular from the parties. All judges are also subject to an 
obligation of discretion in various forms which prohibits them from any perceived 
political affiliation or position-taking.
2. The Interference of Public Authorities in the Operation of the Legal System
32 – Public authorities intervene in the operation of the legal system in two dif-
ferent ways that affect the independence of the judiciary — interference by the 
legislative branch in judgements and the influence of the executive branch in 
managing courts’ budgets.
a. Interference of the legislative branch in judgements
33 – The interference of the legislative branch in judgements arises in civil mat-
ters when a statute becomes applicable to ongoing trials22 (such a possibility is 
excluded in penal matters unless the new law is less stringent). The legislature 
thereby changes the course of a civil proceeding by amending the law the judge 
must apply, generally to avoid the effect of unwanted jurisprudence. This is clearly 
a breach of the principle of the separation of powers and the independence of the 
judiciary. On this issue, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council23 contra-
dicts the position of the European Court of Human Rights.24 It generally allowed 
the application of new law in pending civil matters whereas the European Court 
imposed more stringent conditions: to be retroactive, the statute had to be justi-
fied by compelling reasons of public order. After a resounding condemnation of 
France for such practices, which are contrary to Article 6 of the Convention, the 
Constitutional Council brought its jurisprudence into line by setting very strict 
conditions of compliance of so-called ‘validation’ statutes with the Constitution.25
21 Guinchard et al. (2009) supra footnote 1.
22 Jean-François Renucci, Traité de droit européen des droits de l’homme, LGDJ, Paris, 2007, p. 398.
23 Constitutional Council Decisions No. 96-375 DC of 9 April 1996, No. 97-393 DC of 18 December 
1997, No. 98-404 DC of 18 December 1998; No. 99-425 DC of 29 December 1999.
24 ECHR 28 October 1999, Zielinski et al. v. France, Reports 1999-VII, 95 .
25 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2001-458 DC of 7 February 2002.
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b. The influence of the executive branch on court administration and 
 management26
34 – I will conclude this first section with the highly debated issue of the budgetary 
autonomy of the courts. On this point, the solutions adopted by the various States 
are quite different. Some States confer great management autonomy on the courts, 
considering it an inherent part of their independence, while other States deny 
judges any power in this regard, entrusting these duties to administrators answer-
ing directly to the government. In France, the situation is somewhere between the 
two. The courts have funds which they administer themselves but their budget is 
proposed and discussed in Parliament by the Minister of Justice, who allocates the 
funds among the courts. Also, expenditures are ordered within the courts jointly 
by the Presidents and the prosecutors according to a co-management principle, 
another indication of the government’s control over the courts.27
35 – The adoption in 2001 of a new system for voting on and implementing the 
government’s budget28 would have been an ideal opportunity to rectify this situ-
ation. However, the issue of the budgetary management of courts in terms of 
judicial independence was not taken into account and the situation therefore 
remained unchanged. In a period of budgetary restrictions, the issue of funding 
for the courts, which is constantly being debated in France, is a pressing one. The 
least we can say is that, according to the French conception, the independence of 
the judiciary does not extend to budgetary autonomy. However, the issue is more 
satisfactory for administrative courts and even more so for the Constitutional 
Council which, to various degrees, enjoy greater autonomy in establishing and 
implementing their budget.
36 – Each of these political, administrative and budgetary characteristics which 
stand in the way of a natural and unambiguous conception of the independence 
of the judiciary come into conflict with the constitutional guarantees designed to 
ensure effective protection of the required standard of independence in a demo-
cratic society.
3. The effectiveness of the principle of independence in the French legal model
37 – Like most States, the provisions protecting the independence of the judiciary 
in France are constitutional. In this way, the Constitution itself bears the mark 
of a specifically French political concept of justice which is rooted in history. The 
essential aspect of this identity is that since the Former Regime, the judiciary 
in France has not been considered an autonomous branch equal to the execu-
tive and legislative branches. Emanating from royal authority, it was placed under 
the control and protection of the sovereign, which would be a source of ongoing 
26 Institut Montaigne, Pour la justice, 2004.
27 Id. 
28 Institutional Act No. 2001-692 of 1 August 2001 governing public finance.
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conflict among the courts of the Former Regime and the King and, in response, 
would lead to the weakening of the courts in revolutionary law.29 As a result, in the 
institutions of the Fifth Republic, the law was not on an equal footing with the 
Executive and Parliament; it was an ‘authority’ and the independence of this ‘legal 
authority’ was guaranteed by the President of the Republic.30
38 – With this political background in mind, the Constitution contains consti-
tutional standards which guarantee the independence of the judicial authority. 
Through its decisions since 1958 and especially beginning in the 1980s, the Con-
stitutional Council has given them content which ensures their effectiveness.
A. Constitutional Provisions Relating to the Independence of the Judiciary
39 – The constitutional provisions relating to the independence of the judiciary 
are taken from both the Declaration of 1789 of the Rights of Man and of Citi-
zens, to which the preamble of the 1958 Constitution refers, and the provisions 
of its Title VIII. The independence of the Constitutional Council is guaranteed 
by the provisions of Title VII which are specific to it and the independence of the 
administrative courts stems from a fundamental principle recognized by the law 
of the Republic, entrenched by the preamble of the 1946 Constitution, which is 
also included in the constitutional corpus.
40 – Article 16 of the Declaration of 1789 reads as follows: “Any society in which 
the guarantee of the rights is not secured, or the separation of powers is not deter-
mined, has no constitution at all”. This is the founding principle of the separation 
of powers on which the independence of anybody vested with the power to judge is 
based, regardless its nature, and which prevents the legislature or the government 
from censoring court decisions, subjecting them to injunctions or substituting 
their own decisions in the judging of disputes falling under their authority.31 The 
independence of the judiciary takes on a new dimension with the affirmation of 
the former principle according to which no person can be reassigned against his 
will to a court other than that designated by law.32 As a result, the law cannot create 
a special court to decide on a specific trial and no citizen may choose a different 
court unless it is in the public interest. Conversely, no court may be suppressed 
without guarantees for both the persons subject to trial and the members of such 
courts.
29 Royer, Jean & Durand (2009) supra footnote 2.
30 Th. S. Renoux, Le président de la République, garant de l’indépendance de l’autorité judiciaire?, 
Revue Justices, 1996, no. 3. This conception was expressed in very clear terms by the President 
of the Republic in a press conference held on January 31, 1964: “In France there is no authority, 
whether civil, military or judicial, which does not derive its legitimacy from the Head of State …” 
(translation by author).
31 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 80-119 DC of 22 July 1980; Decision No. 87-228-DC of 
26 June 1987.
32 Article 17 of the Law of August 16-24, 1790; Th. S. Renoux, Le droit au juge naturel, droit fonda-
mental, RTDciv. 1993, no 1, p. 33.
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41 – Article 64,33 which deals with the judicial authority, contains substantial 
provisions involving the principle of independence in the French tradition. Other 
than pointing out that the President of the Republic is its guarantor, it states that 
in exercising this part of his power, the President of the Republic is assisted by 
the High Council of the Judiciary. It indicates here again that the status of mem-
bers of the judiciary is determined by a category of special laws, institutional acts, 
voted on according to a strengthened procedure designed to increase the statutory 
guarantees granted to members of the judiciary34 and lastly that members of the 
judiciary, i.e. judges, cannot be removed from office so they cannot be reassigned 
without their consent, even for a promotion.
42 – Article 6535 sets out the composition and mission of the High Council of the 
Judiciary, presided over since 2010 by the Chief President of the Cour de Cassation 
33 Article 64: The President of the Republic shall be the guarantor of the independence of the Judi-
cial Authority. He shall be assisted by the ‘High Council of the Judiciary’. An Institutional Act 
shall determine the status of members of the Judiciary. Judges shall be irremovable from office.
34 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2001-445-DC of 19 June 2001.
35 Article 65: The High Council of the Judiciary shall consist of a section with jurisdiction over 
judges and a section with jurisdiction over public prosecutors. 
 The section with jurisdiction over judges shall be presided over by the Chief President of the Cour 
de Cassation. It shall comprise, in addition, five judges and one public prosecutor, one Conseiller 
d’État appointed by the Conseil d’État and one barrister, as well as six qualified, prominent citi-
zens who are not members of Parliament, of the Judiciary or of administration. The President of 
the Republic, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate shall each 
appoint two qualified, prominent citizens. The procedure provided for in the last paragraph of 
article 13 shall be applied to the appointments of the qualified, prominent citizens. The appoint-
ments made by the President of each House of Parliament shall be submitted for consultation 
only to the relevant standing committee in that House. 
 The section with jurisdiction over public prosecutors shall be presided over by the Chief Public 
Prosecutor at the Cour de Cassation. It shall comprise, in addition, five public prosecutors and 
one judge, as well as the Conseiller d’État and the barrister, together with the six qualified, promi-
nent citizens referred to in the second paragraph. 
 The section of the High Council of the Judiciary with jurisdiction over judges shall make rec-
ommendations for the appointment of judges to the Cour de Cassation, the Chief Presidents of 
Courts of Appeal and the Presidents of the Tribunaux de grande instance. Other judges shall be 
appointed after consultation with this section. 
 The section of the High Council of the Judiciary with jurisdiction over public prosecutors shall 
give its opinion on the appointment of public prosecutors. 
 The section of the High Council of the Judiciary with jurisdiction over public prosecutors shall 
give its opinion on disciplinary measures regarding public prosecutors. When acting in such 
capacity, it shall comprise, in addition to the members mentioned in paragraph three, the public 
prosecutor belonging to the section with jurisdiction over judges. 
 The High Council of the Judiciary shall meet in plenary section to reply to the requests for opin-
ions made by the President of the Republic in application of article 64. It shall also express its 
opinion in plenary section, on questions concerning the deontology of judges or on any question 
concerning the operation of justice which is referred to it by the Minister of Justice. The plenary 
section comprises three of the five judges mentioned in the second paragraph, three of the five 
prosecutors mentioned in the third paragraph as well as the Conseiller d’État, the barrister and 
the six qualified, prominent citizens referred to in the second paragraph. It is presided over by 
the Chief President of the Cour de Cassation who may be substituted by the Chief Public Prosecu-
tor of this court. 
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for the section with jurisdiction over judges and by the Chief Public Prosecutor at 
the Cour de Cassation for the section with jurisdiction over public prosecutors. At 
the request of the President of the Republic or the Minister of Justice, it meets in 
plenary session to express its opinion on any question concerning the operation of 
justice, including those affecting its independence.
43 – The independence of the Constitutional Council is guaranteed by Article 56 of 
the Constitution,36 which determines the number of members and the procedure 
for appointing them.37 It has nine members who hold office for a non-renewable 
term of nine years. Three of its members are appointed by the President of the 
Republic, three by the President of the National Assembly and three by the Presi-
dent of the Senate. These appointments are subject to the approval of the relevant 
standing committees of each House, which may oppose them with a majority of at 
least 3/5 of the votes cast. In addition to these nine members, former Presidents of 
the Republic are ex officio life members of the Constitutional Council. The Presi-
dent of the Constitutional Council is appointed by the President of the Republic.
44 – Lastly, the independence of administrative courts, which are likened to Cours 
des comptes [courts of auditors], is guaranteed by a fundamental principle recog-
nized by the laws of the Republic.38 For members of these courts, the rules govern-
ing their independence are not found in legislation on the judiciary but in specific 
rules applicable to them within general civil service regulations.39
 The Minister of Justice may participate in all the sittings of the sections of the High Council of 
the Judiciary except those concerning disciplinary matters.
 According to the conditions determined by an Institutional Act, a referral may be made to the 
High Council of the Judiciary by a person subject to trial. 
 The Institutional Act shall determine the manner in which this article is to be implemented. 
36 Article 56: The Constitutional Council shall comprise nine members, each of whom shall hold 
office for a non-renewable term of nine years. One third of the membership of the Constitutional 
Council shall be renewed every three years. Three of its members shall be appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Republic, three by the President of the National Assembly and three by the President 
of the Senate. The procedure provided for in the last paragraph of article 13 shall be applied to 
these appointments. The appointments made by the President of each House shall be submit-
ted for consultation only to the relevant standing committee in that House. 
 In addition to the nine members provided for above, former Presidents of the Republic shall be 
ex officio life members of the Constitutional Council. The President shall be appointed by the 
President of the Republic. He shall have a casting vote in the event of a tie.
37 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 566-DC of 9 July 2008: “It is implicit from all the provisions 
of the Constitution that the legislator intended to guarantee the independence of the Constitu-
tional Council” (transation by author).
38 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 80-119-DC of 22 July 1980.
39 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 91-L of 12 March 1991.
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B. Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Council Regarding the Independence of the 
Judiciary
45 – Through a series of decisions, the Constitutional Council, which is respon-
sible for deciding whether laws comply with the Constitution,40 has progressively 
given effect to each of the constitutional standards we have just mentioned. For 
courts and the Constitutional Council, the implementation of these texts must be 
referred to institutional acts41 which are systematically submitted to it before being 
enacted. It has therefore been able to systematically oversee the constitutionality of 
these specific statutes. The organisation and status of other courts are determined 
by ordinary statute which may be referred to it by political authorities and groups 
of parliamentarians before being enacted. In addition, since the institution of a 
constitutionality provision42 which, during a trial, allows a party to submit the con-
stitutionality of the statute applicable to the dispute to the Constitutional Council 
upon referral by the judge of first instance and after screening by the Conseil d’État 
or the Cour de Cassation, it may be asked to rule on any legislative provision which 
impairs the independence of the judiciary. This has led to a significant jurispru-
dential corpus defining the scope and content of the independence of the judici-
ary, which we will briefly discuss below.
46 – The Constitutional Council thus ensures that the legislature complies with 
the guarantee of independence, both with respect to its statutory aspect, i.e. the 
independence of judges, and its institutional aspect, applied to the courts. It exer-
cises this oversight both internally in terms of the operation of justice by ensuring 
that in rendering judgement, the judge does not receive any instructions from his 
own superiors,43 and externally, in terms of the executive and legislative branches, 
by ensuring that the public authority does not interfere with either judges’ free-
dom to render decisions or the authority of their decisions. This guarantee of inde-
pendence must also shelter the judge from political and administrative pressure 
as well as pressure from the parties or private influences. It protects all judges, 
regardless the court to which they belong, whether they are professional judges or 
part-time judges hired on an as-needed basis.44
47 – The Constitutional Council also ensures that the guarantee of indepen dence 
applies to all facets of a judge’s career, from his appointment,45 assignment,46 
40 Article 61 of the Constitution.
41 This requirement stems from Article 64 of the Constitution. Constitutional Council, Decision 
No. 2002-445-DC of 19 June 2001; Decision No. 2003-446-DC of 20 February 2003. 
42 Article 61-1 of the Constitution.
43 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 70-40 DC of 9 July 1970; Decision No. 80-127-DC of 20 Jan-
uary1981; No. 2003-466-DC of 20 February 2003.
44 Regarding juges de proximité (local magistrates): Constitutional Council, Decision No. 94-355 of 
10 January 1995. 
45 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 93-336-DC of 27 January 1994.
46 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 93-336 of 27 January 1994.
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the evaluation of his professional skills, remuneration, transfer, promotion47 and 
extension48 to the cessation of his duties.
48 – The Constitutional Council pays particular attention to ensuring that the law 
efficiently complies with the irremovability of judges and it denounces any pro-
ceeding which would move a judge without his prior consent, even in the case of 
a promotion,49 or assign him to other duties. It thus carefully examines the status 
of judges vested with temporary or part-time functions, or rules limiting the time 
given to exercise certain functions.50 It gives general scope to the irremovability 
rule by applying it to both higher court judges and members of administrative 
courts.51
49 – With respect to the requirement of independence, its control extends to leg-
islative provisions relating to the status of members, the rules of procedure of 
the High Council of the Judiciary, guarantor of the independence of judges, with 
respect to opinions and decisions regarding appointments, as well as the rules 
involving disciplinary proceedings and in particular the terms according to which 
referrals may be made to it by persons subject to trial.52 The body guaranteeing 
independence must clearly be sheltered from any influence itself.
50 – Since the judges are elected, like members of labour courts53 and commercial 
court judges, the Constitutional Council bases the guarantee of independence, 
which is an integral part of the exercise of judicial duties, on Article 16 of the 
Declaration of 1789 rather than on status as member of the judiciary, which does 
not apply to them. It is important in all cases that those involved be subject to the 
rights and obligations applicable to all members of the judiciary which give access 
to court functions, and thus to the same guarantees of independence, subject only 
to the specific provisions imposed by the part-time or temporary exercise of their 
duties.54
51 – For all categories of judges, the independence guarantee includes verifica-
tion of their ability to render justice. The law which determines their status must 
therefore indicate the level of knowledge or legal experience they must have.55 
47 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2001-445-DC of 19 June 2001.
48 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 86-220-DC of 22 December 1986.
49 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 67-33-DC of 12 July 1967; Decision No. 80-123-DC of 
24 October 1980.
50 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 94-355-DC of 10 January 1995; Decision No. 2001-445-DC 
of 19 June 2001; Decision No. 2003-466-DC of 20 February 2003.
51 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 80-119-DC of 22 July1980.
52 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2010- 611-DC of 19 July 2010.
53 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 45-DC of 28 December 2006.
54 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2003-466 DC of 20 February 2003.
55 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2003-466 DC of 20 February 2003.
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This capacity requirement is based on Article 6 of the Declaration of 1789,56 from 
which the principle of equal access to public office is inferred and which, in this 
case, completes the constitutional sources cited above. The capacities, virtues and 
talents taken into account must also relate to the functions of a judge and are 
designed to guarantee equality before the law, a principle which also stems from 
Article 6 of the Declaration of 1789.57
52 – Lastly, the legal requirement of setting up independence guarantees for all 
judges is controlled both positively, through the censure of legal provisions which 
breach it, and negatively, where the law fails to provide such guarantees.58
4. Conclusion
53 – This brief review shows that the Constitutional Council has built an efficient 
apparatus for protecting the independence of the judiciary by reconciling the 
special treatment of the power to judge in our political tradition and the unique 
context of French legal institutions with the fundamental guarantees set forth 
in the preamble and body of the Constitution in order to place requirement of 
judicial independence at the level of international standards. This wish to adhere 
to universal principles of good legal governance can be seen in particular from 
the convergence of the decisions of the French constitutional judge with, on the 
one hand, those of the European Court of Human Rights based on Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights and, on the other hand, those of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union based on fundamental principles 
of European law.59 Such a convergence is indispensable in the framework of an 
European space which requires that justice be rendered in all European Union 
member States according to identical standards of quality in order to be mutually 
recognized and executed throughout the European territory.
56 Article 6 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens: “(…) All citizens, being equal in its [the 
law’s] eyes, are equally eligible to all public dignities, places and employments, according to their 
capacities, and without other distinction than that of their virtues and talents”.
57 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 98-336 of 19 February1998.
58 Constitutional Council, Decision No. 2010-10 QPC of 2 July 2010.
59 Renucci (2007) supra footnote 22, p. 402.
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The Coming of Age of Review of Administrative 
Action in the Netherlands: A Battle of Effectiveness 
and the Rule of Law
Willem Konijnenbelt
1. Effectiveness and the Rule of Law
Effectiveness, in the context of our subject, essentially means effective review of and 
protection against administrative action: a procedure that brings the claimant, if 
he wins his case, the remedy he was seeking. Rule of Law essentially means, in 
this context, a procedure of review that ensures verification of the legality of the 
administrative action by a court addressing the criteria of Article 6 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights: in cases where civil rights and obligations are 
concerned or where a criminal charge is involved – both as understood by the case 
law of the Strasbourg Court – a review ensured by a court that fulfils the criteria 
of the Convention with regards to its nature and procedure. One of the essential 
characteristics required by the Convention is independence of the reviewing court. 
And the implication that the court cannot take the place of the administration.
The question that forms the background issue of the whole article is then: How 
to reconcile the requirement of effective review of administrative action and the 
requirement of review by an independent court? The twain, are they compatible 
or will they never meet?
2. Until the Middle of the XIXth Century
Under the Republic of the United Provinces (1579-1795), all cases against the 
administration could be brought before the ordinary law courts of the provinces. 
Following the end of the French period – with its dogmatic separation of judicial 
and executive powers – in 1814, the newly founded Kingdom of the Netherlands 
initially retained the ancient system of full competence of the judiciary vis-à-vis 
the administration. The then king, William I (our only autocratic monarch), dis-
approved of the system and in 1822 the French conflict system was reintroduced. 
Thus, in civil procedures against a public body before a judicial court, the provincial 
governor could raise a conflict of competence, as a result of which the court would 
cease to be competent in the case and the dispute would be decided by the King 
(who would seek the advice of his Council of State). From 1830 onwards – when 
*
* Dr. W. Konijnenbelt is Emeritus Professor at the University of Amsterdam.
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the royal authority had been seriously weakened by his stubborn and authoritar-
ian way of handling the revolt of the Belgian provinces – raising conflicts fell into 
disuse; in 1844 the conflict system was formally abolished.1
3. The Rise of Administrative Review
Still, by then one had become accustomed to having, in several cases, a possibil-
ity of administrative review instead of one form or another of judicial review. The 
reviewing authority would then be an administrative organ: the municipal council 
(for decisions by the municipal executive or the mayor); the provincial executive 
(for decisions by municipal or water board bodies); or the Crown (either directly, 
for decisions made by ministers or by decentralised bodies, or, indirectly, in cases 
where an appeal could be brought against reviewing decisions by the provincial 
executive). Whether an administrative appeal would be possible against a certain 
kind of administrative decision, whether the decision given in review would be 
subject to appeal to the Crown and to whom such an appeal would be available, 
all depended on separate provisions in the statute law: in Acts of Parliament, in 
government regulations; or in provincial, municipal or water board byelaws. Ini-
tially, there were no general rules of procedure or generally accepted principles of 
due process.
The ordinary courts remained competent for “all disputes about property or rights 
deriving from it, about claims or civil rights”, according to a provision of the 1815 
Constitution.
From the mid-1840s onwards, the Provincial States of several provinces would vote 
byelaws providing rules of procedure, such as the obligation to hear both sides. 
The Provinces Act of 1850 made such rules compulsory. It was not until 1861 that 
the Council of State Act would give rules of procedure for the proceedings in appli-
cations for administrative review by the Crown: all parties concerned would be 
heard by the Contentious Section of the Council of State, which would formulate 
a decision in the form of a draft Royal Decree. Should a minister hesitate to follow 
the opinion of the Section, he had to demand that the section reconsider its draft. 
The minister could persist in deciding contrary to the draft only if he found the 
minister of justice willing to countersign the Royal Decree (‘contrary decision’). 
In practice, contrary decisions were extremely rare: they appear in just 1% or 2% 
of cases.
The case law of the provincial executives and especially the Crown have both made 
a fundamental contribution to the development of Dutch administrative law by 
elaborating – long before the courts and the French Conseil d’État – the concept 
of unwritten general principles of law with which administrative decisions must 
1 R. Kranenburg, De bescherming tegen onrechtmatig bestuur, in C.W. van der Pot et al. (eds.), 
Nederlandsch Bestuursrecht, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1932, p. 255.
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comply, such as equality, legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expecta-
tions, proportionality, prohibition of détournement de pouvoir (use of a power in 
pursuit of wrong ends) and of arbitrariness.
Since the written law would never give specific reasons for granting a review, it 
was self-evident that these reasons could be both of a legal and of a policy nature. 
This being the case, and the reviewing authority being an administrative authority 
itself, if the review were to come down to the annulment of the decision challenged 
and therefore a requirement that a new decision be made, the reviewing authority 
would simply replace the annulled decision with its own decision. Hence, this 
system offered very effective remedies2 but the rule of law requirement of review 
by independent courts was not met.
4. End of the 19th Century: Judicial Review, the Exception
By the end of the century, during the eighties, there was much debate – influ-
enced by developments in Germany and France – about the desirability of creat-
ing a system of independent administrative courts. Some supported the idea of 
transforming the Contentious Section of the Council of State into an independent 
administrative court. The constitutional reform of 1887 made this possible. The 
French example was not entirely unrelated to this idea. Others were in favour of 
creating specialised administrative courts; a third suggestion was to add cham-
bers for judicial review of administrative action to the ordinary courts of justice. 
In the end, no decision could be reached.
From the nineties onwards, some specialised administrative courts were created 
(e.g. taxes, social security, civil service). In many cases, a statute, or a byelaw issued 
by a decentralised body, would make some kind of administrative review of indi-
vidual administrative decisions possible, mostly a review by the provincial execu-
tive or by the Crown. In other cases, one would have to try and seek access to the 
ordinary courts with a claim that an administrative decision was ‘illegal’ and had 
therefore harmed the claimant. Over the course of the 20th century, the courts 
would come to accept more and more grounds for the illegality of an administra-
tive decision: not just conflict with written ‘private’ law but also with public law 
and with unwritten principles of law, including the principle of due care.
In financial disputes (e.g. tax law, social security), the specialised administrative 
courts would replace an administrative decision, annulled on grounds of illegality, 
with their own decision. In other kinds of judicial review of an administrative deci-
sion, a judgment that found the decision being challenged illegal would be content 
with annulling the decision, leaving it to the administration to make a new deci-
sion. The ‘discretionary power’ of the administration ought to be respected, both 
for constitutional reasons (in many cases statute law gives discretionary power to 
2 Kranenburg (1932) supra footnote 1.
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the administration and to the administration only; only administrative authori-
ties can exercise such powers under parliamentary or comparable responsibility) 
and on practical grounds (in many cases, the courts lack the skills and the tools 
for making the right decisions). In administrative review, however, the reviewing 
body would always, as we have seen, able to make the decision itself if need be.3
At this stage, review by the specialised administrative courts met the requirements 
of both effectiveness and review by an independent court. But in many cases the 
only judicial review available was a tort action before the ordinary courts. This was 
an independent judge, but effectiveness was assured only insofar as a claimant 
could be given adequate financial compensation; a ‘better’ administrative decision 
was something the judge could not provide though. In the many cases where only 
administrative review was possible, the effectiveness of the review was assured but 
the rule of law requirement of review by an independent judge was not met at all; 
in this respect, the situation showed no improvement.
5. After the Second World War – 1976: ‘Arob’, Decline of Administrative Review
After the Second World War, new attempts were made to set up a system of review 
for individual administrative decisions. In 1976 – after a series of intermedi-
ate stages – this resulted in the Wet Arob (Act on judicial review of individual 
administrative decisions). The Act upheld the existing possibilities for judicial or 
administrative review of individual decisions but it created a new independent 
court for claims with the intention of the annulment of an individual administra-
tive decision for ‘illegality’, i.e. being (a) contrary to a written provision of law; 
(b) contrary to the prohibition on the unlawful use of power (détournement de pou-
voir); (c) contrary to the prohibition of arbitrariness, and (d) contrary to any other 
general principle of administrative law. This new court was the Administrative 
Justice Section of the Council of State. In most cases, an objection procedure, 
based on the principle of fair hearing before the authority that had made the chal-
lenged decision, was compulsory.
The new Section, often referred to as the ‘Arob judge’, played an important role 
in the further development of the procedural general principles of administrative 
law, thus completing the work of the Crown, the pre-existing administrative courts 
and the ordinary judiciary. The ‘Arob judge’ would, in cases where the challenged 
decision was annulled, mostly content himself with annulling the decision and 
leaving it to the administration to decide on the consequences of the annulment; 
only in cases where it was clear that the reason for annulment, had no, or only 
partial, bearing on the substance of the annulled decision, could it decide that the 
legal consequences of the annulled decision were upheld entirely or in part.
3 Kranenburg (1932) supra footnote 1.
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From 1976, the possibility of administrative review of individual decisions was 
gradually removed from many pre-existing statutes (though not from all). As a 
result, ‘Arob review’ gradually became the standard method of reviewing indi-
vidual decisions. But three specialised administrative jurisdictions continued to 
function, each in its own province: tax courts (as part of the common judiciary); 
a court for social security and civil service disputes and a court for matters to do 
with economic legislation.4
All in all, ever more individual administrative decisions have become potentially 
subject to review by an administrative court. Where access to the Arob judge was 
made available, the Arob judge replaced the ordinary courts; this has not changed 
the quality of the system in terms of rule of law: one independent judge has given 
way to another. In terms of effectiveness the change implied some improvement. 
On the other hand, where the Arob judge had replaced administrative review by 
the Crown, rule of law had won to the detriment of effectiveness; a shift in the 
balance.
6. Fall of Administrative Review by the Crown
In 1985, the Benthem ruling of the European Court of Human Rights in Stras-
bourg confirmed the opinion of those who had argued that the Dutch administra-
tive review system did not fulfil the requirements of Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, namely that a claimant whose civil rights or obli-
gations are at stake or has a criminal charge against him, is entitled to a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. When the Crown is the 
final competent reviewing body, there is no independent tribunal to hear the case. 
In view of that, the competence of the Crown to hear claims against individual 
administrative decisions was soon abolished; provisionally, the Contentious Sec-
tion of the Council of State – the same Section that used to hear the cases and that 
would draw up the draft Royal Decrees that were meant to decide the cases – was 
declared competent to decide these cases. It could annul a decision on the same 
grounds, as could its ‘sister’ the Administrative Justice Section, in Arob cases. (In 
practice, several Councillors of State would be members of both Sections.) A more 
permanent solution would be introduced a few years later.5 – A further gain for 
rule of law, but at the expense of effectiveness in the eyes of the claimants.
7. 1994: The General Administrative Law Act
The second half of the Eighties and the beginning of the Nineties brought a sort of 
repetition of the debate of one hundred years earlier about review of  administrative 
4 H.D. van Wijk/W. Konijnenbelt & R.M. van Male, Hoofdstukken van bestuursrecht, The Hague 
2002, p. 502.
5 Id., p. 503.
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action, the only real difference being that an important role for administrative 
review was no longer an option. Again, three principal models were discussed: 
(a)  the integration of administrative justice into the ordinary judiciary, with the 
Hoge Raad (‘High Council’) on top as a mere court of cassation; (b) some adminis-
trative courts as courts of appeal and, again, the Hoge Raad as a common court of 
cassation for the whole of the judiciary and (c) the retention of the existing system 
with some adaptations.
Without great enthusiasm on anyone` s part, the third option prevailed. The spe-
cialised administrative courts for social security affairs, civil service disputes (and 
disputes on scholarships) and for economic law disputes were upheld, the tax law 
chambers remained part of the ordinary judiciary, and the two judicial sections of 
the Council of State merged into one Section for Administrative Justice. As a rule, 
a claimant cannot be heard by an administrative court if he has not followed the 
objection procedure before the authority responsible for the decision which he is 
challenging. The law concerning the proceedings before the three ‘autonomous’ 
administrative jurisdictions was unified; in 2005, these rules of procedure came 
to apply in tax disputes too.6
Recently, the debate has begun anew. The Government seems to be in favour 
of leaving the system more or less as it is, with improvements where necessary. 
I should add that there is a constant stream of minor or major legislative improve-
ments, arrangements for a better lay-out of the system and – as we shall see next – 
improving its effectiveness.
Unfortunately, I must also add some recent setbacks: for not always very convinc-
ing reasons, some procedures – especially in the field of construction and road 
building – have been shortened (the final decision of the court ought now to be 
reached within six months), resulting, of course, in delays in other matters treated 
by those same courts; and there is a bill pending before parliament raising the 
costs of the procedures drastically. There was a chance, however, that the senate 
would refuse to pass the bill. In the beginning of the year 2013 the new govern-
ment withdrew the bill; this danger is now over.
8. Effectiveness and the Rule of Law Revisited
The tradition of administrative review by the Crown was one of a substantive 
scrutiny of decisions: although questions of procedural law were not completely 
neglected, the main focus of the reviewing procedure was what would be the right 
decision. If it was thought that the decision challenged was right in the end, the 
grounds put forward by the claimant would fail; possible faults of a formal nature, 
6 H.D. van Wijk/W. Konijnenbelt & R.M. van Male, Hoofdstukken van bestuursrecht, Amsterdam 
2011, p. 516; R.J.N. Schlössels & S.E. Zijlstra, Bestuursrecht in de sociale rechtsstaat, Deventer 
2010, p. 1096, 1128.
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such as lack of research or failure to hear interested parties, non-convincing moti-
vation etc., would be ‘repaired’ in the course of the proceedings before the Crown. 
If it were thought that the decision ought to have been read differently, the deci-
sion challenged could be annulled as a whole or in part and the outcome of the 
proceeding would be the right decision – ‘right’ meaning both legally correct and 
appropriate for its purpose. The Crown being itself an administrative organ, it 
was considered that it had every authority to impose the decision it thought right. 
The one flaw of the procedure, however, was that the legal scrutiny was carried 
out not by an independent court but, in the end, by the administration, regardless 
of the important role of the (independent and impartial) Contentious Section of 
the Council of State: its role was important, decisive even – but the role was, in 
law, just an advisory one. Hence, there was non-compliance with Article 6 of the 
ECHR.
The tradition of the ‘Arob judge’, the Administrative Justice Section of the Council 
of State, was more or less the opposite of the Crown’s. The question here was not 
‘what is or would should have been the right decision?’ but ‘are the legal com-
plaints of the claimant well-founded or not?’. Very often, if no serious fault of a 
substantive legal nature could be found, it would appear that the administration 
had committed one or two formal mistakes and for that reason alone the Section 
would annul the decision, unless it was sufficiently clear that the mistake had 
had no effect on the substance of the decision. All in all, it was relatively easy for 
a claimant to succeed. But very often the victory thus won appeared to be Pyrrhic: 
the administration, having ‘repaired’ the reasons for the annulment, could make 
a new decision, the substance – if not the wording – of which could be an exact 
replication of the annulled earlier decision. A better founded decision this time, 
true, but all in all mainly a loss of time.
Under the General Administrative Law Act, 1994, the attitude of the administra-
tive courts has gradually changed. Right from the start the Act, in Article 8:72, 
stipulated that if an administrative court found a reason to annul the decision 
challenged, it could, inter alia, ‘instruct the administration to make a new deci-
sion […] with due observance of its ruling, or it can determine that its ruling will 
replace the annulled decision or the annulled part of it’. At first, this provision was 
interpreted rather narrowly: a court was allowed to use its replacement power only 
if there could be no doubt that only one legally correct decision was conceivable. 
Gradually, the courts became more lenient. In 2008 they adopted the policy that a 
court, having annulled an administrative decision and finding that a new decision 
will have to be made, will make the new decision itself unless there are sound 
reasons to leave it to the administration. During the hearing, the court may ask the 
opinion of the parties concerned about possible positive outcomes of the proceed-
ing. There are many possible reasons for leaving the making of a new decision to 
the administration. For example, the annulled decision was the refusal to grant a 
written permit, even if it is clear that the permit must be granted now, it may be 
impossible for the court to establish the conditions attached to the permit. Or the 
reasons for refusing the permit were insufficient but under the relevant statute 
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law there may be other serious reasons for a refusal and further exploration is 
needed before a new decision can be reached. In such a case the court will, nowa-
days, very often set a term for the new decision, possibly with a penalty payment 
if the administration does not reach its new decision within a given time-limit.
As of 2013, the GALA provides a special procedure where the court may instruct 
the administration to try and repair the legal defects discovered so far (and maybe, 
to find a solution that is more favourable to the claimant), so that the court will 
be able to take the new decision into account before giving its final judgement.7
All in all, nowadays the courts will do their utmost to make sure that the proce-
dure will give every indication possible about the consequences of an annulment. 
From January 1st of 2013 on, Article 8:41a of the General Administrative Law Act 
obliges the administrative courts even explicitly to strive after final settlement of 
the disputes they handle.8
All this may be so, but it still cannot avoid the fact that judicial review is, and 
always will be, ‘inferior’ to administrative review in one respect: a court of law 
cannot scrutinise the non-legal, policy aspects of administrative decisions (apart 
from more or less obvious ‘misfits’, decisions that are manifestly unreasonable 
from a policy viewpoint – which, fortunately, occur very rarely).
Here a new approach to the objection proceedings, which are compulsory in nearly 
all cases before the case can be brought before an administrative court, may help. 
The aim of objection proceedings is that the deciding authority should reconsider 
its own decision after a fair hearing of all the interested parties. Under the Wet 
Arob of 1976, the Act which made the procedure compulsory, and in view of the 
more or less formalistic character of the ‘Arob judge’s’ approach to such matters, 
a tradition has developed of using the objection procedure as a sort of pre-trial, 
neglecting, to a large extent, the non-legal aspects of the affair, even when in real-
ity those were predominant for the objector. The committees which, very often, 
carry out the hearings for the administration and give their opinion on the out-
come they think appropriate, have developed a tendency to ‘play the little judge’.
For some years now, a campaign initiated by the Ministry of the Interior has tried 
to convince the various administrative authorities and their advisory committees 
to adopt a different attitude in the objectives proceedings and to try to find a solu-
tion for the complaints of the objectors, paying less attention (but still enough, 
if a solution cannot be found) to the legal aspects of the affair. This campaign, 
7 B.J. Schueler, J. K. Drewes et al., Definitieve geschilbeslechting door de rechter, The Hague 2007; 
J.E.M. Polak, Effectieve geschillenbeslechting: bestuurlijke lus en andere instrumenten, Neder-
lands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht 2011, 2.
8 Cf. footnote 6.
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welcomed by most, is beginning to bear its first fruit.9 But much must still be 
done in this respect; an attitude that is widely spread and has taken root over some 
decades cannot be completely altered in such a short time.
The new, more ‘positive’, attitude of the courts, resulting in fewer fruitless annul-
ments and in far more ‘leading’ rulings, seems solid enough by now; it is strongly 
advocated by all administrative appeal courts and there is little opposition. Previ-
ously, the courts had already made sure that their rulings were delivered promptly, 
the proceedings before a tribunal of first instance or before an administrative 
court of appeal seldom take more than one year. In most cases they take six to ten 
months, and in urgent cases there is a very effective system of preliminary provi-
sions (‘référé administratif ’) available.
If we do succeed in transforming the nature of the objection proceedings into a 
problem-solving affair instead of ‘playing the little judge’, the result will be an 
intelligent combination of ‘administrative’ and independent judicial review that 
is both effective and in accordance with the rule of law. So there is hope for the 
future – but there is still much work to be done!
9 Alex Brenninkmeijer & Bert Marseille, Meer succes met de informele aanpak van bezwaarschrif-
ten, Nederlands Juristenblad 2011, 1596.
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The Function of Judicial Independence in Modern 
Legal Systems: Preserving the Boundaries of Law
Martine Valois
1. Introduction
Since the end of the last century, the general understanding of the separation of 
powers has changed drastically, especially with respect to the status and function 
of the judiciary. In 1985, the Supreme Court of Canada had summarised the role 
of the three branches in the following way:
…the role of the judiciary is, of course, to interpret and apply the law; the role of 
the legislature is to decide upon and enunciate policy; the role of the executive is to 
administer and implement that policy.1
Under that conception, each power had a very narrow and definite role. Among 
the three branches of government, the legislature was paramount since only that 
branch had democratic legitimacy. As to the judiciary, its role was limited to the 
interpretation of statutes according to legislative intent. The situation is very dif-
ferent today. The Supreme Court of Canada teaches us that the constitutional prin-
ciple of the separation of powers protects the exclusivity of certain functions per-
formed by each of the three powers, in particular those carried out by the courts, 
and that a law may ‘unconstitutionally interfere with courts’ adjudicative role’.2
These transformation of the function of courts brought with it a general question-
ing of the role of judges in the production of norms. Paradoxically, the mounting 
power of judges poses a challenge for judicial independence – the judges’ freedom 
to make decisions based on law without any form of pressure or influence – also 
had adverse consequences for judicial independence. This is because the increased 
mobilisation of the judiciary to decide social or moral issues has led to an increase 
in the criticism addressed to judges and the decisions they render. The rise of criti-
cism towards the judiciary have paved the way to a diminution in the protection 
afforded to judges.
* Dr. M. Valois LL.B., LL.M., LL.D. is a member of the Quebec Bar and Professor of law at the Uni-
versité de Montreal, Canada.
1 Fraser v. Public Service Staff Relations Board, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 455.
2 B.C. v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. [2005] 2 S.C.R. 474, para. 54.
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My intention in this paper is to explore these issues using the theoretical frame-
work of Niklas Luhmann systems theory.3 With the unique perspective of systems 
theory, issues related to the role of the judiciary in modern legal systems and the 
concept of judicial independence are given a new significance. Indeed, one may 
ask if there is yet more worth discussing about judicial independence and the rule 
of law in legal theory, now that it is universally agreed that the rule of law cannot be 
guaranteed without judicial independence. On the other hand, the fact that there 
are still serious threats to the rule of law and judicial independence, even in legal 
systems where both principles are constitutionally guaranteed, raises the question 
of the conditions required for judicial independence to be fully implemented.
In this text, I propose a new understanding of the way judicial independence 
works to guarantee the rule of law. Using the conceptual tools elaborated by Nick-
las Luhmann, I will demonstrate that the principle of judicial independence is 
closely linked to law’s independence, that is, the autonomy of the legal system. 
As an autopoietic system, law observes, reproduces, and conserves itself. Its 
autonomy is maintained by the self-reflexivity of the system’s operations. This 
autonomy preserves the integrity of the law’s key function in differentiated socie-
ties – the stabilisation of individual and collective normative expectations over 
time.4 The independence of law from political pressure and other irritants can 
only be guaranteed if this autonomy is preserved. By enforcing the principle of 
judicial independence, the judiciary participates in the organisational closure of 
the legal system.5 This closure is preserved by the boundaries of law, which keep 
communications from other social systems, particularly the political system, out-
side the legal system. This is so because these communications are not relevant to 
the operation of the legal system.6
In this text, I will first show the conceptual underpinnings of systems theory and 
how it can be used to elucidate the legal system’s functioning. In the second part 
of the essay, I concentrate on the role of the courts in modern legal systems. In the 
last part, I explain how judicial independence contributes to law’s organisational 
closure as one of the essential condition of the maintenance of the rule of law.
3 Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.
4 Id., chapter 3.
5 Martine Valois, Judicial Independence: Keeping Law at a Distance from Politics, LexisNexis, 
Markham, Ontario, 2013.
6 Id., p. 102-103: “It [the legal system] does not pursue imperialist interests to attract as much 
communication as possible and to retain it in the system. It is not an attracting system. It only 
predicates: if law is to be used, that is, if there is a question of law as to law and injustice, it can 
be used only in the terms set by the legal system. Exactly in this sense the legal system is an opera-
tively closed and structurally determined system.”
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2. Systems Theory Applied to Law
Before we enter into the fundamentals of systems theory, it must be pointed out 
that this theory does not pretend to depict the reality ‘out there’, that is, the reality 
which can be seen by the normal observer. Systems theory operates in the same 
way as Weber’s ideal types;7 it is a scientific method which serves to make sense 
of the contingent and complex reality of social facts. Systems theory places the 
observer in a second-order observation position.8 The first observer is only capa-
ble of observing the object because its look remains fixed on the object.9 Systems 
theory concerns what can be inferred using the observation of the first observer 
and his observation activity. From the second-order position, the observer can 
observe how others observe and make distinctions.10 Furthermore, systems theory 
makes use of very abstract conceptual tools that are unique to that sociological 
theory, such as self-referential and autopoietic systems, binary codes, conditional 
programmes and structural couplings. We shall define those notions as we go on.
Social systems are not made of rules or institutions, or of social interactions 
between actors, but of communications. These communications convey a mean-
ing that is relevant to the function of the system. Systems theory is thus concerned 
with societal communications ‘that accept or reject statements, interpretations, 
decisions, theories, policies and so on’.11 The function of every system is to organ-
ise societal communications in a way that all communications may be treated by 
the relevant system. Systems theory does not assess the performance of a system 
within society; it only depicts how social systems treat communications that are 
relevant to their function. In the legal system, the relevant communications are 
the ones relating to the distinction between what is legal and what is not. To illus-
trate the nature of legal communications, the authors Michael King and Chris 
Thornhill give the following examples:
Law extends to all those communications that are understood as directly relating to 
the issue of legality or illegality. It extends, for example, to car-drivers arguing about 
which of them made the error of judgment which resulted in an accident, a customer 
insisting on his or her rights as a consumer that a shop reimburses him or her for 
faulty goods, a man refusing to pay maintenance for a child on the basis that the 
father could have been someone else. In all three examples what is invoked is law 
rather than some other system of communication.12
7 Max Weber, Rudolf Stammler et le matérialisme historique, Presses de l’Université Laval, Ste-Foy, 
Québec, 2001, p. 129.
8 Luhmann 2004 supra footnote 3, p. 94. Richard Nobles & David Schiff, Observing Law through 
Systems Theory, Hart, Oxford, 2013.
9 Micheal King & Chris Thornhill, Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law, Hart, Oxford, 2006, 
p. 18.
10 Id., p. 19.
11 Id., p. 26.
12 Id., p. 36.
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It is not because an event can be treated under law that it necessarily falls under 
the scope of the legal system. It is the legal meaning conveyed through the com-
munications about these events that is relevant to the operations of the legal 
system. Legal communications are those that serve its societal function, that is, 
the stabilisation of normative and collective expectations over time.13 In modern 
legal systems, law is made of legally regulated decisions. Modern law is thus posi-
tive, in the sense that it can be modified by another legally regulated decision, be it 
a judicial decision or a legislative decision. Only positive law is sufficiently flexible 
and alterable to respond to the individual and collective normative expectations of 
differentiated societies.
Social systems are said to be self-referential or autopoietic systems because they 
use their own reference for the production and reproduction of operations. Hence, 
a communication is a legal communication if it is treated as such by the legal 
system. The unity of the system resides in this self-reference since both lawful 
and unlawful communications are part of the legal system. The self-referential 
mode of reproduction of law also means that the law does not have to conform to 
any external authority in order to be considered as valid law by the system. The 
distinction of system/environment, which is at the heart of the systems theory, 
entails that the system’s operations are closed to the environment of the system. 
Closure of the system does not amount to isolation;14 the interaction of the system 
with the environment exists through structural couplings.
As far as the legal system is concerned, closure of the system means that the 
system will only use legal standards as programmes for conditional decisions. 
These decisions are the operations that assign the value legal or illegal. What 
cannot be treated under the binary code legal/illegal does not belong to the legal 
system, but to its environment.15 In other words, the legal system is normatively 
closed but cognitively opened. We say that it is normatively closed because only legal 
communications may be treated internally by the system’s operations. It is the 
system’s closure that prevents expectations born out of other social systems from 
making their way into the legal system.
Every social system operates with a different binary code and structure of pro-
gramme. The binary code of law is the legal/illegal distinction. This code applies 
not only to events occurring outside the legal system but also to legal decisions, 
since the legal system is a self-referential system. The binary code of law excludes 
the application of a third value, like, for instance, the moral or social acceptability 
of a court’s ruling. The application of a third value would place a risk to the closure 
13 Luhmann 2004 supra footnote 3, p. 148: “Concretely, law deals with the function of the stabiliza-
tion of normative expectations by regulating how they are generalized in relation to their tempo-
ral, factual, and social dimensions. Law makes it possible to know which expectations will meet 
with social approval and which not.” [footnote omitted].
14 Luhmann 2004 supra footnote 3, p. 80.
15 Id., p. 94.
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of the legal system. This process is called ‘dedifferentiation’ by Luhmann. The 
dedifferentiation of the legal system means that legal norms are supplemented by 
other considerations irrelevant to the code and programming of the legal system. 
King and Thorhnhill define dedifferentiation in the following way:
Where law’s institutions (courts, tribunals, statutory drafting, prosecution services), 
for example, put into effect the policies of the government without giving due con-
sideration to their legal applicability, overtly base their decisions upon the supposed 
reliability of witnesses who have wealthy connections, delegate responsibility for 
deciding cases to panels of scientific experts, actively seek to promote people’s well-
being or protect them from harm or leave matters to be decided by God’s will, the 
legal system will have become dedifferentiated.16
Two components of modern law serve to maintain the differentiation of the legal 
system: a conditional programmes structure of law and organisational closure 
based on one binary code made up of only two values, legality and illegality. The 
separation of substantive and procedural law17 is one of the evolutionary steps in 
the developments of positive law, which has permitted the introduction of a struc-
ture of conditional programmes into law (of the type ‘if, then’). The conditional 
programmes form the architecture of modern legal systems and guarantee the 
existence of a differentiated legal system. The conditional programmes of law bind 
judges in their task of making decisions, while limiting their responsibility regard-
ing the consequences of those decisions in the social system. The conditional pro-
grammes of law also participate in the stabilisation of law by preventing a change 
of legal norms even when they fail to respond to their anticipated benefits.18
Even when the legal system has achieved the stage of an independent normative 
order, it is still under the constant threat of dedifferentiation. Differentiated legal 
systems are constantly subjected to pressure asking for material expectations to be 
integrated in the normative order. This is so because social systems located in the 
legal system’s environment continuously produce communications that irritate 
the legal system. The different social systems may not communicate with each 
other but can ‘irritate’ one another through their respective environments, which 
contain every other communication of society. These communications are forcing 
their way into the legal system to modify the conditional programmes of laws.
Every social system is cognitively open to its environment through the structural 
couplings it has with other systems. The cognitive openness of systems allows 
16 King & Thornhill 2006 supra footnote 9, p. 41.
17 Niklas Luhmann, La légitimation par la procédure, Presses de l’Université Laval, Québec, 2001, 
p. 63. The differentiated legal system separates on the one side ‘the supply sector of premises 
to legal decisions’, characterized primarily by legislation, and on the other, the source of ‘factual 
premises for decision’ situated in the jurisdiction. In this way, the institutions that determine the 
facts (and therefore truth) and those that establish the law are distinct and socially separated; 
they are only confronted at the time of the judiciary proceedings.
18 King & Thornhill 2006 supra footnote 9, p. 16.
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them to learn about expectations coming from other social systems. Structural 
couplings will occur when the operations of one system trigger a response from 
another system.19 In such a case, an event will provoke a response in each system 
of communication, although it will not be interpreted in the same way because 
of the difference in coding and programming. Because the system’s closure is 
a semantic closure, communications will not have the same meaning in every 
system. Legislation is an example of structural coupling between the legal and the 
political systems.20 Legislation is communication relevant to both systems but it is 
not treated in the same way by each of them. While the political system may have 
a specific policy objective when proposing the adoption of legislation, once this 
policy is translated into a legal norm, it is treated differently in the legal system 
where only conditional programmes and a single binary code are allowed.
3. The Courts in Differentiated Societies
Now that we have gone through the essentials of systems theory epistemology, it 
is time to address the focal point of this paper, that is, whether Niklas Luhmann’s 
systems theory provides a better understanding of how judicial independence can 
be protected in modern legal systems.
Like many sociologists before him, Luhmann studied the changes in societal 
evolution over time. He made the postulate of a transformation of the social 
structure in three successive phases: segmentation, stratification and functional 
differentiation. For Luhmann, the structure of law followed the transformation 
of the social organisation and has gone through the same phases of structural 
changes. Thus, the law has evolved from a state of segmentation where the social 
structure was essentially based on parental and tribal relationships, to a state of 
stratification, where law and the exercise of power were ranked according to social 
prestige, wealth or domination by a superior class over others, to the last stage of 
differentiation where the social organisation is neither horizontal nor vertical, but 
functional.
The functional differentiation of law can only be achieved when the production 
of legal rules are separated from systems of legitimation. The American sociolo-
gist Talcott Parsons placed the functional differentiation of law among the few 
evolutionary universals of societies. For him, the development of an independent 
normative order is one of the hallmarks of modernity.21 He defined the independ-
ent legal order as follows:
A general legal system is an integrated system of universalistic norms, applicable to 
the society as a whole rather than to a few functional or segmental sectors, highly 
19 Luhmann 2004 supra footnote 3, p. 42-43.
20 King & Thornhill 2006 supra footnote 9, p. 44.
21 Talcott Parsons, Evolutionary Universals in Society, American Sociological Review 1964, 3, p. 353.
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generalized in terms of principles and standards, and relatively independent of both 
the religious agencies that legitimize the normative order of the society and vested 
interest groups in the operative sector, particularly in government.22
For Parsons, the establishment of the organisational independence of the judiciary 
was the crucial symbolic development which accompanied the institutionalisation 
of an independent normative order. In a universalistic system of rules, symbolised 
by positive law, the validity of legal norms is not made contingent upon its iden-
tification to religious or moral norms. Positive law is a distinctive system of law 
where the formalisation of procedural rules is independent of substantive legal 
rules. In democratic societies, the definition of substantive legal rules is the main 
responsibility of elected legislators, while the judiciary is entrusted with the task 
of applying substantive legal rules while following a well-defined set of procedural 
rules.
But in modern legal systems, the legislator often fails to respond to individual and 
collective normative expectations while the judiciary is pressured into deciding 
the legality of normative expectations that have been rejected by the legislative 
system. Normative expectations rejected by the legislative system are trying to 
make their way into the legal system. Unlike the legislative system, the judicial 
system does not control the type of cases that are brought before it. Furthermore, 
because of the prohibition of the denial of justice, the courts are forced to decide 
the legality of these expectations even in the absence of applicable norms for the 
solution of the legal dispute. As a result, the distinction between substantive and 
procedural law, which lies at the very foundation of positive law, becomes blurred 
by this new role of the courts that formulate the legal norms they have to apply.23
In Law as a Social System, Luhmann argued that because of the prohibition of the 
denial of justice, courts are placed in an exceptional position in the centre of the 
legal system.24 The prohibition of the denial of justice is present in the French, 
22 Id., p. 351.
23 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd. supra (footnote 2), para. 51: “The judiciary has 
some part in the development of the law that its role requires it to apply. Through, for example, 
its interpretation of legislation, review of administrative decisions and assessment of the consti-
tutionality of legislation, it may develop the law significantly. It may also make incremental devel-
opments to its body of previous decisions – i.e., the common law – in order to bring the legal 
rules those decisions embody into step with a changing society”: R. v. Salituro, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 
654, at p. 666.
24 Luhmann 2004 supra footnote 3, p. 275.
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German and the Swiss civil codes,25 as well as in the Quebec Interpretation Act.26 
Under this principle, judges cannot refuse to decide because of a lack of applicable 
norms or rules. The courts of autopoietic systems of law are internally different in 
the legal system. They operate in the centre of the legal system, while other struc-
tures (parliaments, lawyers, clients) are placed in the periphery of the system.27 
In this position of relative isolation, the courts regulate the operations of the legal 
system. These operations are restricted to the code and programmes of law. As 
we have seen earlier, the application of a third value is excluded. The court’s duty 
is to apply only one or the other side of the binary code, depending on what the 
conditional programmes of law provide in relation to the specific fact-pattern it 
has to decide.
In that sense, we can say, as the Supreme Court of Canada in the Mackin case 
did regarding the relationship between courts and others, that the differentiation 
of courts in the legal system operates an ‘intellectual separation’28 between the 
norms and the irritants which are trying to make their way into judicial decision 
making. This separation is even more necessary in democratic societies where the 
political system controls the legislature and judicial intervention is increasingly 
sought to force a change in the law.
4. Judicial Independence versus Judicial Responsibility
The problem of judicial independence in complex societies lies in the constant 
requests made to the courts for a change to the law through judicial interpreta-
tion. These demands have put a considerable burden on the judiciary. Judges are 
now faced with the difficult task of deciding conflicts of values and solve prob-
lems that should have been dealt with by other social systems. It is not difficult to 
imagine how the pressure to decide cases even in the absence of applicable legal 
25 In article 4 of the French Civil Code, it is stated that the judge cannot refuse to decide (transla-
tion) under the pretext of silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law (“Le juge qui refusera de 
juger, sous prétexte du silence, de l’obscurité ou de l’insuffisance de la loi, pourra être pour-
suivi comme coupable de déni de justice.”). Furthermore, in article 5, it is expressly stated that 
the judge cannot act as legislator to overcome the insufficiencies of the law (Il est défendu aux 
juges de prononcer par voie de disposition générale et réglementaire sur les causes qui leur sont 
soumises). There is thus a double interdiction placed on the judge, one being to refuse to decide 
in the absence of law and the other to make general rules.
26 Interpretation Act, RSQ, c. I-16: 41.2. A judge cannot refuse to adjudicate under pretext of the 
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.
27 Nobles & Schiff 2013 supra footnote 8, p. 31.
28 Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice c. New Brunswick, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405, para. 
37: “The concept of independence accordingly refers essentially to the nature of the relationship 
between a court and others. This relationship must be marked by a form of intellectual separa-
tion that allows the judge to render decisions based solely on the requirements of the law and 
justice. The legal standards governing judicial independence, which are the sources governing 
the creation and protection of the independent status of judges and the courts, serve to institu-
tionalize this separation.” (emphasis added).
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norms may have on the impartiality and independence of the judiciary. One of 
the consequences that this combination of the prohibition of the denial of justice 
and the increase mobilisation of the judiciary to solve political or social conflicts 
has on judicial independence, is that judges are asked to take into account the 
effects of their decision in the social system. The tendency to make the justice 
system and judges ‘responsible’ or ‘accountable’ for the consequences of legal deci-
sions threatens the autonomy of the legal system, because it introduces a criterion 
of social  relevancy into decision making.29 Law is constructed on a conditional 
programmes structure of the type, if – then30 which prevents “any future facts, 
not accounted for at the time of the decision, from being relevant to a decision 
concerning legal or illegal”.31
Judicial independence relies on the differentiation of a legal system working in a 
conditional programmes structure, as opposed to a purpose-specific programmes 
structure, which is oriented towards the achievement of predetermined outcomes, 
either political, economic or other. Under such a conditional programmes struc-
ture, judges are not requested to consider the objectives pursued by the norma-
tive system, nor are they required to verify whether the decisions will achieve the 
intended results. Furthermore, the legally imposed condition that decisions be 
made by an independent and impartial judge presupposes that it will be taken by 
a judge who is free of his other social relationships, whether parental, political, 
financial, or even moral or religious etc. Since the decision must be based solely 
on the law and the facts that are presented before the judge, he or she cannot be 
criticised on the basis of considerations that have not been taken into account 
in the process leading to the decision. By justifying his decision solely on the 
basis of written rules and recognised precedents, the judge frees himself from the 
un desired consequences of his decisions in the social system. Furthermore, by 
preventing situations where a judge has prejudged of the outcome of the applica-
tion of the (legal/illegal) binary code in a decision, the principle of impartiality 
preserves uncertainty as to the outcome of litigation. The guarantee that judges 
will decide solely on the law and the facts proven before them ensures an almost 
complete neutralisation of the possible influence of their other social roles.
Judicial independence is both the condition and the consequence of the internal 
differentiation of courts in the legal system. Courts have to be insulated from 
the irritations of the environment of the legal system. It is in the centre of the 
legal system where judges are best protected from the pressures coming from 
the political system. Judicial independence is also a consequence of this central 
position where judges who benefit from the essential elements of judicial indepen-
dence (security of tenure, financial security and administrative independence) can 
be shielded from criticism regarding the adverse effects of their decisions in the 
29 Valois 2013 supra footnote 5.
30 Luhmann 2004 supra footnote 3, p. 197.
31 Id., p. 198.
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social system.32 Accountability must be reserved for government officials whose 
decisions are oriented towards goal-attainment objectives and who are elected on 
the basis that they will implement specific programmes.
Judicial independence also participates in the differentiation of the legal system 
and the political system. In the 1997 Provincial Judge Reference, the Supreme Court 
of Canada held that the three components of security of tenure, financial secu-
rity and administrative independence derive from the “constitutional imperative 
that, to the extent possible, the relationship between the judiciary and the other 
branches of government be depoliticized”.33 In systems theory, this constitutional 
requirement is only another way of saying that the legal system is functionally 
differentiated from the political system and that communications about the legal 
principle of judicial independence are relevant to the legal system, not the political 
system. Thus, when courts claim that they guarantee the rule of law, they contrib-
ute to the preservation of the differentiation of law. Only an independent judicial 
system can safeguard the rule of law, because the legislature is too close to the 
political system, and contract is bound by to the instrumental considerations of 
the parties interested in the law. As ‘central guardians of the rule of law’,34 courts 
are essential to the maintenance of an independent normative order. Who but the 
judges can delimit the boundaries between the legal and the political systems? In 
a recent Supreme Court of Canada’s decision concerning the constitutionality of 
supervised drug injection sites, Chief Justice McLachlin reminded the federal gov-
ernment that once translated into law, governmental policy choices are no longer 
relevant to the political system and must be treated as communications belonging 
to the legal system.35 The Court also pointed out to the government that moral 
considerations were irrelevant to the issue of the constitutionality of legislation.36
32 Id., p. 202: “The more a decision is supported by such purpose-specific reasons, the higher the 
probability that it is wrong; for the future remains unknown – even to judges. Purpose-specific 
reasons expose judges to empirical criticism, which leaves only the authority of office and the 
necessity of decision-making to render judicial decisions valid.”
33 Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court (P.E.I.), [1997] 3 S.C.R., para. 131.
34 Ell v. Alberta, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 857, para. 31.
35 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, para 105: “The 
issue of illegal drug use and addiction is a complex one which attracts a variety of social, politi-
cal, scientific and moral reactions. There is room for disagreement between reasonable people 
concerning how addiction should be treated. It is for the relevant governments, not the Court, 
to make criminal and health policy. However, when a policy is translated into law or state action, 
those laws and actions are subject to scrutiny under the Charter”.
36 Id., para. 102: “The second strand of Canada’s choice argument is a moral argument that those 
who commit crimes should be made to suffer the consequences. On this point it suffices to say 
that whether a law limits a Charter right is simply a matter of the purpose and effect of the law 
that is challenged, not whether the law is right or wrong. The morality of the activity the law regu-
lates is irrelevant at the initial stage of determining whether the law engages a s. 7 right.”
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5. Conclusion
In Weber’s sociology of law, the empirical validity is the meaning ascribed to a 
legal rule by the actors or, in other words, the shared understanding of its validity 
and enforceability.37 The sociological validity of a rule can only be determined 
empirically; precedents or legal rules of interpretation are of no help in that deter-
mination, although they might be of great assistance in assessing the juridical 
validity. To be really effective, the constitutionally guaranteed principle of judicial 
independence depends on the existence of sociological conditions that serve as 
empirical foundations to its legal validity. As we have tried to demonstrate, these 
sociological requisites are the preservation of the conditional programmes of law 
and the limitation of the judges’ responsibility for the consequences of their deci-
sions in the social system. It is under these sociological conditions that the legal 
principle of judicial independence can acquire its empirical validity in the legal 
system.
At the level of the legal system, the principle of judicial independence preserves 
the uncertainty as to the outcome of litigation and contributes to limit the respon-
sibility of judges for the consequences of their decisions in the social system. 
Judicial independence participates in the autonomy of the judicial system, and 
in the autonomy of law as a universal, general, and conditional normative order. 
The keystone to a strong principle of judicial independence is the independence of 
law from other systems of legitimation such as politics, religion and the market, 
and a tradition of respect for the judicial role in the legal system. That tradition 
of respect is one of the most important element in the evaluation of the empirical 
validity of the principle of judicial independence. As we have seen, in the British 
legal tradition and in Canada, the lack of a norm of judicial independence in a 
written constitution was not a bar to the recognition of a strong principle of judi-
cial independence mostly based on tradition.38
The determination of the scope of the protection provided by judicial independence 
is the key to preserving the internal boundaries of the legal system, which keeps 
courts at a distance from the law’s other sub-systems. The norm of judicial inde-
pendence effects the separation that must exist between the law and the extrane-
ous influences that seek to introduce themselves into judicial decision-making.39 
As guardians of the rule of law, judges are the keepers of this separation between 
the law and the irritants of the legal system’s environment.40 The autonomy of law 
depends on this capacity of the judiciary to maintain that buffer zone between 
37 Weber 2001 supra footnote 7, p. 130.
38 Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, para. 34: “Lord Sankey, L.C., said in Parliament: The 
independence and prestige which our judges have enjoyed in their position have rested far more 
upon the great tradition and long usage with which they have always been surrounded, than 
upon any Statute. The greatest safeguard of all may be found along these lines for traditions 
cannot be repealed, but an Act of Parliament can be.”
39 Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick, supra, footnote 28, para. 35.
40 Valois 2013 supra footnote 5.
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law and politics.41 The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the Insite case is a 
remarkable example of how judges can stand up to the politicians. Unfortunately, 
even in democratic countries, judges do not always dare to do it.42
In the Provincial Judges Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada established a 
strong precedent for the protection of judicial independence and the autonomy 
of law. Despite the harsh criticism directed towards the Court in the aftermath 
of the decision, the scope given to the principle of judicial independence by the 
Court was praised for in other jurisdictions.43 The fear of a ‘government of judges’ 
should never make one forget that only courts can enforce the legal limits which 
check political authority and prevent the abuse of power.
41 Amnon Reichman, Judicial Non-dependence: Operational Closure, Cognitive Openness, and the 
Underlying Rationale of the Provincial Judges Reference – The Israeli Perspective, in Adam Dodek 
& Lorne Sossin (eds.), Judicial Independence in Context, Irwin Law, Toronto, 2010
42 In Israel, the Supreme Court upheld the legal validity of a coalition agreement between the Labor 
Party and Shas which instituted a committee composed of five lawyers and a retired judge whose 
task was to review judicial decision of the Israeli Supreme Court and determine if it kept in line 
with the status quo in matters of religion: HCJ 5364/94 Velner v. Chairman of the Labor Party, 
IsrSC 49(1) 758 (1994) referred to in Reichman (2010) supra footnote 41, p. 441.
43 Id.
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1. Introduction
In the opening speech for a theme conference a couple of years ago on judicial 
activism at Georgetown University, retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor stated:
Directing anger toward judges has had a long tradition in our nation… While scorn 
for some judges is not altogether new, I do think that the breadth of the unhappiness 
being currently expressed, not only by public officials but in public opinion polls in 
the nation, shows that there is a level of unhappiness today that perhaps is greater 
than in the past and is certainly cause for great concern.1
This statement by a former Justice of the US Supreme Court reveals an evident 
and somehow disturbing aspect characterizing the role of the judiciary not only in 
the US, but in almost all well-established Western democracies: judicial activism, 
and in general the role judges play in the political game, one of hottest topics of 
debate inside the legal world.2 As Justice O’Connor’s words show, this discussion 
not only affects the intricate relations judicial power has with its surrounding 
environments, but also the (Hartian) normative perspective as to the issue, i.e. the 
self-vision judges (and the legal world) have of themselves and their role in this 
network of relations.3
Since judicial activism primarily focuses on the point of the relations between law 
and politics, the main purpose of this article is to evaluate whether Constitutional 
Courts should be considered as simply ‘markers’ of the constitution, i.e. legal actors 
simply enforcing that written by political actors in statutes and constitutions, or 
as ‘makers’ of the constitution, i.e. institutional actors with a predominant nature 
* Prof. dr. M. Zamboni is Professor at the Faculty of Law, Stockholm University, Sweden and Visit-
ing Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, the Netherlands.
1 See Sandra Day O’Connor, Importance of an Independent Judiciary (Conference on the State of 
the Judiciary), available at <www.law.georgetown.edu/webcast/eventDetail.cfm?eventID=178>.
2 See, e.g., European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), The Binding 
Effect of Federal Constitutional Court Decisions upon Political Institutions (available at <www.
venice.coe.int/docs/2003/CDL-JU(2003)018-e.pdf>).
3 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd Ed.), Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 239. See also 
H.L.A. Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Phi-
losophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 103-105.
*
70
I – Independence and the Rule of Law
of being political in determining what the law should say. This investigation con-
siders in particular not only the function Constitutional Courts play as a bridge 
between law and politics, but also the very positioning of this bridge. These results 
are of particular importance in determining what the existence of this point of 
passage between law and politics implies, on one hand, whether these courts are 
a necessary requirement for the concept of democracy and, on the other, whether 
primarily ‘political’ criteria that need to be fulfilled, particularly the requirement 
of being ‘democratic,’ are applicable to such courts.
The basic thesis of this work is that Constitutional Courts, though playing a 
bridging role between the political and legal worlds, from an institutional and 
functional perspective are still primarily legal actors. These Courts play without 
doubt a role in the political game; however their location as an institutional actor 
should be based on the direct effects of their decisions (‘outputs’) within the legal 
arena rather than on their indirect consequences (‘outcomes’) in the political 
arena. Thus the primary responsibility of Constitutional Courts is towards the 
legal community and the paradigms governing its discourse. By underscoring the 
legal nature and function of these courts, it is also possible to offer some criteria 
for moulding the ideal-typical structure of a Constitutional Court, namely a court 
that in its formation and working is truly independent from both the political 
and socio-economic arenas. In order to preserve in particular the legal nature of 
the Courts towards the political and social actors, this work suggests a shift of 
focus in the reforms from substantive decisions to more ‘democratic’ procedures 
in Constitutional Courts.
This article certainly makes no pretense of providing any final words either in 
the discussion on judicial activism or as to the relations between the legal and 
political worlds in general, whatever the ‘solution’.4 The focus here is also solely 
on Western legal systems. This work has the more limited objective of contribut-
ing to clarifying the terms of the discussion, in particular by finding a solid base 
(at least from a legal perspective) from which to begin the discussion on whether 
judicial activism is good or bad. In other words, this investigation has primarily 
a legal theoretical task, at least in a loose Hartian meaning of the words: To clarify 
that meant when the legal discussion deals with the ‘political’ in the work of Con-
stitutional Courts.
After defining certain key-concepts used in this article, the focus in Part II is 
on the importance of judicial activism when dealing in particular with Consti-
tutional Courts. Part III views the typical features of Constitutional Courts in 
well-established Western democracies, i.e. their ‘in-the-middle’ position between 
the legal and political arenas. The central Parts IV and V then identify why the 
characterization of Constitutional Courts, as either legal or political actors, is so 
relevant from a legal perspective, both in descriptive and normative terms. These 
parts also explore how it is possible, at least from a legal theoretical perspective, to 
4 See Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 231.
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resolve the dilemma of ‘legal vs. political actors’ by defining Constitutional Courts 
as legal actors performing a political function.
Based on this legal theoretical characterization, the final Parts VI and VII sketch 
certain of the consequences as far as concerns the relevance of questioning an 
‘activist’ Constitutional Courts in relation to the idea of democracy. In particular, 
Part VII examines the necessity of shifting the focus of attention, when dissecting 
the necessity of Constitutional Courts more in-line with the ideal of democracy, 
from a substantive perspective to more procedural standpoints.
2. Some Definitions
Before starting, definitions must be clarified with respect to some of the concepts 
used throughout the text. First, judicial activism, though sometimes also referred 
to under different guises (e.g. ‘constitutional politics,’ ‘government of judges’ or 
‘judicialization of politics’), identifies in general the phenomenon, typical (but 
not only) of well-established Western democracies, when ‘courts impose a judicial 
solution over an issue erstwhile subject to political resolution’ by intervening and 
striking down a part of properly enacted legislation, or by ‘legislating’ in an area 
in the absence of legislation.5 Judicial activism then identifies a judicial activity 
directed at stretching the formal structures and letter of the law (in particular 
at the constitutional level) in order to fill gaps left by politicians. This is done by 
judges in order to implement those values the political actors are unable to sense 
in the community, or are unable to transform into legislative measures, or simply 
those that are part of the political baggage of certain judges.
Second, when referring to Constitutional Courts, included here are all the highest 
courts that although under different names (e.g. High Council or Supreme Court), 
have among their legal duties the jurisdiction to evaluate the constitutionality, 
i.e. the consistency or conflict of legally relevant documents produced in a cer-
tain legal system in reference to the basic legal documents of a community. Such 
courts are also characterized, at least with respect to conducting constitutional 
reviews, for being positioned somehow outside the ordinary court system and for 
their work being completely independent (at least in their working modalities) 
of the other branches of public authority. For this reason, the other fundamental 
function of Constitutional Courts is often to eventually resolve conflicts between 
these different branches, in particular in terms of that defined as legally compe-
tence according to the constitutional document or fundamental law.
5 David L. Anderson, When Restraint Requires Activism: Partisan Gerrymandering and the Status 
Quo Ante, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 6, 1990, p. 1570. See also Robert H. Bork, The Tempt-
ing of America: The Political Seduction of the Law, Touchstone, New York, 1991 and, for a more 
articulated definition of the term ‘activism’, Mark V. Tushnet, Tushnet: Comment on Cox, Mary-
land Law Review 1987, p. 147-153 and Greg Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, Regent University Law 
Review, Vol. 14, 2002, No. 1, p. 142-145.
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It is worth noting that under this definitional umbrella, several types of Constitu-
tional Courts can find a place. In particular, this definition allows placing under 
scrutiny both Constitutional Courts that have an abstract review competence (i.e. 
when a Constitutional Court is asked to decide the compatibility of statutory law 
with the Constitution at the request of non-judicial public bodies, e.g. a law-draft-
ing committee of the National Assembly or a regional government), and those 
who have a more concrete review power (i.e. when a Constitutional Court’s review 
jurisdiction is activated by a party to litigation pleading that a law violates the 
constitutional texts).
Third, the definition of political actors adopted here is fairly different from that 
used by the other discipline that also investigates the role of Constitutional Courts 
in and towards the political system, political science. While for the latter political 
actors are more or less identified with all the institutional actors that ‘make the 
law,’ by political actors in this article, at least from a legal perspective, is intended 
a narrower range of institutional entities whose primary goal is to see their values 
implemented into a community by making use of the legal apparatus and system, 
e.g. political parties or interests-groups. Political actors can (and usually do) have 
a primary goal of a non-legal nature (e.g. economic nature) and therefore mainly 
take into consideration the surrounding political environment. Moreover, their 
primary intent is to influence people into adopting a certain model of behavior 
by means of convincing the addressees of the ‘inner goodness’ of their model.6
Finally, particularly in Western legal systems, legal actors can be defined as those 
institutional actors primarily aiming at affecting the legal system, and therefore, 
mainly focusing on the latter’s logical structure.7 Similarly to political actors, the 
main goal for legal actors is to exercise power, i.e. the concrete capacity of forcing 
people to do things that they otherwise are not willing to do.8 As pointed out by 
Hans Kelsen, both law and politics try to make people do something, the law 
being ‘a social order, that is to say an order regulating the mutual behavior of 
human beings.’9 However, that important for a legal actor dealing with a statute or 
legal precedent is these exist and exercise their (binding) power on the addressees 
only as part of a larger hierarchical system of norms with a similar (legal) nature, 
6 See Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, Law and Society 
Review, Vol. 17, 1983, No. 2, p. 259.
7 See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (G. Roth & C. Wittich 
eds.), University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, p. 657. See also Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal 
Positivism, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2002, p. 36-39.
8 See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (T. Parsons ed.), Free Press, 
Glencoe, Illinois, 1964, p. 152.
9 See Hans Kelsen, Law, State, and Justice in the Pure Theory of Law, in H. Kelsen, What is justice? 
Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1957, 
p. 289.
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and according to specific (legal) rules to be used for interpretation, application and 
creation (legal reasoning).10
3. The Importance of Judicial Activism by Constitutional Courts
The ‘creative’ interpretation, or judicial activism, of legal texts is a phenomenon 
generally characterizing all courts in a legal system, from the lowest county court 
to the highest court. However, despite that asserted in general by some socio-
legal scholars, judicial activism somehow becomes a ‘more evident’ issue when 
addressed by and to Constitutional Courts (and all the highest courts in general, 
e.g. the French Court of Cassation).
Using Niklas Luhmann’s distinction between the social system and other sub- 
systems internal to it, it is first possible to see that the judicial activism taking 
place by Constitutional Courts tends to become more visible because it normally 
deals with fundamental questions relevant to all the other sub-systems, i.e. ques-
tions that by their nature can affect not only the legal or political arenas, but every 
arena and every person of a national community. Decision-making by Constitu-
tional Courts has as its object the fundamental laws of a community, and one of 
the features of well-established democracy is the (actual or potential) intrusion of 
the law in all the aspects of community life.11 Moreover, the typically high degree 
of social legitimacy Constitutional Courts possess, i.e. among all actors of a cer-
tain community, contributes to rendering every decision taken by these courts 
more than simply a question of law and politics.
When judicial activism takes place at the constitutional level, as a consequence 
it potentially reaches out to the social community at large, or at least, using Luh-
mann’s terminology, it creates ‘noises’ that can somehow ‘disturb’ the internal 
work (autopoiesis) of all the other subsystems.12 This is valid both for Consti-
tutional Courts with a jurisdiction of abstract review and also for those with a 
more concrete review jurisdiction. For example, in a specific euthanasia case, a 
Constitutional Court’s decision can face issues relevant for cultural or religious 
subsystems, namely the general question of how far the State can interfere with 
individual rights, or whether the ‘right to live’ includes also the necessity for the 
10 See Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1970, p. 3-4, 
193. See also Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1996 [1934], p. 11: “To comprehend something legally can only be to comprehend it as law.”
11 See Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalisation Around the North Atlantic, Modern Law Review, 
Vol. 55, 1992, No. 1, p. 13-14. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, Total Justice, Russell Sage Founda-
tion, New York , 1985, p. 147-152; Lawrence M. Friedman, The Republic of Choice: Law, Authority, 
and Culture, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998, p. 15; Niklas Luhmann, 
Law as a Social System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, p. 273; and Antonie A.G. Peters, 
Law as Critical Discussion, in G. Teubner (ed.), Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare State, Walter de 
Gruyter, Berlin, 1988, p. 252-254. 
12 See Gunther Teubner, Law as an autopoietic system, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, chapter 5.
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public authorities to implement this right against the consensus of the ‘owner’ of 
such right.
The second factor underlying the importance of judicial activism by Constitu-
tional Courts has to do to their being the highest judicial body of a legal system. 
From a more specific legal sub-system perspective, judicial activism is important 
throughout all the levels of the judicial system. However, in the majority of cases, 
it is questionable whether lower level judicial law-making, though directly impor-
tant for the community, can actually in an indirect way influence the higher level. 
For instance, a county court’s law-making interpretation of a specific county coun-
cil directive on shop-licenses to allow for a certain kind of business in town tends, 
for natural reasons derived by its limited jurisdiction, to have an impact confined 
to the local implementing administrative offices. On the other hand, even such a 
simple issue in the exceptional case can occasionally have reverberations through-
out the entire judicial system, for example when it is a question of a pornography 
shop and freedom of speech.
When it comes to Constitutional Courts, their influence as a rule transcends all 
lower and intermediate levels, affecting the entirety of the legal structure, i.e. 
including the lower structure, and a large part of the political world. This influ-
ence, and consequently relevance of constitutional judicial activism over all that 
is legal and political, is both due to the very structure of the legal system (i.e. its 
being hierarchical) and for the typically high degree of legal legitimacy these types 
of courts have gained historically from the actors belonging to the legal arena. The 
centrality of the law-making of the Constitutional Courts is also recognizable in 
the fact that, when discussing judicial activism, most critical voices, whether in 
academia, politics or the judiciary, end up in with these Courts as main targets 
(and not the lower courts).
4. ‘Makers’ vs. ‘Markers’: Constitutional Courts as ‘in-the-middle’ Actors
When dealing with the issue of Constitutional Courts in relation to politics, the 
first question is where these institutional actors should be positioned on an imagi-
nary map on which there are two ideal-typical continents, namely the legal world 
and the political world. The role played by the courts in general and the Constitu-
tional Courts in particular is extremely important in every legal system, in both 
the legal and political systems.13
As far as concerns the legal system, Constitutional Courts are ranked at the top, 
being the supreme and ultimate interpreters of the constitution and consequently, 
of the constitutionality of different law-making measures, in particular (but not 
13 See, e.g., generally Bruce Ackerman (ed.), Bush v. Gore. The Question of Legitimacy, Yale Univer-
sity Press, New Haven, 2002, where a decision of the Supreme Court is analyzed by looking at 
its effects both in the legal as well as in the political worlds.
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exclusively) statutes. Constitutional review is the legal competence allowing the 
courts to enjoy an exclusive decision-making power and a legal superiority in rela-
tion to the other branches of power.14
In addition to this central position within the legal structure, Constitutional 
Courts also tend to occupy a dominant place in the political building characteriz-
ing a democratic form of state. Constitutional Courts are entrusted by the political 
system (and through it by the community as such) as the ultimate guardians of 
the basic values that inspired the Founding Fathers and Mothers when writing the 
fundamental documents (or in establishing the fundamental customs) underpin-
ning and regulating the life of the political community.
If seen from the perspective of the relations of law and politics, however, one can 
assert that Constitutional Courts actually occupy a third position at a much deeper 
level, functioning as a sort of transfer point between the legal and political worlds. 
If one considers the primary (though often implicit in the building of a modern 
democracy) position occupied by Constitutional Courts, this can be identified as a 
bridge between values produced in the political world and legal thinking.15 Due to 
their ‘in-the-middle’ position, and their consequent relevance both for the political 
and the legal worlds, it is not then surprising that Constitutional Courts have been 
the favorite target of investigations by the discipline primarily concerned with the 
political world and its surroundings, namely political science.
As previously seen, the primary function of a Constitutional Court is constitu-
tional review, i.e. to continuously monitor the compatibility of legislation and other 
normative measures with the basic values as announced in the constitution or 
fundamental law. The basic problem, at least from a legal perspective, is that the 
constitution is legal in nature, i.e. it is binding towards the addressees. Its mes-
sage, however, namely the models of behaviors prescribed, is heavily affected by 
the fact that constitutions are not only written by political actors (as are most legal 
measures) but that they also often are the product of extremely complex political 
compromises or very general political statements. Their being a political product, 
the constitution or fundamental law tends to be written less in legal terms, i.e. in 
terms of (at least in the intention) ‘if-x-then-y’ or ‘either-or’ statements, and more 
in terms of political messages, i.e. in terms that resemble the political propaganda, 
where the fundamental goals to be achieved in the community are designed in 
terms of models of behavior the political actors want to be ‘realized’ in the com-
munity itself.16
14 See, e.g., the landmark decision by US Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 177 
(1803).
15 See, e.g., the debate on the French Constitutional Council as reported by Martin Shapiro & Alex 
Sweet Stone, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p. 81.
16 “One lesson of American constitutional experience is that words of each provision in the Bill of 
Rights tend to take on a life of their own, becoming the obsessive catchphrase for expressing 
everything one might want to say about the right in question.”, see Waldron 2001 supra, p. 220.
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On the other end, constitutional documents are regarded for historical reasons 
as the highest sources of law in Western legal systems. This means that they are 
treated as legal documents, having the strongest binding force on all the national 
law-making and law-applying agencies and the community as well. In other 
words, constitutions or fundamental laws in general have a content that tends to 
be dominated by the logics of the political discourse, but is inserted into a shell 
which has the form of a law, shaping and somehow determining the agenda for 
the entire legal arena of a certain community.17
Since the primary goal of a Constitutional Court is somehow to ‘guard’ such docu-
ments, how this institutional actor tends to end up being a sort of ‘in-the-middle’ 
actor is easily understood. Three different features affect Constitutional Courts, 
rendering it an actor that though they have their feet in the legal world, they tend 
to lean heavily towards the political arena.
First, Constitutional Courts are an ‘in-the-middle’ actor from an institutional 
perspective, i.e. from the perspective of where these courts are positioned among 
the different organizations in a certain community having the primary goal of 
governing the behavior of individuals, characterized for being permanent as well 
as making and enforcing rules governing human behavior. Constitutional Courts 
are in the middle in the sense that their institutional position as an intermedi-
ary link between the political actors, is represented in particular by the various 
assemblies with law-making powers, and the legal actors, mostly in the forms of 
judges and all the legal apparatus, having as a primary duty the implementation 
of the product of the political law-making.
A Constitutional Court has the position of being a legal institution, i.e. an organiza-
tion constructed for taking care of certain important legal issues from a legal per-
spective, namely the constitutional review of statutes and other legal documents, 
and not, for example, the political opportunity of statutes. At the same time, a Con-
stitutional Court indirectly places the activities and operations of political actors, 
such as national or local assemblies, under scrutiny. It is true that its evaluation is 
directly legal in nature, but it is also true that the main voice political actors have, 
at least in a democratic form of a state that has adopted rule of law, is the law. Each 
time Constitutional Courts modify, approve or even remain silent as to that which 
political actors have expressed through the law, the courts operate in the political 
institutional arena, particularly by allowing or disallowing certain political actors 
to produce statements that are directly relevant and binding for the entire com-
munity from which such actors have been (directly or indirectly) chosen. In other 
words, Constitutional Courts are ‘in-the-middle’ institutional actors because they 
are gate-keepers, allowing the actors operating in the political world to be heard 
(or not) in the legal world.
17 See Waldron 2001 supra, p. 221-222, calling for not formalizing rights into a fixed constitutional 
document due to their very political nature (and therefore adaptable to the wishes of the repre-
sentative institutions).
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At the side of this institutional factor, i.e. concerning the very location of Consti-
tutional Courts among the different actors, a second factor operates from a struc-
tural perspective in such a way as to render Constitutional Courts as ‘in-the-middle’ 
actors between the political and legal arenas; this factor has to do with the element 
characterizing the configuration of these highest courts as different from that of 
other types of courts.
It has previously been mentioned how Constitutional Courts reside outside of the 
ordinary court system and are independent from other branches of the public 
authorities. However, Constitutional Courts always tend to present a certain 
‘structural cohesion’ with the actors belonging to the political arena. By this is 
meant that almost all Western legal systems have foreseen that political actors, 
either as legislators or within the executive branch, can have partial (as in Italy) 
or total (as in the US) control as far as concerns the individuals who are to sit as 
justices in the Constitutional Courts. As a consequence, the political arena and 
the ideologies prevailing within it, by means of the legal power to decide who will 
be justices, affect and somehow overlap the very structure of the courts and their 
fundamental components.
Despite this important political influence in deciding the structure of Constitu-
tional Courts, these courts cannot be considered as having a pure and exclusive 
‘political structure’. This type of structure, when it occurs at least in Western legal 
systems, is of an exceptional nature, such as for revolutionary courts (e.g. during 
the French revolution) or for ‘people courts’ in totalitarian states (e.g. in Germany 
during the last years of World War II). On the contrary, though they can (and 
often are) politicized individuals. The predominant feature of individuals sitting 
on Constitutional Courts normally is that they are always chosen from among 
lawyers or individuals with formal education in law.
In other words, even when all justices are chosen based on political considera-
tions, and according to their personal political ideologies and affiliation, the selec-
tion process is limited (either by law or by constitutional customs) to individuals 
trained at least formally in the art of law, e.g. holding a law degree. Moreover, most 
(but not all) of the time the recruitment procedures require that the candidates 
have spent some years working in the judiciary branch at a high level.
Finally, Constitutional Courts can be defined as being ‘in-the-middle’ actors 
between the political and legal arenas from a functional perspective, i.e. by observ-
ing the function these courts play in the relations between lawyers and politicians. 
In this work, function refers to the function-as-effects of a certain institution on a 
certain environment, in this case, the concrete outcomes that the work of Consti-
tutional Courts have on structures in both the legal and political worlds.
Viewed from this functional perspective, one can note how Constitutional Courts 
perform an intermediary function between these two arenas. As briefly sketched 
above, one of the major contributions of Constitutional Courts to the community 
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is mediating between the highly political statements present in the constitution, 
i.e. statements dominated, from a legal perspective, by the substantive rationality 
of the political discourse, and the ‘legally relevant’ concepts and categories, i.e. 
concepts binding public officials and the community in general due to their obser-
vance of the parameters of formal rationality required by a certain community 
from a legal system.
This mediating role played by Constitutional Courts is not only in the direction 
towards the legal world in defining for its actors in legal terms what the general 
statements of goals enunciated in the constitutional documents or practices mean, 
for example, by guiding a justice in the interpretation of constitutionally ques-
tionable statutes or parts thereof. The mediating role is also played in the direc-
tion towards the political arena as the decisions of Constitutional Courts set the 
legal frameworks that the political actors in their law-making ought to respect, for 
example by extensively discussing the right of ‘due process’ with regards to a new 
administrative procedural statute.
This mediating role has not only a horizontal dimension, i.e. among different 
arenas in the same system, but also a vertical one. In particular, it is worth briefly 
noting how Constitutional Courts play a decisive role in mediating the values pro-
duced at international or supranational levels into the national legal arena. A clas-
sic example is the US Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence vs. Texas, or several 
of the decisions taken by different European national courts in order to further 
implement the values of the EU fundamental charters.18
Since a constitution is the product of the will of a community (through their politi-
cal representatives), at least in theory, Constitutional Courts in a democratic state 
play the function of mediating to the community and, in particular, to its politi-
cal representatives, the value-message that this very community and its political 
actors originally adopted, but now in terms of a legal message, i.e. a message also 
and primarily directed to the actors endorsed with the duty of implementing the 
legal rules as ‘interpreted’ (or accepted) by the Constitutional Court. As the Ameri-
can legal realists and Alf Ross pointed out, judges in general play a decisive role 
as the point of passage where the ‘law-in-books’ becomes ‘law-in-action,’ i.e. the 
normative apparatus of rules felt as binding by the population or by the officers.19
In this case, Constitutional Courts have the primary function of translating into 
binding norms for the political actors and the community the law-in-books that the 
very latter have enacted. Constitutions tend to be documents where the political 
18 See, the US Supreme Court decision in striking down the sodomy law in Texas with Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 US 558 (2003). In particular, Justice Anthony Kennedy, citing a European Court of 
Human Rights’ case (Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1981, signs an opening of the ‘parochial char-
acter’ of some parts of the American legal system, in particular at the State level, to the political 
globalizing political values, e.g. equality regardless of sexual orientation).
19 See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution,: Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, p. 7-15; and Waldron 2001 supra, p. 262.
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origins of the law, a typical feature of contemporary law, surface more clearly than 
in other legal documents (e.g. a statute regulating taxation law). Constitutions are 
often used not only as a legal document grounding a new legal system, but also 
as a primary form of a ‘political symbol’, i.e. as a message to the community by 
the political actors as to which fundamental values the state/community is based. 
Moreover, and as a consequence of this partial political nature, legal language in 
the Constitution tends to be interspersed with the political language. A classic 
example in this sense is the article of the Italian constitution stating that property 
ownership is guaranteed by the law as long as it fulfills its social function.20
This being the situation, where judges by their nature are the intermediaries 
between the ‘paper-law’ and ‘real-law,’ and the ‘paper-law’ being the Constitution, 
a mixture of political statements and legal concepts, it is then not surprising that 
more than in the other branches of the judiciary, Constitutional Courts become 
the ‘makers’ by being the ‘markers.’ As already pointed out by many legal theoreti-
cal approaches focusing on the legal discourse, regardless of whether their compe-
tence is of concrete or abstract constitutional review, the adjudication power that 
is typical for every court, therefore even for the Constitutional Courts, tends to 
become a law-making power. The very text to ‘mark’ is so vague that the ‘marking’ 
of its content and of its border becomes a ‘making’ (at least if seen from a legal 
perspective) of the law directly applicable in concrete cases (as for the concrete 
constitutional review) or in general (as for the abstract constitutional review).21
In summary, Constitutional Courts, for all the reasons mentioned above, are a 
special type of institutional actor that positions themselves among the ‘markers’ 
of the law, i.e. they are mostly actors aiming at interpreting and applying the law, 
but at the same time largely overlap with the ‘makers’ zone, i.e. through interpre-
tation Constitutional Courts shape the very law.22 This being the situation, the 
question naturally arises as to whether and why it really is necessary, from a legal 
perspective, to insert Constitutional Courts into a box with either ‘legal actors’ or 
‘political actors’ labels.
5. Why Is A Definition, either Legal or Political, So Important For Constitutional 
Courts?
Shifting attention to the central question of this work, namely whether Consti-
tutional Courts should be defined as either primarily legal or political actors, a 
20 Italian Constitution, Art. 42: “Property is public or private. Economic assets may belong to the 
State, to public bodies or to private persons. Private property is recognized and guaranteed by 
the law, which prescribes the ways it is acquired, enjoyed and its limitations so as to ensure its 
social function and make it accessible to all” (emphasis added).
21 See Gunther Teubner, And God Laughed... Indeterminacy, Self- Reference and Paradox in Law, in 
J.-P. Dupuy & G. Teubner (eds.), Paradoxes of Self-Reference in the Humanities, Law and the Social 
Science, Anma Libri, Stanford, 1991, p. 31.
22 See Luhmann 2004 supra, p. 235.
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first reaction can be to question the importance of this very issue. It appears to be 
a purely terminological question as the competence and jurisdiction accorded to 
Constitutional Courts tend, at least in well-established Western democracies, to 
be the same from a legal perspective, regardless of whether they are considered 
more political or more legal actors operating inside a certain system of powers. 
Regardless of whether they are considered primarily as legal or political actors, 
justices sitting in the highest benches will always be in charge of deciding the 
constitutionality of statutes and, by doing this, will always be influenced by the 
political environment and their political ideologies.
However, this is not simply a definitional or academic problem.23 As often hap-
pens for legal matters, defining something or someone means attributing it with 
certain legal areas of competence and jurisdiction and, at the same time, limiting 
its capacity to operate in other legal areas.24 In other words, when it comes to legal 
issues, the classification of either a problem or a subject matter means shaping it 
and, at the same time, reducing it.25
If one considers in particular Constitutional Courts and the definition of their 
nature as actors working in a certain environment, it has been previously seen 
that among their central tasks is ‘controlling’ that the transformations of ideolo-
gies or values into law are done according (or at least not grossly contrary) to the 
basic and often politically formulated principles enumerated in the constitution or 
fundamental law of a certain community.
The characterization of Constitutional Courts as either being legal or political 
actors brings with it the identification of fundamental criteria, or in Max Weber’s 
terminology, ‘rationalities,’ that ought to govern this control of the constitutional-
ity of the law-making taking place in a certain legal system.26 By defining the 
nature and function of Constitutional Courts, it then is possible to answer the fol-
lowing normative question that is fundamental for every democratic legal system: 
What is the fundamental criterion that ought to guide a Constitutional Court 
when performing its task of constitutional review?
Considering the fact that Constitutional Courts operate as ‘in-the-middle’ actors 
between the legal and political worlds, it is possible to identify two fundamental 
criterion, or rationalities, inspiring Constitutional Courts in their work. First, at 
23 See Waldron 2001 supra, 229.
24 See Timothy Andrew Orville Endicott, Law and Language, in J. L. Coleman & S. Shapiro (eds.), 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, 
p. 935-968.
25 See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Applying the New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of 
Reader and Writer, Text and Context, Journal of Legal Education, Vol. 49, 1999, No. 2, p. 155. See 
also Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric, and Legal Analysis, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London, 1988, p. 2-3. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986, p. 50-51.
26 See Weber 1978 supra, p. 650-658.
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least when seen from a legal perspective, Constitutional Courts have the option 
to primarily embrace a substantial rationality in order to resolve issues of con-
stitutionality. In order to reach the ‘best’ solution, justices then regard the legal 
system as primarily instrumental to the fulfillment of certain goals external to the 
system itself. In other words, Constitutional Courts ought to be ready to ‘sacrifice’ 
the internal rationality and rules traditionally superseding Western legal systems 
and reasoning, if and as long as this capitulation is directly functional to reaching 
the political, social and economic values the courts intend, on various grounds, to 
insert into a certain community.
However, there is another possible ideal-type rationality or criterion that ought to 
guide Constitutional Courts in their work. As pointed out by Weber, in modern 
capitalist societies, the fundamental criterion inspiring the work of legal actors 
is formal rationality, i.e. they reach a decision or a legal solution according to the 
criteria of internal logical criteria and for the maintenance of the consistency of 
the legal system, regardless of the actual effects in the surrounding environments. 
This respect for formal rationality (or ‘legality’) is and ought to be, as Weber con-
tinues, because it is directly functional and fundamental for legal actors (and 
judges in particular) in order to gain and maintain ‘legitimacy,’ i.e. a high degree 
of probability that their decisions will be concretely followed by the majority of 
addressees because they are considered ‘correct’ and therefore binding.27
The characterization of a certain actor as legal or political then is always funda-
mental, at least from a legal perspective, in order to attach to a certain actor a 
certain criterion (or type of rationality, as in this work) that should guide it in 
its operations. This definition, however, is even more important in the case of 
Constitutional Courts due to the position these types of courts occupy in modern 
democratic forms of political organization.
Constitutional Courts are certainly not the only actors whose nature can be and 
is widely disputed. For example, the legal nature of in-house attorneys is often 
heavily questioned, they are treated as facilitating simply a legal cover-up of purely 
economic and political programs; the same can be said of general practitioners 
or law professors.28 However, the theoretical issue of defining Constitutional 
Courts is fundamental because, among both legal and political actors of a modern 
democracy, the decisions of these courts (and consequently the criteria inspiring 
them) are those that can shape the fundamental legal, but also political and social, 
features of an entire community, sometimes even more than the decisions taken 
in the democratically elected assembly. For example, in deciding Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954), the Supreme Court of the United States shaped (at least as much 
as the Congress did ten years later with the 1964 Civil Rights Act) the future of an 
27 See Weber 1978 supra, p. 654-658.
28 See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1981, p. 126.
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entire national community as far as concerned unlawful structural discrimina-
tion based on ethnicity.29
It is also true, by using Dworkin’s famous metaphor, that Constitutional Courts 
write just one chapter in the chain novel that constitutes the valid law, since, 
after their decisions, their words will then be interpreted by all the other actors, 
e.g. legal scholars, lower judges and law-makers.30 However, even if the subse-
quent actors write a ‘different’ continuation of the novel, it is the Constitutional 
Courts that have the privilege of setting the agenda for future discussion. Using 
the previous example, with Brown v. Board of Education the US Supreme Court 
definitely opened the door to de-segregation, i.e. it gave a heavy push to put into 
the trash can all the attempts to retain in American society the racist principle 
‘separate-but-equal.’
Many other aspects, both political and legal, underscore the necessity of coming 
forward with a clear definition of which kind of actors Constitutional Courts are. 
From a political perspective, the definition of a Constitutional Court is important 
as it clarifies, and therefore partially prevents, possible points of collision between 
the highest powers in a community. By pointing out the basic features and criteria 
that should inspire the work taking place in the courts, this clarification allows for 
a better and more precise control of the activity of the courts by political authori-
ties, e.g. in the form of offering a clear matrix to parliamentary committees or 
investigators against which to evaluate certain constitutional judicial decisions. In 
other words, this legal theoretical definition more clearly locates a fundamental 
actor on the political map, either as primarily promoting certain and different in-
time ideologies (if defined as a political actor) or primarily as attempting to main-
tain one single and established legal ideology, namely the rule of law (if defined 
as a legal actor).
The necessity of characterizing the nature of Constitutional Courts is also impor-
tant from a legal perspective as this maneuver allows us to normatively fix what 
type of rationality Constitutional Courts ought to follow in their work. Justices 
sitting on the highest bench can be defined primarily as legal actors. As a con-
sequence from a legal perspective, the legality of their decisions in ‘hard-cases’ 
can and should be questioned, even by lower courts, when their legal reasoning is 
mainly grounded on the goal of implementing values they consider as immanent 
in a community, although they do not explicitly appear in the constitutional docu-
ment or fundamental law.
This critique of the legality of their decisions can and ought to be done in par-
ticular when the realization of values is done at the expense of the traditional 
criteria superseding the legal reasoning (e.g. consistency or respect for previous 
decisions on similar matters), i.e. the only type of reasoning on which legal actors 
29 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 495 (1954).
30 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986, p. 228-238.
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in modern democracy have a legitimate domain. For example, if a court decides in 
diametrical directions in similar cases or issues, it can be directly criticized from 
a legal perspective for violating a fundamental principle of Western legal systems 
as such, namely treating individuals equally under the same circumstances.
On the other end, in the event Constitutional Courts are defined primarily as 
political actors, the possibility of holding them responsible from a legal perspec-
tive for doing something ‘illegal’ is more restricted. If they are considered politi-
cal actors, while it is always possible to legally criticized Constitutional Courts 
for violating certain basic rights guaranteed in the constitution through a certain 
decision, it is not possible to ‘force’ the courts to decide in accordance, or at least 
consequent, with previous decisions. One privilege accorded to political actors in 
general is the fact that they can indeed change their value system without being 
held responsible (at least legally) for this. If a political party or national assembly 
decides to pursue values other than those originally planned, it cannot be criti-
cized or held responsible from a legal perspective for such.
Finally, another element stresses the importance of questioning the nature of 
Constitutional Courts in Western legal systems. Constitutional Courts somehow 
symbolize and stretch to the limits an underlying feature typical of most legal 
actors operating in contemporary Western legal systems: their ‘middle’ position 
between the political world where values (or models of society) are created and the 
legal world, through which those values have to pass in order to be implemented 
into a community. Each one of the concrete individuals forming the skeletal struc-
ture of the legal actors is formally educated in the law and such an education is 
almost always a formal requirement to becoming a part of this group of actors. 
The individuals composing the legal actors, in other words, are all educated in the 
idea that law, although highly politicized, keeps certain features that distinguish 
it from pure political propaganda.31
On the other end, for justices working in Constitutional Courts, most legal actors 
operate within the legal system but with a face also turned to the outside world, 
to the world where non-legal (in the sense of value-oriented) ways of reasoning 
dominate. They work within the legal system, but they do this with the knowledge 
that law is instrumental in order to introduce into a community models of behav-
iors or values embraced by their political reference (e.g. for legal experts work-
ing in political parties) or by economic reference (e.g. in-house attorneys for large 
corporations).
This characteristic feature of the law and legal system in the Western legal system, 
i.e. their always being functional to something else, then forces legal actors in 
31 See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, Columbia Law 
Review, Vol. 40, 1940, No. 4, p. 589 and Alf Ross, Towards a realistic jurisprudence: a criticism of 
the dualism in law, E. Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 1946, p. 72. See also Neil MacCormick, Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1978, p. 188.
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general to always take into consideration the ideologies, or value systems, affect-
ing the origins, development and final environment in which the law-making or 
law-applying is taking place. In short, the importance of defining Constitutional 
Courts as either legal or political actors lies in the fact that such institutional 
actors represent better than others the difficult situation in which lawyers operate 
nowadays: educated in law and employed in order to build, interpret and apply the 
law, but under an extreme non-legal pressure that wants them to disregard that 
considered the characterizing elements for a legal system (predictability, certainty, 
rule of law and so on) in order to instead fulfill political goals.
6. A Possible Legal Theoretical Solution
Part III (‘Makers’ vs. ‘Markers:’ Constitutional Courts as ‘In-the-middle’ Actors) 
showed how Constitutional Courts can be considered as actually positioning ‘in-
the-middle’, between the legal and political worlds. Part IV (Why Is the Definition 
‘Either-Legal-Or-Political’ So Important For Constitutional Courts?) pointed out that 
for several reasons, it is important to somehow ‘insert’ the Constitutional Courts 
into either one of these two ideal typical boxes, i.e. to establish which of the two 
natures (political vs. legal) dominates Constitutional Courts and should be used as 
basic point for investigating and (if warranted) criticizing their decision-making.
A possible perspective from whence to begin the journey to answer this funda-
mental question is certainly legal theory. Due to the central position and func-
tion Constitutional Courts play in contemporary legal systems, legal theory has 
devoted many and important writings on this topic. From the modern natural 
law theories to legal positivism, from critical legal thinking to legal-sociological 
approaches, most contemporary legal theories have tackled the issue of what Con-
stitutional Courts are, somehow being forced to take issue with this question due 
to the impact of these courts decisions on the law and society at large.32
Though along legal theoretical paths, it is helpful here to start, however, by resort-
ing to a sociological distinction made between the institutional position of a cer-
tain actor and the function-effects of that actor’s work. By the first is intended 
the position given to a certain actor operating inside a larger environment. This 
positioning, as far as concerns judicial bodies, is mainly a combination of the 
operating of two (often overlapping) factors: the degree of legitimacy that judicial 
bodies enjoy, indicating where in the spectrum of power judges are inserted (ver-
tical positioning); and the distribution of power as sanctioned in the law, which 
indicates where, at the stage assigned by the legitimacy, the judicial body is located 
(horizontal positioning).
32 See, e.g., the decision of the US Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 495 
(1954) or by the German Federal Constitutional Court in Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (BvR 2, 
197/83; 1987 3 CMLR 225), (1986) (Solange II).
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When speaking of function-effects of an actor’s work, this simply refers to the 
impacts that the work of the actor has on the environment. These effects can be 
of different ideal-typical natures. They can be intended, where they correspond to 
the original goal the actor had in mind when starting the work, or unintended, 
where they do not (totally or partially) correspond to the original motive of the 
action. Effects can also be in the form of either outputs or outcomes.33 Outputs are 
the impacts (intended or unintended) a certain action has inside the ideal-typical 
arena in which the action has taken place (e.g. effect of a decision of a court on the 
legal right of the condemned to appeal). Outcomes, in contrast, mark the effects 
(intended or unintended) such impacts have on the surrounding environment (e.g. 
the effect of a court decision on the economic situation of the condemned’s family).
In reality, these different ideal-types almost always tend to be mixed with each 
other, e.g. in the form of court decisions that have intended and unintended effects 
or outputs and outcomes simultaneously. Despite this, such ideal-types can be 
useful analytical tools in order to reveal specific tendencies in an actor as to oper-
ating in one environment instead of another in order to gain certain effects, and 
then choosing the type of rationality more suitable for that purpose.
If one considers Constitutional Courts in light of these distinctions, between insti-
tutional position and function-effects (and among the different types of effects), 
one can see how the dominant features of the courts are of a legal nature. Starting 
from the institutional position, Constitutional Courts first of all are ‘courts.’ This 
means that their decisions are what they are, namely considered binding by the 
vast majority of the addressees, and not because of the content of the decisions, 
i.e. the models of behaviors they aim to impose on a community. They are con-
sidered binding because they are legal normative decisions, that is decisions that 
ought to be obeyed because they are produced by a legally formed body, entrusted 
with the legal power to produce such type of binding decisions. In other words, 
the major institutional position of the Constitutional Courts, i.e. their being a 
‘dispute-resolving’ actor, is given to them by the legal legitimacy such courts enjoy 
in the modern form of a democratic state.
In contrast to political actors such as political parties or lobby groups, the consid-
eration and respect for the work of Constitutional Courts is not so much based 
on the intrinsic values promoted by the very decisions, for example, such as the 
‘popularity’ of a certain political program. The respect, or legitimacy, is given to 
the decisions by the legal form they take, and by the forms that have been observed 
while producing the decisions and choosing the individuals (i.e. judges) in charge 
of taking such decisions. In other words, Constitutional Courts keep their position 
33 This separation of outputs from outcomes is actually an adaptation of the results reached by 
a long series of studies developed in political science. See, e.g., Joel A. Thompson, Outputs 
and Outcomes of State Workmen’s Compensation Laws, Journal of Politics, Vol. 43, 1981, No. 4, 
p. 1132; or Francis G. Castles, Comparative Public Policy. Patterns of Post-war Transformation, 
Edward Elgar, Northampton, Massachusetts, 1998, p. 248-292. 
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and ‘job’ in the community as the highest dispute-resolving actor as long as they 
are able to maintain their legal legitimacy, i.e., legitimacy gained in Western legal 
systems mostly by observing the paradigms of formal legal rationality.
Naturally, this does not mean that Constitutional Courts lack political sympathies. 
However, even when justices are strongly politicized, they still have to operate 
taking a look at and being forced into the barriers and limits as set by the legal 
system or, if in more modern terms, by the principles or paradigms established by 
the dominating legal culture (e.g. rule of law, bill of rights, separation of powers, 
due process and so on) in order to not lose their legitimacy among the addressees.
As to their function, if one starts by considering the intended and unintended out-
puts of a certain decision by a Constitutional Court, the primary arena of opera-
tion of Constitutional Courts here is the legal one. A Constitutional Court, per 
definition, evaluates legal issues, in particular the possible unconstitutionality of 
a statute or acts of law-making agencies. The outputs of the courts’ deliberation 
are to decide whether certain legal rules of a lower dignity can still be considered 
as ‘binding and therefore existing’ legal rules. In particular, Constitutional Courts 
‘prove’ the existence of these rules by evaluating whether they are compatible with 
the fundamental rules and principles enumerated in (or somehow derived from) 
constitutions and fundamental laws. This, as pointed out before, is a typical legal 
problem since it is created exclusively by axiomatically accepting the legal princi-
ples presupposing an ascending structure of rules, where the lower rules, in order 
to exist as legal (and therefore to be binding) rules, cannot be in conflict with the 
higher.
As pointed out by Hans Kelsen, and also by other legal scholars (even natural law 
theoreticians), this idea is typical of the legal arena.34 In contrast, the hierarchi-
cal structure in the political arena, though present (e.g. basic values vs. tactical 
choices), is not fundamental in order to give ‘validity’ to the lower types of deci-
sion. Tactical decisions taken by a congressional party are still considered ‘valid’ 
for the political line of a certain party, even if contrary to the fundamental values 
contained in the party program and even if such tactical decisions can perhaps 
‘shape’ the support the party’s leader enjoy in the same party.
In contrast to political actors, Constitutional Courts are not totally freed in their 
reasoning from what can be defined as the ‘external’ borders of legal reasoning. 
By ‘external borders’, or ‘minimum content of natural law’ in Hart’s terminology, 
are identified in particular the no-cross limits of the legal culture of a certain com-
munity, limits which have to exist in order for the legal system to exist as such.35 
In a democratic free-market regime, for example, these no-cross borders can be 
34 See, e.g., Hans Kelsen 1970 supra, p. 3-4, 19. See also Neil MacCormick, Natural Law Reconsid-
ered, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 1, 1981, No. 1, p. 108.
35 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961, p. 189-195. See also Hart 
1983 supra, p. 112.
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defined as the fundamental legal principles (e.g. protection of freedom of expres-
sion and private property) expressing the substratum of political, cultural, and 
economic forces by which the system itself is created and to which it is functional.
Political actors do not necessarily have to respect such external borders of the legal 
reasoning. Actually, for many political parties, the primary and fully politically 
legitimized goal of their existence is to change or shift such external borders, 
for example by heavily restricting freedom of expression or by eliminating legal 
protection accorded to private property.
The situation changes if one moves the focus to the outcomes of the decisions 
taken by Constitutional Courts, i.e. the effects (intended or unintended) that their 
decisions have on the (non-legal) environments surrounding the one in which the 
courts operate (the legal one). It is easy to note here how the legal feature charac-
terizing the function played by the Constitutional Courts tends to disappear. Deci-
sions by Constitutional Courts almost always have effects outside the legal world 
or, using Luhmann’s terminology, in the other sub-systems composing a society: 
in the cultural, economic, and political life of a community. In other words, it 
goes without saying that as far as concerns the outcomes of their decisions, Con-
stitutional Courts present certain similarities with political actors such as, for 
example, the government or national assemblies. As for the latter, Constitutional 
Courts with their decisions also attempt in the end (consciously or unconsciously) 
to impose certain models of behaviors or values upon a community.
Despite this sliding into the political arena, Constitutional Courts should be con-
sidered as having primarily a legal nature, i.e. primarily being a legal actor. First, 
the grouping of an actor under a certain terminological roof has to be done primar-
ily according to both its institutional location and the function-effects of its work, 
in particular the intended outputs its actions produce. If one should look at the 
outcomes, the very analytical possibility of grouping actors in ideal-typical arenas, 
and the consequent possibility to identify some normative criteria according to 
which evaluate and criticize their work, would disappear. Outcomes of decisions 
almost always tend to spread in different directions and, especially for unintended 
outcomes, it is often not even possible to determine in which area a certain action 
has had its major impact particularly after a long period of time. For example, a 
decision taken by large corporations can have relevant outcomes in the religious 
or cultural fields, but it would be quite strange to define such corporations (and 
consequently evaluate their work) as primarily religious or cultural actors.
The fact that Constitutional Courts are legal actors does not rule out the possibility 
that they still can (and often do) play a political function. As said, all legal decisions 
have certain outcomes, but generally, Constitutional Courts make their decisions 
by looking (or at least by reasoning according) to the legal outputs, namely the 
constitutionality or not of certain provisions. Justices sitting on the highest bench 
certainly can (and often do) have a political agenda, but they are still forced to con-
front it with the legal system and the principles dominating within it. A reversed 
88
I – Independence and the Rule of Law
example can be found in individuals sitting in the Parliament. They are without 
doubt political actors with a clear political agenda, but they still sometimes play a 
very relevant legal function, and this is done according to a specific legal agenda, 
i.e. according to certain model of how the legal system or part of it should look. 
This is the case, for example, when members of Parliament in a special committee 
evaluate the legal limits of criminal liability attached to the highest position of the 
State, such as the President of the Republic or the Prime Minister.
Moreover, and connected to the latter, the legal feature attached to Constitutional 
Courts is traceable to the fundamental ideology shaping their work. Justices work-
ing in Constitutional Courts live in an environment which, though with many 
political passersby, has a primary legal task: to be the guardian insuring that the 
law-making taking place in a certain state is done, or conflict among the highest 
public authorities is decided, according to the highest rules fixed in the constitu-
tional documents or fundamental law.
This task of Constitutional Courts is legal in the sense that it consists of deal-
ing with legal rules. When justices sit on the bench, they primarily work with 
checking the ‘constitutionality’ of certain legal rules, i.e. with the possibility that, 
from a legal discourse perspective (i.e. with the traditional rules regulating the 
legal reasoning), such legal rules can fit into the legal system as designed in the 
constitutional documents or fundamental laws. Obviously, justices are often well 
aware of the indirect political effects of their decisions (outcomes), an awareness 
that sometimes affects their very reaching a certain solution instead of another. 
However, regardless of any hidden agenda behind a certain decision, justices are 
always forced to somehow ‘squeeze’ their politically-motivated decisions into boxes 
of legal justification.36
In the end, Constitutional Courts must always speak the language of the law, not 
the one of politics, even if they want to send political messages. As pointed out by 
Michel Foucault, among others, language in modern society is power, and by clas-
sifying a political problem and a political solution according to legal terminology, 
the choice of language immediately imposes on the issue the domain and limits 
set by the legal discourse and, at the same time, tends to exclude all features and 
limits set by the other types of discourses, among them the political one.37
36 For instance, the doctrine of stare decisis is primarily a legal doctrine, though it certainly pre-
sents both political roots and political effects on the political world. See, e.g. Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future 
of Unenumerated Rights, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 9, 2006, 
p.  160-176; and Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
2006, p. 147-50.
37 See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, Pantheon 
books, (New York, 1972, chapter 2. See also Alan Hunt & Gary Wickham, Foucault and Law: 
Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance, Pluto Press, Chicago, 1994, p. 7-12, 41-43; and Anne 
Barron, Foucault and Law, in J. Penner et al. (eds.), Introduction to Jurisprudence and Legal Theory: 
Commentary and Materials, Butterworths, London, 2002, p. 955-997.
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Now that the fundamental nature of Constitutional Courts, at least from a legal 
theoretical perspective, has been established, it is now time to move back to the 
original issue, namely the law-making activity by Constitutional Courts and in 
particular, the possibility of evaluating it according to a political criterion such as 
its (present or absent) ‘democratic’ character.
7. Constitutional Courts as Legal Actors and The Idea of Democracy
One of the major criticisms against judicial activism is that it allows non-elected 
legal actors (highest courts) to substitute themselves for duly elected political actors 
(legislatives) and, therewith, destabilizing the very idea of democracy. In general, 
most legal theories describing or prescribing what democracy is, or better, the 
fundamental elements for having a democratic form of state are, have problems 
with ‘fitting in’ the position and function played by Constitutional Courts in their 
theoretical portrait of a democratic law-making.
With all the specifications taken, one of the basic elements for a democracy, at least 
when dealing with law-making, is that the ultimate agency empowered to enact 
laws (or to somehow ‘sanction’ the legitimacy of certain normative statements as 
legally binding) resides in the political actors. This is because only the latter are 
the elected (and therefore legitimate) representatives of the ultimate actor from 
which all power in a democracy emanates, namely the people.
This being the case, it is quite consistent that it is difficult for most democracy 
theoreticians (both inside legal and political scholarships) to somehow insert in 
their idea of how a law-making works in a democratic country the fact that some 
older men and women, not chosen or directly sanctioned by popular vote, have the 
power to stop a statute or a decision taken by the legally highest representative of 
the people, either the Congress or President of a nation. While (more or less) shared 
solutions have been reached as to similar limits imposed on the law-making and 
political actors by the legal concept of human rights (mostly by incorporating the 
latter into the very idea of democracy), it is still very difficult for most democracy 
theories to somehow accept the fact that a non-elected actor actually has an institu-
tional position higher than the representatives of the people, a position that allow 
justices to always have the final word in legal matters. Even where Constitutional 
Courts are not especially ‘active’, they still retain a law-making power of striking 
down new pieces of legislation enacted by the political representative of a certain 
community.
The definition of Constitutional Courts as legal actors then reveals a central ques-
tion once considered from the perspective of the democratic form of state. One 
fundamental feature of democracy shared by the majority of contemporary legal 
theories is that the political powers of the state organization are chosen (directly 
or indirectly) by the community. Moreover, there ought always to be a possibility 
for the representatives of the people to somehow control and decide the course of 
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action of all the other non-political actors belonging to the state apparatus. In addi-
tion to all accepted specifications (e.g. Robert Dahl’s theory of economic democ-
racy), the adopting by a modern state of democracy ideology still takes with it the 
axiom of the prevalence of the political discourse and its main actors above all the 
other discourses, either religious, cultural, or legal.38
In contrast to the current political discourse, which in order to exist as such needs 
a legitimacy built on the acceptance (even by the most extreme ideologies) of the 
concept of ‘support’ (explicit or implicit) by the majority of people, legal discourse 
is by nature undemocratic. This feature is given to the legal discourse in particular 
by its very way of working its primary source, the law, the latter being based on the 
‘authority’ of certain decisions taken by certain unelected persons, regardless of 
whether they are supported by the majority of people.
If one defines Constitutional Courts as legal actors, the question that can be raised 
then is the following: As Constitutional Courts are not democratically elected by 
the majority of a certain community, is it undemocratic that they retain the high-
est legal power among the public authorities, a power allowing them to virtually 
stop every legal measure taken by political actors who are representative of the 
people? Isn’t the fact, that through Constitutional Courts, the ‘undemocratic’ legal 
discourse prevails over the ‘democratic’ political discourse, against the very con-
cept of democracy?
These are significant issues and it certainly is not feasible to answer them by the 
end of this short essay, as this would probably take more than a few pages. How-
ever, based on the results reached by the analysis developed above, it is perhaps 
possible to at least identify the correct perspective from which to start answering 
whether Constitutional Courts fit without major problems in an ideal democratic 
form of state.
When talking about democracy, one refers to a form of primarily political organi-
zation, namely a form to organize the ‘striving for a share of power or for influence 
on the distribution of power.’39 The idea of democracy is either a picture mirroring 
the reality (for the descriptive theories) or a painting of how the reality should be 
(for the normative theories) and it zooms directly on the organization, structuring 
and sharing of political power. In other words, the characterization of a democratic 
38 See Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael & P.G. Stein (eds.)), Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1978 (1762-1763), p. 200. But see Hart 1961 supra, p. 72-74; cf. Wolf-
gang Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (2nd Ed.), Stevens & Sons, London, 1972, p. 505-506. 
Another explanation can be traced back to Machiavelli’s idea as to the modern state in general 
(and not necessarily in a democratic shape), where one can observe the growth and dominance 
of political reasons and categories over almost all other kinds of discourses. See, e.g. George 
H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (3rd Ed.), Holt Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1964, 
p. 344-347.
39 Max Weber, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in P. Lassman & R. Speirs (eds.), Max 
Weber: Political Writings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 311.
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form of state is ascribed to it primarily by the specific way the power is distributed 
in a certain community. Of course, this structuring and sharing of political power 
is usually done by means of using certain legal instruments and legal institutions 
(such as an elected legislative assembly).
However, while the presence of certain forms of political organization is funda-
mental for defining a certain state as democratic (e.g. the presence of competing 
political ideologies represented in the political discourse), the presence or absence 
of the usual legal instruments normally attached to a democratic form of state can 
be not essential. Using a previous example, while it is certain that a democracy has 
to protect human rights, it is still highly controversial which human rights are to 
be protected (e.g. the right to private property), their extent (e.g. right to life) and 
whether the public authorities should act ‘actively’ for their implementation (e.g. 
right to work).40
Similarly, different political communities in the Western hemisphere in particular, 
share a common denomination of democracy, but this does not necessarily imply 
the presence of the same legal institutions with the same legal powers, and in 
particular of a Constitutional Court with the jurisdiction of constitutional review. 
A typical example can be found in a parallel observation of the United States and 
Sweden. Both these systems are considered as a political form of democracy. 
However, as far as concerns the organization of their legal systems, fundamental 
differences are detectable, in particular as to the presence of a highest court with 
jurisdiction in constitutionality matters.
The United States has a highest court with the specific power to check the consti-
tutionality of statutes and when necessary, the legal possibility to directly strike 
them down. Sweden (as most of the other Nordic countries) has a high organ, com-
posed of well-experienced judges, with the jurisdiction to perform a constitutional 
review prior to the passage of legislation, the Council on Legislation. However, 
this body cannot be considered a Constitutional Court, since its decisions are not 
legally binding to the addressees (namely the Parliament and the Government 
in this case); it is more a constitutional council, working as legal advisor for the 
political actors but unable to stop them, even in cases of gross violations of funda-
mental laws. It is true that courts, either general or administrative, have the power 
to strike down acts of the Swedish Parliament as unconstitutional, but this power 
is strictly limited only to the case in question, and only if the error is ‘manifest’ 
(in Swedish, uppenbarhetsrekvisitet). This power has only been used in a handful 
of cases in recent decades. Moreover, this power has been granted comparatively 
recently in comparison to that of the United States Supreme Court (thirty years 
40 See Waldron 2001 supra, p. 224-225 as to the very complexity of the legal concept of ‘rights’ 
already in its philosophical underpinning.
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compared to the almost two hundred since Marbury v. Madison), and certainly long 
after Sweden was considered a well-established democratic form of State.41
Moreover, if one looks at the procedures used in selecting justices, extremely dif-
ferent processes exist, different in particular as far as concerns the role political 
actors and political culture play. Existing procedures are stretched across a broad 
spectrum. At one extreme is the US Supreme Court, where justices are directly 
nominated by the President (a political actor) with the approval of the Congress 
(another political actor) after hearings in which the candidate’s position on vari-
ous (and often very hot) political issues are ‘tested.’ Somewhere in the middle is 
the Italian procedure of choosing constitutional judges (and to some extent also 
France’s), where political actors and their ‘political scrutiny’ play a relevant role (by 
electing one-third of the judges). The legal world and its dominating culture also 
matter, one-third of the judges elected being among the most qualified judges, 
appointed directly by the Supreme Organ of the Judicial Body, the highest internal 
instance of the judicial body. Sweden can be positioned at the other extreme end 
of the spectrum, where, though political ‘affiliation’ plays a certain role (due in 
particular to the fact that the appointment of the justices is entirely by political 
actors), the criteria and reasons of choosing one justice over another are based 
mainly on evaluative criteria ‘internal’ to the judicial body. The criteria used in 
this Scandinavian country are almost of a purely ‘judicial bureaucratic’ nature and 
do not consider the ‘link’ between the political value of the justice and the political 
representatives of the community.
As the procedures for choosing justices are so different among well-established 
political democratic regimes, as is also the role political culture plays in them, the 
simple conclusion can be drawn that a necessary sine qua non relation between the 
selection of the justices and the participation of the representatives of the people 
in the process does not exist; or, to put it in another way, a democratic political 
system does not necessarily require a direct link between political actors and the 
justices sitting in Constitutional Courts in order to guarantee the ‘democratic’ 
representation of the latter.
Another element considered essential to Western democratic regimes from which 
Constitutional Courts depart is the position of political rights (e.g. the right to vote) 
as essential for a constitution and the work of Constitutional Courts in protecting 
them.42 If, as for the previous example, one considers the US Supreme Court and 
the Swedish Supreme Court as two different ideal-typical Constitutional Courts, 
one can notice a deep divergence of positions on this issue. First, the consideration 
and progressive ‘refinement’ of political rights enumerated in the Constitution 
has occupied quite a bit of space of the US Supreme Court’s work, being followed 
41 See Instrument of Government (in Swedish, Regeringsformen) (Ch. 11, § 14, 1974). Compare to 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
42 See Martin Shapiro, Judicial Review in Developed Democracies, Democratization, Vol. 10, 2003, 
No. 4, p. 11-13.
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in this (but only to a certain extent) by several European Constitutional Courts, 
such as the German Federal Constitutional Court or the Italian Constitutional 
Court. In the Swedish form of democracy, the primary role of the Supreme Court 
(and the constitutional texts) has been, at least until recently, mostly concentrated 
on distributing and delimiting political power among the various institutional 
actors. Until very recently, the protection and interpretation of most basic political 
rights have been left instead to extra-parliamentary agreements among the actors 
of the political, legal and social arenas; when addressed by statute, political rights 
tend to fall under the domain of administrative law and administrative courts 
more than that of constitutional law. Similar to Sweden, the French Constitu-
tional Council has only from the early 1970’s taken a strong stand in positioning 
basic political rights in the central part of the constitutional map.43 In both cases, 
however, Sweden and France have been considered democracies long before the 
constitutional recognition of political rights took place.
Finally, from a legal perspective, one aspect that the different Western Constitu-
tional Courts at least have in common, as pointed out in Part II (Some Definitions) 
is that all Constitutional Courts are courts with the specific legal competence to 
check the constitutionality of statutes or acts. This being the case, when one starts 
evaluating the actual use or implementation of such legal power, a broad range 
of positions can be detected, however, going from the frequent striking down of 
the constitutionality of the work of the political actors (as in the US or many of 
European countries) to the almost constant ‘constitutional-guarantee’ stamp for 
every word produced in the political world (as in Sweden or, until the early 70’s, 
in France).
Naturally, one can maintain the idea that Constitutional Courts in Sweden (or in 
France) do not go against the law-making by political actors because the latter were 
more ‘cultivated into legal matters’ and ‘obedient’ to the law than in other Western 
countries. However, a more realistic assessment, at least from a legal perspective, 
is that in the Swedish (and to some extent French) form of democracy, the control 
of constitutionality by a specific court does not belong to the legal underpinning 
necessarily required by a Western democratic political regime, legal underpin-
nings to which, for instance, one can ascribe legal rules safe-guarding freedom of 
expression, freedom of association or private property.
This brief comparative analysis shows one important fact: Constitutional Courts 
in the well-established democracies can, in relation to the political world, present 
fundamental differences as to their legal jurisdiction, as to the procedures for their 
formation (and the role political actors play in it), as to the areas of focus of most of 
their work, and even as to the ‘actualization’ of their judicial review jurisdiction. 
As the issue of whether both the United States and Sweden are fully considered 
and legitimized as Western democratic forms of state is not debated, the conclu-
43 See Constitutional Council of France (in French, Conseil Constitutionnel), Décision n° 71-44 DC of 
16 July 1971.
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sion then must be drawn that the presence or absence of a Constitutional Court, 
with binding decision-making power as to constitutional review, cannot be consid-
ered a conditio sine qua non for a democracy. As recently pointed out in an article 
by Lee Epstein et al., Constitutional Courts can play a decisive role in ‘reinforcing’ 
already democratic political regimes, but not in ‘establishing’ them.44 In other 
words, having a Constitutional Court is helpful but is not a fundamental require-
ment for a community in order to be considered as living in a democracy.45
A fundamental bias can then be detected in the accusation against a certain legal 
system or legal culture in general for being undemocratic because there is space 
for judicial activism that a legal actor, as a Constitutional Court, can control, limit 
and somehow modify the decisions taken by a democratically elected political 
power. This charge presupposes that the concept of democracy necessarily incor-
porates Constitutional Courts, an incorporation that the empirical observation of 
the realities of the legal systems in the Western world does not support.
At the same time, this accusation of operating as political actors paradoxically 
starts with the implicit presupposition that Constitutional Courts should be politi-
cal. It begins with the premise of attaching to Constitutional Courts the wrong 
kind of legitimacy, namely legitimacy based on the idea that, as for the political 
actors, it is given by the content of their decision (‘the decision is against the major-
ity’s will, therefore it shakes the legitimacy of the court’). However, Constitutional 
Courts are primarily legal actors and, as pointed out by Weber at least for Western 
legal systems, the fundamental criterion according to which their legitimacy is 
acquired and maintained is not by following the substantive rationality, but the 
formal one.46 This means that the formal legitimacy of Constitutional Courts 
is not based on how ‘democratic’ their message is, but on the observance of the 
pre-established rules regarding how the decision should be taken, according to 
which procedures and by whom (‘the decision is done following the proper forms, 
therefore it reinforces the legitimacy of the court’).
In the end, criticism against the judicial activism of Constitutional Courts is 
shown to be a paradox, or better yet, confusion as to which kind of legitimacy is 
and should be attached to these courts. Critics attack court activism for destabiliz-
44 See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Estab-
lishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, Law & Society Review, Vol. 45, 
2001, No. 1, p. 138-148.
45 See Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Con-
stitution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, chapter 6, as an example of possible 
co existence of a dictatorial political regime and a functioning Constitutional Court.
46 See Weber 1978 supra, p. 37 (“Today the most common form of legitimacy is the belief in legality, 
the compliance with enactments which are formally correct and which have been made in the 
accustomed manner”). See also Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of Modern State. A Socio-
logical Introduction, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1989, p. 132; Immanuel Kant, Die Meta-
physik der Sitten, in I. Kant, Immanuel Kants Werke Band VII 25-26, (B. Kellermann ed.), Bruno 
Cassirer, Berlin, 1916 (1797), p. 122 and Philippe Nonet & Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Tran-
sition: Toward Responsive Law, Harper and Row, New York, 1978, p. 51-52.
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ing democracy due to the political content of their decisions, and in the long run, 
for endangering one of the central axioms of democracy, namely a system of courts 
legitimized as purely law-applying actors. However, this criticism of being ‘politi-
cal’ presupposes that the work of courts and their decisions ought to be evaluated 
(and legitimized) from the same perspective as for other political actors’ decisions, 
namely from the presence (or not) of a content which is supported (directly or 
indirectly) by the majority of the people.
Once the constitutional document has been written and its legitimacy as such 
accepted and, in particular, the premise that an independent Constitutional Court 
should exist with the primary legal task of controlling that the law is done and 
applied according to the constitution is accepted by the political actors, it would 
be against the very idea of certainty of the fundamental law to ask Constitutional 
Courts to play according to a different criterion, namely the political evaluation of 
the democratic level of certain decision instead of their legality.
8. Towards A More ‘Democratic’ Model of Constitutional Court
It is necessary to point out one thing before concluding this article. The point of 
this article is not to totally ‘disconnect’ Constitutional Courts from the ideal of 
democracy. The basic point instead has simply been to stress that Constitutional 
Courts are not necessarily present in every Western democratic political system 
or, in other words, the institution of Constitutional Courts does not belong to the 
legal substratum typical for every democratic regime. However, as pointed out 
above by Epstein et al., Constitutional Courts can (and usually do) help a commu-
nity reinforce the democratic form of organization: democracies can exist without 
Constitutional Courts, although it can be seen to be better if democracies are 
assisted by Constitutional Courts.47
In other words, the point made here is that the debate on judicial review, in par-
ticular at the constitutional level, does not have to end by claiming that courts 
(and their judicial review) and democracy do not belong together. On the contrary, 
based on the consideration of the legal nature of Constitutional Courts and the 
primary political nature of the concept of democracy, the aim is to re-set the terms 
of the debate of ‘democracy’ and ‘judicial review,’ at least from a legal theoretical 
perspective.48
47 See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova 2001 supra, p. 155-156.
48 See, e.g. Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial Review, Law 
and Philosophy, Vol. 9, 2004, No. 4, p. 353-354; Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Ele-
ments in Modern Law, Law and Society Review, Vol. 17, 1983, No. 2, p. 254; and Andrew Halpin, 
The Theoretical Controversy Concerning Judicial Review, Modern Law Review, Vol. 64, 2001, 
No. 3, p. 500. But see Waldron 2001 supra, p. 283.
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Most of the debate as to constitutional judicial review starts from the request to the 
courts to be a more ‘integral part’ of the democratic form of state, the position then 
being different as to what is expected by ‘democratic’ courts (e.g. strict obedience 
to the legal rules laid down by the representatives of the people vs. ‘activism’ in 
searching of the ‘true meaning’ behind the legal text). However, as seen up to now, 
by defining Constitutional Courts as essentially legal actors, there is a need to shift 
the perspective from which the evaluation (and eventually criticism) of the work of 
the Constitutional Courts originates, at least in the legal debate: from the political 
standpoint (e.g. majority’s support to a certain decision) to the legal standpoint (e.g. 
respect to the traditional rules dominating the legal reasoning).49
Specifically, since Constitutional Courts are not part of the conceptual hard-core 
of ‘democracy’, but usually play a relevant function in the establishment of democ-
racy, the re-setting of the debate on constitutional judicial review and democracy 
should then not be in the direction of absorbing one element (Constitutional 
Courts) into the other (democracy), but instead in proposing an ‘ideal’ of Consti-
tutional Courts more aligned or compatible with the elements characterizing a 
democratic form of state.
As an example of this search for compatibility between Constitutional Courts and 
ideals of democracy, one can begin with the definition of democracy developed, 
among others, by Jürgen Habermas: Democracy is that form of state striving for 
the participation of all the community (or specific part of it) to the formation of 
the decisions which have effects on the community (or on the specific part of it).50 
If one starts from this definition of democracy, then changes to the Constitutional 
Courts in order to make them more ‘compatible’ to a democratic system should 
be in the direction of their procedural aspects, and less on the material content 
of their decisions, i.e. in the direction of making the addressees of the decisions 
more participatory in decision-making processes.
The first step to be taken is certainly one of adopting a process of selection of the 
candidate justices similar to the one used for the US Supreme Court. In particular, 
the ‘hearings’ procedure in front of the national Assemblies would allow not only 
a more specific control of the judges by the representatives of the people. More 
importantly in the modern information society, public hearings also allow the 
49 As typical representative of the political standpoint from which to investigate the idea of democ-
racy in relation to the role of Constitutional Courts, see Waldron 2001 supra, p. 283.
50 See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and 
Democracy, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 134, according to whom the democratic discourse 
is the one allowing the citizens “to test whether a contested norm can or could obtain to acqui-
escence of all those who might be affected”. See also Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, Okla-
homa, 1991, p. 8-9. But see the substantive idea of democracy as expressed by Dworkin 1996 
supra, p. 17, for whom the most fundamental aim of genuine democracy is not to pass laws in 
accordance with certain procedural requirements, but to treat “all members of the community, 
as individuals, with equal concern and respect”.
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community (in particular through the mass media) to have a larger set of informa-
tion as to the people occupying such an important position as a justice. Unlike 
that which happens now in most European Constitutional Courts, in this way the 
community will have access to greater information and, hopefully, a clearer idea of 
‘who represents what’ or of the specific political culture each justice carries.
This solution, of course, does not prevent justices from playing a less ‘political’ 
function, a function that as seen above is somehow connected with the ‘in-the-
middle’ position of Constitutional Courts. However, public hearings give the 
addressees, or their representatives, a better way of participating in fundamental 
decisions affecting them, certainly better than the ‘behind-closed-doors’ proce-
dures vastly used in Europe and at the European Union level.
A general preference for the typology of concrete instead of abstract review is a 
further procedural element adapting the Constitutional Courts better to the ideal 
of democracy. The concrete review typology, by allowing the parties of a case to 
raise a possible question of constitutionality, implements a relative ‘socialization’ 
of the constitutional review. By this expression is meant that, though in relative 
terms due to the filtering presence of the court invested by the case, concrete con-
stitutional review gives the possibility for a wider spectrum of actors in a certain 
national community to stimulate the control and the respect of the constitution.
Instead of leaving the entire commencement procedures in the hands of public 
authorities (as for the abstract review typology), concrete review better fits in the 
idea of democracy by transferring the starting mechanisms to the hands of those 
who are the direct addressees of a certain provision thought to be unconstitu-
tional. This transfer to the social arena provided by the concrete review typology 
is furthermore strengthened if it is paralleled by the extension of the number of 
institutional actors that can access and promote the judicial constitutional review. 
In particular, Constitutional Courts are more aligned with the ideal of democracy 
if the procedures governing their work allow ‘groups of interests’ relevant for the 
case (e.g. NGOs in human rights issues) to participate and help private parties in 
cases in front of the Constitutional Courts. Moreover, this ‘democratization’ of 
the constitutional review procedures can be strengthened by parallel reforms of 
procedural law allowing these groups of interests to participate in various trials 
where the issue of constitutionality can be then raised.
Another aspect to consider is introducing the mechanism of dissenting opinions. 
In this way, the various positions of justices, somehow mirroring the complexity 
of the issue among the community, can be represented entirely behind the legal 
reasoning leading to a certain decision. Introducing the mechanism of dissenting 
opinions also allows the legal discourse to get closer to those discourses in the 
other sub-systems. In controversial questions (e.g. euthanasia), in particular, the 
legal discourse, which tends to operate in a binary way (‘either-or’), will be struc-
turally more in touch with the other kind of discourses (e.g. cultural discourses), 
which can present a range of possible intermediate solutions. Moreover, as shown 
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for example by US constitutional law history, the dissenting opinion of today can 
become the majority opinion for tomorrow or, in other words, it can lead the path 
for future decision-making and law-making developments.
A final suggestion in the direction of making the work of Constitutional Courts 
more in-line with the ideal of democracy here assumed, should be in the direction 
of opening to the public (and to the media in particular) the very proceedings of 
discussion of constitutional review. This, for instance, can be done by modeling 
the phase of debate as more similar to a ‘normal’ trial than as to the usual ‘behind 
closed doors’ decision-making process, the latter being closer to the political par-
ties or group interests’ way of taking fundamental decision (i.e. political actors).
In summary, pointing out the ‘undemocratic’ nature of decisions taken by justices 
is a never-ending debate, and probably, a question without a concrete solution, 
as justices are legal actors who will, and should, always play a political function. 
Instead, by focusing on the procedural aspects surrounding the work of Constitu-
tional Courts, the above-mentioned suggestions open the courts to the scrutiny of 
and availability to larger segments of the community, and in the end, render the 
entire system of constitutional judicial review closer to the ideal of participative 
democracy.51
9. Conclusion
In the light of the debate as to judicial activism, in particular at the constitutional 
level, this work has investigated the issue of whether Constitutional Courts should 
be considered primarily legal or political actors and whether they really should be 
targeted for the political accusation of being ‘undemocratic.’ After having stressed 
in Part II the importance of Constitutional Court ‘activism’ inside the general 
issue of judicial activism, Part III pointed out the reasons why Constitutional 
Courts in established Western democracies can be seen as occupying an ‘in-the-
middle’ position between the legal arena and the political arena. The central Parts 
IV and V then stressed the importance of the reasons why Constitutional Courts 
can be defined, from a legal theoretical perspective, as legal actors, though playing 
a political function. Part VI sketched certain of the consequences of this ‘legal’ 
characterization of Constitutional Courts, in particular as far as concerns the 
wrongfulness of absorbing judicial activism at the constitutional level (and the 
work of Constitutional Courts in general) in the general discussion about democ-
racy. Finally, Part VII presented some possible examples of making the work of 
Constitutional Courts more ‘compatible’ with the Habermas ideal of democratic 
form of political organization, in particular focusing on the need of shifting from 
a ‘democratic’ Constitutional Court decisions to a ‘democratic’ Constitutional 
Courts procedures.
51 See Waldron 2001 supra, p. 276: “[P]rocedural rules… make participation possible, by setting out 
a matrix of interaction in which particular contributions can take their place and ‘register’.”
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In conclusion, criticizing Constitutional Courts for not fulfilling the democracy 
criterion is like criticizing a soccer referee for not being democratic because he or 
she does not follow the teams’ beliefs on controversial decisions during a match. 
As for political parties, the teams’ belief can eventually become a criterion in 
choosing a certain referee (as for justices in the United States), or in adopting 
certain types of basic rules at the beginning of the tournament or in the deciding 
of playing a certain tournament or even in later changing the rules of the game. 
However, once the teams have decided to be in the tournament and to play by the 
fundamental rules, while playing the match the teams’ belief systems cannot and 
ought not to be used in evaluating how the referee should apply the fundamental 
rules of the game: a soccer referee can be criticized for having applied the wrong 
rule or of having misjudged the situation to which the rule was applied, but not 
for being ‘undemocratic.’52
As for soccer, one of the essential elements for having a real, functioning, and fair 
to everybody democracy perhaps is having ‘undemocratic’ chosen referees for the 
match, who apply during it rules felt as ‘undemocratic’ both by one team’s players 
and fans.
52 See Stephen Holmes, Passion and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995, p. 163-164, as to the different types of constitutive rules and regu-
lative rules. But see Waldron 2001 supra, p. 277.





Adjudicative Independence: Canadian Perspectives
John Evans
1. Introduction
Judicial independence is for judges what academic freedom is for professors. Both 
are generally acknowledged as indispensable. Judicial independence is the bed-
rock of the rule of law in a democratic society because it allows for the impartial 
adjudication of disputes according to law, free from external influences. Academic 
freedom protects the dispassionate pursuit of truth through research, writing, and 
teaching. These principles preserve the legitimacy of the institutions and activi-
ties to which they relate and thereby protect the fundamental public interests in 
justice, and in advancing our understanding of the world, society, and the human 
condition.
Both concepts are, however, contingent and contested at the margins. Govern-
ments are tempted to rail against judicial decisions that do not conform to their 
policy preferences or political interests, and to call into question the legitimacy of 
decision-makers who are neither elected, nor politically accountable to the Legis-
lature or the Executive. It is never too difficult to arouse a suspicion in the public 
that judicial independence and academic freedom are merely devices created by 
judges and professors to ensure that their privileges and policy preferences are 
beyond the reach of the public at large and its elected representatives.
On the other hand, judges and professors can stretch the concepts of judicial 
independence and academic freedom beyond their intended goals; they are not all 
about us, but about the respective public interests that they serve. To be frank, we 
are both rather good at persuading ourselves, if not others, that our professional 
and personal interests are one and the same as the public good. The danger is that 
unduly expanding these concepts will discredit them and render them incapable 
of performing their essential functions.
Judicial independence and academic freedom must also be dynamic concepts if 
they are to remain functional. They must evolve in response to new demands 
and challenges relating to, for example: the proper roles of the judiciary and the 
academy in contemporary society; competing and growing demands for public 
*
* J.M. Evans is Judge in the Federal Court of Appeal, Canada. He wishes to thank Kathrin Furniss, 
his law clerk for the judicial year 2011-12, for her substantial contributions to the preparation of 
this paper. Her work here, as in all other aspects of her professional responsibilities, is character-
ized by diligent research and perceptiveness.
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accountability in the exercise of power and use of scarce resources; and changing 
demographics and societal values.
In Canada, the independence of the judiciary has traditionally and principally been 
concerned with protecting judges from attempts by the government to improperly 
influence the course or outcome of litigation, whether or not the government is 
a party. Another important aspect of judicial independence concerns the insti-
tutional independence of courts. While the Executive retains overall financial 
control by setting courts’ budgets, some aspects of the operation of courts are so 
closely linked to the adjudication of cases that judicial independence requires that 
they be left within the control of the court itself, normally acting through its chief 
justice.1 These core areas of judicial administration include: the assignment of 
judges to cases; the sittings of the court; the establishment of court lists; the allo-
cation of courtrooms; and the direction of the court staff engaged in carrying out 
these and other functions connected to the performance of judges’ adjudicative 
responsibilities. Institutional independence as an aspect of judicial independence 
is not discussed further in this paper.2
Maintaining the confidence of the public in the impartial and independent charac-
ter of the judiciary is of vital importance to the rule of law. The legal arrangements 
for securing judicial independence must therefore be sufficiently robust to satisfy 
a sceptical public that its judges will decide cases according to law, without fear 
or favour. The legal test of judicial independence is objective: would a reasonably 
informed person, having thought the matter through in a practical manner, con-
clude that the judge was independent?3
Political culture and public opinion give judicial independence its vitality; both 
the Legislature and the Executive (and particularly its political heads, the Minis-
ters) must be mindful not to trespass on terrain of the Judiciary and thus bring 
into question its independence. They should, for example, not voice criticisms of 
individual judicial decisions that, because of their content or tone, might appear to 
members of the public as likely to intimidate judges and thus to call into question 
their independence. This, of course, is in no way to say that judges and their deci-
sions are above or immune from vigorous criticism from public and politicians 
alike. But there are lines that, in the interests of maintaining judicial independ-
ence, should not be crossed.
The first half of my paper gives a brief account of the constitutional framework 
within which judicial independence is secured in Canada, and compares judges 
and members of administrative tribunals in this regard. The second part describes 
three contemporary pressure points where judicial independence comes up 
1 See R. v. Valente, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673 (Valente case).
2 See further, Fabien Gélinas, Judicial Independence in Canada: A Critical Overview, in Anja 
 Seibert-Fohr (ed.), Judicial Independence in Transition, Springer, Heidelberg, 2012, p. 567. 
3 Valente case supra footnote 1, paras. 21-22.
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against the competing principle of accountability: the processes for the appoint-
ment of judges, for the determination of judges’ salaries and pensions, and for 
the disposition of complaints of judicial misconduct. The Constitution does not 
deal expressly with any of these issues, although the constitutional guarantees of 
judges’ security of tenure and financial security form an essential backdrop. And 
it is to this that I now turn.
2. The Constitutional Framework
1. The Judiciary
If political culture and public opinion provide the necessary vitality to judicial 
independence, the law and the Constitution provide its essential form and struc-
ture. Canada is a federation and is in some respects very decentralized; however, 
compared with the United States, the federal level of government plays a relatively 
small role in the regulation of trade and commerce. For example, only last year, 
the Supreme Court of Canada declared unconstitutional a federal Bill creating a 
federal scheme for the regulation of the capital market and securities industry.4
However, the Constitution Act, 1867, which sets out the division of powers between 
the provinces and the central government, does not rigorously apply the federal 
principle to the judiciary, unlike the Constitutions of the United States, and Aus-
tralia for example. Thus, section 96 confers on the federal government the power 
to appoint the judges of the superior courts and courts of appeal in each of the ten 
provinces and the three territories, which administer both provincial and federal 
law within their borders. Section 101 also authorizes the federal Parliament to 
create additional courts for the administration of federal law (currently, the Tax 
Court of Canada,5 the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal6), and “a General 
Court of Appeal for Canada” – the Supreme Court of Canada, our national court of 
last resort from provincial courts of appeal and the Federal Court of Appeal. The 
federal government appoints the judges of the section 101 courts, and is responsi-
ble for paying the salaries and pensions of the all the judges it appoints.
4 Reference re Securities Act, 2011 SCC 66.
5 Formerly the Tax Review Board, the Tax Court of Canada principally hears appeals by taxpayers 
from federal income tax and goods and services tax (analogous to VAT) assessments.
6 The Federal Courts were established in 1971 by the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7. They 
decide disputes governed by wide areas of federal law, including disputes between individu-
als and the federal government and its agencies (federal administrative law), taxation appeals, 
intellectual property, Aboriginal law, maritime law, and any issues of constitutional law arising 
therefrom. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada, also a statutory court and created in 1875, 
determines disputes involving constitutional law, provincial laws (statutory and non-statutory, 
the civil law of Quebec and the common law of other jurisdictions), and federal laws, including 
the Criminal Code.
106
II – Independence and Accountability of Judges and Adjudicators
On the other hand, the administration of justice in the provinces is the responsi-
bility of the provincial level of government.7 This includes the creation, operation, 
and financing of the courts in the province (including those in which federally 
appointed judge sit) and the appointment of judges to the courts below the level of 
the superior courts. Provincially appointed judges decide all but the most serious 
criminal cases, as well as cases involving aspects of family law and the welfare of 
children. There is a right of appeal from the provincial court of a province to its 
superior court.
Drawing on the British Act of Settlement of 1701, Canada’s Constitution Act, 1867 
sets out the three basic safeguards of independence for the judges of the superior 
courts: tenure in office until the age of 75 during good behaviour; dismissal from 
office only on an address passed by both Houses of the federal Parliament; and a 
salary and pension provided by Act of Parliament.8
These explicit protections of the independence of superior court judges do not 
apply to judges of the lower courts appointed by provincial governments.9 How-
ever, in 1997, the Supreme Court extended to provincial court judges the protec-
tions of the basic principles of security of tenure, salary, and pension.10 It held that 
judicial independence is an unwritten principle of the Constitution that extends 
beyond its specific provisions; guarantees of security of tenure, salary, and pen-
sion analogous to those of superior court judges apply to all judges.11
7 Constitution Act 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3, s. 92(14).
8 The relevant text of the Constitution Act 1867, ibid., reads as follows:
  “99 (1) Subject to subsection two of this section, the Judges of the Superior Courts shall hold 
office during good behaviour, but shall be removable by the Governor General on Address of the 
Senate and House of Commons.
 (2) A Judge of a Superior Court, whether appointed before or after the coming into force of 
this section, shall cease to hold office upon attaining the age of seventy-five years, or upon the 
coming into force of this section if at that time he has already attained that age.
 100. The Salaries, Allowances, and Pensions of the Judges of the Superior, District, and County 
Courts (except the Courts of Probate in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick), and of the Admiralty 
Courts in Cases where the Judges thereof are for the Time being paid by Salary, shall be fixed and 
provided by the Parliament of Canada.”
9 Nor is it altogether clear that these provisions apply to judges of the courts created by federal 
legislation under section 101. Section 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c. 11 (Char-
ter) provides that those charged with offences are entitled to a trial before an independent and 
impartial tribunal. This provision applies to provincial courts when exercising their criminal, but 
not their civil jurisdiction.
10 Reference Re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 
3 ( Judges’ Remuneration Reference). If judges of the federally created courts are not within the 
express provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867, they are certainly covered by this decision.
11 See supra footnote 9.
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2. Administrative Tribunals
Unlike judges of the courts, members of administrative tribunals, whether federal 
or provincial, enjoy no constitutional protection for their independence.12 This 
may seem particularly surprising given that governments, both federal and pro-
vincial, are parties to most administrative proceedings in Canada, and often have 
a stake in the outcome that goes well beyond the particular case.
Nonetheless, in Ocean Port Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor 
Control and Licensing Branch)13 the Supreme Court of Canada held that admin-
istrative tribunals are part of the Executive branch of government because their 
function is to implement government policy in the context of particular facts. 
Accordingly, members of administrative tribunals do not enjoy the kind of protec-
tion of their independence that in the Judges’ Remuneration Reference the Supreme 
Court found implicit in the Constitution for judges not covered by the specific 
provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Ocean Port has been the subject of much critical commentary by scholars and 
others who have pointed out that the bright line drawn by the Supreme Court 
between courts and administrative tribunals is too stark. While some administra-
tive bodies certainly fulfil the policy implementation function described by the 
Supreme Court in Ocean Port, others are better described as “rights tribunals” 
and are much more akin to courts. It is thus arguably inappropriate to deny to 
members of all administrative tribunals any constitutional guarantee of indepen-
dence to protect tribunal members from improper interference by government 
with their decisions.14 The criticisms made of Ocean Port include the following.
12 The only hint of constitutional guarantee of the independence of all adjudicative decision-mak-
ers appears in subsection 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, which provides 
that individuals’ legal rights and obligations must be determined by a “fair hearing in accord-
ance with the principles of fundamental justice”. The Bill of Rights was enacted by the Parlia-
ment of Canada in 1960, and was a precursor of the Charter, ibid., which is a part of Canada’s 
formal Constitution. While described as having ‘quasi-constitutional status’, the Bill of Rights is 
a federal statute and therefore does not apply to legislation, administrative acts, or institutions 
of provincial governments. Before the Charter, the courts construed the Bill of Rights narrowly; 
since the Charter, it has been largely ignored. Nonetheless, it is still in force and contains some 
provisions, such as the enjoyment of property described in section 1(a), which are not found in 
the Charter. See generally Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (5th ed.), Thomson Reuters, 
Toronto, 2007, chapter 35 (loose-leaf, consulted on 8 May 2012). The procedural fairness of a 
decision of an administrative tribunal may also be challenged in judicial review proceedings on 
the ground that the tribunal was not independent. However, since this is a common law rule, 
it may be excluded by statute either expressly or by necessary implication. See Brown & Evans, 
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (6th ed.), Canvasback, Toronto, 2011, chapter 11 
at p. 21-25, 69-74 (loose-leaf, consulted on 14 May, 2012). 
13 2001 SCC 52, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 781 (Ocean Port case).
14 See e.g. Ron Ellis, Fair Hearings in an Ocean Port World: A Textured Concept, Journal of Law and 
Social Policy, Vol. 18, 2003, p. 46; Ron Ellis, The Justicizing of Quasi-Judicial Tribunals. Part I, 
Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practise, Vol. 19, 2006, No. 3, p. 303 & Ron Ellis, The 
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First, there is little functional difference between what courts and many adminis-
trative “rights tribunals” do. Both adjudicate disputes between individuals (includ-
ing the government) and determine their rights and obligations on the basis of 
findings of fact, apply the relevant law to those facts, and exercise their discretion 
over the award of the appropriate remedy or some other aspect of the dispute.
Second, these functional similarities are reflected in their decision-making pro-
cesses. The common law rules of natural justice and the duty of procedural fair-
ness, or their statutory codifications, provide for participatory procedures that are 
to a large extent simplified versions of the procedures followed by the courts.
Third, whether a legislature entrusts the resolution of disputes arising from a 
statutory scheme to a court or a specialist tribunal may be more a question of 
practicality than principle. Further, whether an adjudicative body is called a court 
or a tribunal is little guide to its functions, powers, or formality. For example, 
the chair of the Competition Tribunal is a Federal Court Judge, as are some of its 
members, and its powers and procedures closely resemble those of courts. On 
the other hand, provincial small claims courts, which deal mainly with consumer 
disputes involving small sums of money, are highly informal.
Fourth, many administrative tribunals deal with matters involving relatively small 
amounts of money (social assistance, employment insurance, workers’ entitlement 
to vacation pay or minimum wage, and disputes between landlords and tenants, 
for example). However, small sums of money may be very important to those of 
modest means. The larger sums of money at stake in commercial disputes that end 
up in a superior court are not necessarily more important to the parties concerned.
Some administrative tribunals regularly adjudicate disputes involving constitu-
tional rights: the Immigration and Refugee Board,15 the National Parole Board, 
mental competency tribunals, and human rights tribunals,16 for instance. Indeed, 
most adjudicative tribunals also have express or implicit jurisdiction to decide 
questions of constitutional law necessary to dispose of a matter properly before 
them, to determine the constitutional validity of provisions of the statute under 
which they operate, and to fashion an appropriate remedy for breach of an indi-
vidual’s constitutional right.17
Justicizing of Quasi-Judicial Tribunals. Part II, Canadian Journal of Administrative Law & Practise, 
Vol. 20, 2007, No. 1, p. 69.
15 A determination by the Board to accept or reject a person’s claim for refugee status in Canada 
may literally be a question of life or death. 
16 Human rights tribunals adjudicate disputes arising under anti-discrimination legislation. These 
disputes often have constitutional overtones, in the sense that they may raise issues very similar 
to those arising under the constitutional guarantee of equality and freedom from discrimination 
in section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 8. The Charter was added 
to the Canadian Constitution in 1982.
17 R. v. Conway, 2010 SCC 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 (Conway case).
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The truth of the matter is that administrative tribunals are immensely varied in 
the functions they perform, the powers they exercise, and the seriousness of the 
impact that they have on the rights and interests of individuals. Tribunals are 
normally specifically created and designed to decide disputes arising from the 
administration of a particular statutory program or a cluster of programs in a 
given area (“land use planning” or “social justice”, for example).18 While some 
are truly adjudicative (“rights tribunals”), others render individual decisions, or 
make general rules and policies, that are governed more by the exercise of broad 
discretion and public policy choices than by the application of more or less precise 
statutory standards to individual facts.
On the other hand, tribunals created to regulate an area of economic activity 
(telecommunications, energy, foreign investment, and securities, for example) 
typically render their decisions on the basis of broad statutory grants of discre-
tion which call for the balancing of competing interests in order to determine 
where the public interest lies. It may be appropriate to keep those exercising these 
powers on a shorter political leash. One model of independence may well not fit all 
administrative decision-makers. Critics argue that the Ocean Port decision fails to 
acknowledge this.19
I should note here one constitutional interface between the courts and adminis-
trative adjudication, which relates to the independence of courts and the lack of 
similar guarantees for administrative tribunals. The Canadian Constitution does 
not expressly guarantee a right to judicial review of decisions made by administra-
tive bodies affecting individuals’ legal rights, even though the decision-maker is 
not independent of the Executive and, like decisions made by courts, the decision 
turns on the interpretation of legislation and the finding of facts.20
However, the Supreme Court has held that provincial legislatures may not entirely 
exclude decisions of administrative tribunals from judicial review in the superior 
courts.21 The Court inferred this limitation from the power of the federal govern-
ment under section 96 of the Constitution Act to appoint judges to the superior 
courts in the provinces. The Court reasoned that it would make a mockery of this 
18 The province of Ontario recently ‘clustered’ adjudicative tribunals working in similar areas 
through the Adjudicative Tribunals Accountability, Governance and Appointments Act, 2009, S.O. 
2009, c. 33 Schedule 5, ss. 15-19.
19 See supra note 14. It is also notable that the Supreme Court subsequently appeared to recognize 
the varied character of administrative bodies (see Bell Canada v. Canadian Telephone Employees 
Assn., 2003 SCC 36, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 884 at paras. 21-22). The issue of administrative indepen-
dence has not been fully resolved.
20 Of course, if the decision affects a person’s constitutionally protected rights, it is always possible 
to challenge the decision in a superior court. Tribunals’ decisions engaging the constitution are 
always subject to review.
21 Crevier v. Attorney General for Québec, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 220 (Crevier). Previously, courts had nar-
rowly interpreted clauses limiting judicial review so that they did not preclude decisions that 
were beyond the tribunal’s ‘jurisdiction’. The preclusive clause considered in Crevier was held to 
exclude all judicial review, even of decisions outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
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appointing power if provinces could remove the core jurisdiction of the courts in 
which federally appointed judges sit and give to a provincial tribunal the power 
to decide the limits of its own jurisdiction without the possibility of review in the 
superior courts.
Nowadays, this constitutional right to judicial review is viewed as based on 
the rule of law, rather than on the division of powers between the federal and 
provincial levels of government. In particular, it reflects the notion that no one’s 
legal rights or duties may be conclusively determined by an administrative body 
(whose members may not have the essential protections of independence) without 
some level of scrutiny by an independent court.22
3. Three Current Pressure Points
Judicial independence is not an absolute value, but must be balanced against other 
constitutional principles. As mentioned earlier, in recent years judicial indepen-
dence has been important in Canada in three areas: the processes for appointing 
judges, fixing the level of judges’ compensation, and for disciplining judges for 
misconduct. In each instance, the task has been to design a process that appropri-
ately balances judicial independence and political or public accountability.
1. Judicial Appointments
If judicial independence were an absolute principle, then judicial appointments 
would be free from all political influence. However, democratic principles require 
political accountability for the appointment of senior public office-holders, includ-
ing judges. In a parliamentary system of government such as Canada’s, politi-
cal accountability is secured through the Minister responsible for making the 
appointment. The question is how to find a process that strikes a satisfactory bal-
ance between these competing principles.
The approximately 1,100 judges of the superior courts in Canada are appointed 
by the federal government from members of the Bar of the Province or Terri-
tory where they are to sit.23 The legal profession in Canada is organized on the 
common law model, in the sense that law students do not elect a career as a judge 
or an advocate. Candidates for judicial appointment must have been qualified to 
practise law for at least ten years.24 In their pre-judicial lives, most judges will 
22 Since Crevier, ibid., administrative law has seen the virtual disappearance of the concept of ‘juris-
dictional’ provisions in an enabling statute. It is therefore difficult to define how much judicial 
review is constitutionally guaranteed. For most purposes, it may extend only to administrative 
tribunal decisions that can be shown to be unreasonable. With or without a preclusive clause 
limiting judicial review, courts normally defer to tribunals’ interpretation of their enabling legis-
lation unless it is unreasonable.
23 Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 97 and 98.
24 Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. J-1, s. 3. In fact, most appointees have been lawyers for at least twenty 
years.
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have been in private practice as lawyers; government lawyers and, more rarely, law 
professors (like me) are also appointed from time to time.
In Canada, the appointment process for all federally appointed judges, other than 
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, has three stages. First, under a non-statu-
tory process introduced in 1988, an advisory committee in each province assesses 
the qualifications of lawyers who have applied for a judicial appointment. On the 
basis of a candidate’s letter of application, and informal and confidential consulta-
tions within the profession, the committee determines whether to recommend 
or not recommend the candidate as suitable for a judicial appointment. These 
committees comprise judges, lawyers, and non-lawyer nominees of the federal 
Minister of Justice. The committees’ confidential recommendations are sent to the 
Minister of Justice. About 40% of applicants are recommended.
Ministers are not in law bound by the committees’ recommendations. However, 
they have undertaken not to appoint candidates whom a committee has not recom-
mended. Nonetheless, this is a relatively small restriction of the Government’s 
appointment power because at any given time the number of those recommended 
by an advisory committee for judicial appointment exceeds the number of judicial 
vacancies. In addition, the present Government instructed the advisory commit-
tees that candidates were to be put into one of only two categories: recommended 
or not recommended for judicial appointment. Previously, candidates had been 
ranked as highly qualified, qualified, or not qualified.
At the second stage, the Minister recommends to the Cabinet the name of a person 
to be appointed to a particular position. At this stage, political “jockeying” may 
occur among “recommended” candidates. Third, the Minister recommends to 
Cabinet the appointment of a particular person to a vacancy. Cabinet usually, but 
by no means always, accepts the Minister’s recommendation.
This process has attracted much criticism recently, not because of the quality of 
those appointed as judges, but because it is non-transparent and overly politically 
partisan.25 Although not traditionally seen as relevant to the post-appointment 
independence of judges, the present appointment system has also been criticised 
on the ground that it puts the perceived independence of judges into question in 
two respects.
25 See e.g. Lorne Sossin, Judicial Appointment, Democratic Aspirations, and the Culture of 
Accountability, University of New Brunswick Law Journal, Vol. 58, 2008, p. 11; Troy Riddell, Lori 
Hausegger & Matthew Henniger, Federal Judicial Appointments: A Look at Patronage in Fed-
eral Judicial Appointments since 1988, University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 58, 2008, p. 39. It 
is also said that the current appointment process has resulted in the recent appointment of too 
few women and members of visible minorities (see e.g. Jeff Bassett, Minority lawyers demand 
diversity among appointed judges, The Globe and Mail (8 March 2012), <m.theglobeandmail.
com>). The legitimacy of the exercise of judicial power depends in part at least on judges being 
representative of the population as a whole.
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First, it might be thought that a judge appointed through political connections is 
likely to be disposed to find in favour of the government who appointed him or her, 
as a matter of gratitude or loyalty. Judicial security of tenure after appointment 
only goes so far by way of ensuring judicial independence. Loyalties may be seen 
as persisting after appointment, and the possibility of promotion to a higher court 
may be regarded as an additional inducement to favour the government side in 
litigation.26
Second, it may be thought that Governments will tend to appoint judges who 
share their particular ideology on, for example, law and order, environmental 
issues, or labour relations. The independence or impartiality of such judges may 
be regarded as suspect because of their ideological inclinations.
Not surprisingly, commentators complain that the determination of a litigant’s 
legal rights, or the length of a prison sentence imposed on a person convicted 
of a crime, should not depend on whether a case comes before Judge X who was 
appointed by one Government, or Judge Y who was appointed by another. Indeed, 
a recent academic study has attracted public attention because it purports to show 
a wide disparity among judges of the Federal Court in the frequency with which 
they have granted leave to applicants seeking judicial review of tribunal decisions 
in immigration and refugee cases.27 The author argues that his study suggests 
that judges appointed by the present Government are more likely to find in favour 
of the Minister than those appointed by previous Governments.
I express no view on the validity of the methodology employed in this study or on 
the soundness of its conclusions. I would only say that judging is as much art as 
science; finding the facts, formulating the legal rule relevant to a given case, and 
applying it to the facts, are far from being mechanical exercises. Judges inevitably 
bring to these tasks, especially in close cases, a perspective shaped by their life 
experiences, values, and personal philosophy.
Provinces have their own processes for appointing judges to provincial courts. 
The process in Ontario, Canada’s largest and most culturally diverse province, 
is widely admired.28 Vacancies are advertised and applications are invited. The 
selection committee conducts formal interviews with candidates and places three 
names before the provincial Attorney General, who is normally expected to select 
from this list. The process is believed to have greatly reduced the role of partisan 
political influence in judicial appointments and to have resulted in a Bench that 
is not only very competent, but also closely reflects the gender, ethnic, and racial 
26 The promotion of judges to higher courts is entirely a matter for the Minister of Justice. Might 
a reasonably informed person think that judges interested in promotion would be reluctant to 
make decision that would displease the Government?
27 Sean Rehaag, Judicial Review of Refugee Determinations: The Luck of the Draw?, Queen’s Law 
Journal, Vol. 38, 2012, No. 1, p. 1-58.
28 Ontario’s appointment process is described in: Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee, 
Annual Report for 2010, Ontario Court of Justice, Toronto, 2011, p. 13-20 www.ontario courts.ca>.
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diversity of the Province, and is perceived as independent. Giving the Minister the 
power to select from among three names ensures an appropriate level of political 
accountability.
The appointment by the federal government of the nine judges to Canada’s high-
est court, the Supreme Court of Canada, has attracted much media attention in 
recent years, largely because of the public’s awareness of the Court’s increased 
powers following the addition of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to the 
Constitution in 1982, which has brought many controversial issues to the Court. 
Charter cases have included challenges to the validity of legislation concerning the 
refugee determination process, a woman’s right to an abortion, child pornography, 
and collective bargaining rights.29 The Charter has also been the basis for chal-
lenging the validity of Ministers’ decisions to close a safe injection drug facility, 
and to refuse to request the United States to return a Canadian citizen detained in 
the Guantanamo Bay facility.30
Nonetheless, appointments to our Supreme Court have not so far been ideologi-
cally-driven to anywhere near the same extent as in the United States, where law 
and order, racial equality, reproductive rights, religion and the state, and sexual 
orientation are highly divisive political issues.
Recent changes to the process for appointing judges to the Supreme Court of 
Canada are designed to make it more transparent. Although the precise details 
of this non-statutory process remain in flux, the essential elements seem to be as 
follows.31
First, after consulting broadly in the legal community, the Minister of Justice iden-
tifies six or more candidates to fill a vacancy on the Court. Second, these names 
go to an all-party advisory committee composed of Members of Parliament, which 
consults broadly and evaluates the candidates identified by the Minister and 
reduces the Minister’s list to three names. Third, the prime minister nominates 
29 See Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 (refugee process); R. v. 
Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 (abortion); R. v. Sharpe, 2001 SCC 2, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (child por-
nography); Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British Columbia, 
2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR 391 (collective bargaining).
30 See Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 
134 (safe injection); Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (return of 
Guantanamo detainee).
31 See Sossin 2008 supra; Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, Policy Preferences and Appointments 
to the Supreme Court of Canada, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 47, 2009, No. 1, p. 6-12. The 
composition of the nine-judge Supreme Court of Canada is regional. That is, three judges must 
by law come from the Province of Québec (Canada’s only civil law and francophone jurisdiction); 
and by convention three come from Ontario (Canada’s most populous province), and one from 
British Columbia, one from the three provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan or Manitoba, and one 
from the Atlantic region provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador. When a judge retires, his or her successor will be appointed from 
the same region.
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one of these candidates. Fourth, the chosen candidate appears at a televised hear-
ing held by an all-party parliamentary committee, at which he or she makes a state-
ment of their judicial philosophy and answers questions from Parliamentarians. 
Fifth, the prime minister makes the final selection and the person is appointed by 
order in council.
It is too early to say how broadly acceptable this process will prove to be. Suffice it 
to say that critics complain that it still leaves too much power in the hands of the 
Executive and provides too little by way of accountability for its exercise. In my 
view, the larger question is whether judicial independence requires a more radical 
de-politicisation of the appointment process for all federally appointed judges.
I suspect that the time may be ripe for a serious conversation in Canada along 
these lines. Ontario’s appointment process, in both design and operation, offers a 
very attractive alternative model. It appears to have produced high quality judges 
and strengthened judicial independence, while retaining with the Minister the 
ultimate power to appoint and effective political accountability for its exercise. In 
my opinion, the processes for the appointment of judges by the federal govern-
ment should be tilted more to enhancing judicial independence, and political 
power (and hence accountability) reduced.
2. Judicial Compensation
Financial security is an important aspect of judicial independence. Hence, sec-
tion 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867 requires that judges be paid such salaries 
and pensions as are prescribed in a statute enacted by the Parliament of Canada. 
However, section 100 is silent on the process by which the appropriate level of 
statutory compensation is to be determined. In a parliamentary system of govern-
ment, such as Canada’s, the Executive effectively determines the levels of judicial 
compensation as part of its responsibility for the expenditure of public funds, at 
least when it has a parliamentary majority. The challenge is to design a process 
for determining judges’ compensation that both safeguards judicial independence 
and recognizes governmental accountability for the expenditure of public funds.
Here is the problem. In one form or another, the federal government is a frequent 
litigant before the superior courts. Indeed, no other litigant appears as frequently 
in either the Federal Courts or the Supreme Court of Canada. The fact that judges 
are dependent on a frequent litigant for maintaining or increasing their levels 
of compensation may lead to a public perception that judges are likely to find in 
favour of the government in litigation, especially in politically sensitive cases, in 
order to protect their own financial interests.
The Constitution provides no mechanisms for dealing with this delicate issue. 
However, this did not deter the Supreme Court of Canada in the Judges’ Remunera-
tion Reference from establishing the governing principles. The case concerned the 
validity of legislated reductions of the salaries of provincial court judges in three 
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provinces, as part of across-the-board cuts to remuneration in the public service in 
the provinces concerned.
The Court stated that it was entirely inconsistent with judicial independence for 
judges to negotiate with the Executive over compensation increases, decreases, 
or freezes. On the other hand, the Court also recognized that it would be unfair 
to require judges to wait passively for whatever the Government might decide to 
do, if anything, with respect to judicial compensation. To allow governmental 
inaction over time to reduce the purchasing power of judicial compensation is 
inconsistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of section 100 of the Constitution Act 
which provides that the salaries and pensions of superior court judges must be 
fixed by Act of Parliament. The Court resolved the tension between the Executive’s 
responsibility for public expenditure and judicial independence by inferring from 
the “unwritten constitutional principle” of judicial independence the institutional 
mechanisms for determining judicial compensation, which Parliament has now 
codified.32
Every four years, an independent commission is struck to make recommendations 
to the government, on the basis of objective criteria, on the levels of judicial com-
pensation.33 One member of the commission is appointed by the federal Govern-
ment, and one by the Superior Court Judges Association; the chair is appointed 
by the other two members. The parties make written and oral submissions to the 
commission, and adduce evidence, on the basis of which the commission makes 
recommendations to the Government in a published report. The Government 
must respond within six months. Governments are not bound to implement these 
recommendations because they are ultimately responsible for public finances. 
However, if they do not accept a commission’s recommendations, they must pro-
vide reasons for their decision. Similar provisions have been enacted by provincial 
legislatures for dealing with the salaries of judges appointed by the provinces.
It was anticipated that governments would normally implement the recommenda-
tions of an independent and well-informed commission. But this is not how it 
has worked out. Commission reports have generally been regarded as carefully 
researched and reasoned, and balanced in their recommendations. However, 
governments have given them relatively little deference. The present federal 
Government has twice significantly reduced the salary increases recommended 
by two commissions. Judges of the superior courts are yet to follow the exam-
ple of some provincial court judges and applied for judicial review of the legal-
32 Judges Act, R.S.C. 1985, c J-1, ss. 25-26.3.
33 If, mid-way through a four-year cycle, economic conditions require a reduction in judicial salaries 
a part of a broader program of public sector wage restraint, the government would convene a 
commission and obtain its recommendation. The Judges’ Remuneration Reference also held that 
the government could not reduce judicial salaries to a point that judges’ independence was in 
jeopardy. The concept of a constitutionally guaranteed wage for judges, and defined by judges, 
has provoked some skepticism among commentators!
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ity of the Executive’s exercise of its statutory discretion not to accept commission 
recommendations.34
It is obvious that the system is not working well. In my view, the Commission 
process is unduly formalistic, expensive, and adversarial. The results are too often 
unacceptable to the ultimate paymaster. The not uncommon applications by pro-
vincial court judges for judicial review by superior court judges of government 
compensation decisions are frankly embarrassing. The public may be right to be 
sceptical of a system for determining judges’ pay in which the judges write the 
rules, referee disputes, and are players of the game!35 This is an area in which, in 
my opinion, the concept of judicial independence has been stretched too far.
3. Judicial Discipline
Superior court judges may only be dismissed from office for misconduct following 
a Parliamentary resolution.36 No superior court judge has ever been dismissed, 
although there have been a few “pre-emptive” resignations when dismissal seemed 
a real possibility. Security of tenure is at the heart of judicial independence. A legal 
system in which judges fear dismissal if they render a decision that displeases 
the Government does not comply with the rule of law. The appeal process is the 
34 See e.g. Alberta Provincial Judges’ Association v. Alberta (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 418 (Alta. C.A.) 
(the Alberta Government’s reasons for departing from the commission’s recommendations with 
respect to remuneration of provincial court judges were not rational; the Court ordered imple-
mentation of the recommendations); Manitoba Provincial Judges Assn. v. Manitoba (Minister of 
Justice) (2001), 2001 MBQB 191, 202 D.L.R. (4th) 698 (Man. Q.B.) (commission’s recommen-
dations rejected by the government ordered implemented because the reasons for rejecting 
them were either irrelevant, unsupported by economic facts, did not respond to the specific 
recommendation, or did not provide a proper analysis with respect to the Committee’s con-
cerns); Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 13, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 405 (legis-
lation abolishing supernumerary (part-time) judges unconstitutional because the change was 
not approved by an independent compensation commission); Bodner v. Alberta, 2005 SCC 44, 
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 286 (the reasons given by New Brunswick, Ontario, and Alberta for departing 
from the recommendations were rational; however, the Quebec government needed to recon-
sider the issue, their reasons having been rejected as unreasonable).
35 The Supreme Court’s decision in the Judges’ Remuneration Reference has been subject to con-
siderable negative criticism by commentators. They have argued, among other things, that the 
Court constructed out of whole cloth a legal process for reviewing changes to judges’ salary 
levels that was extremely detailed, cumbersome, and based on dubious legal principles. The 
Court, it was said, had gone too far to protect judicial salaries, for reasons not reasonably con-
nected to judicial independence. See e.g. Robert G. Richards, Provincial Court Judges Decision 
– Case Comment, Saskatchewan Law Review, Vol. 61, 1998, p. 575; Tsvi Kahana, The Constitution 
as a Collective Agreement: Remuneration of Provincial Court Judges in Canada, Queen’s Law 
Journal, Vol. 29, 2004, p. 445; Peter W. Hogg, The Bad Idea of Unwritten Constitutional Princi-
ples: Protecting Judicial Salaries, in Adam Dodek & Lorne Sossin (eds.)., Judicial Independence In 
Context, Irwin Law, Toronto, 2010, p. 25; Lori Sterling & Sean Hanley, The Case for Dialogue in 
the Judicial Remuneration Process, in Adam Dodek & Lorne Sossin (eds.), Judicial Independence 
In Context, Irwin Law, Toronto, 2010, p. 37.
36 Judges of provincial courts enjoy similar protections, though an address by the legislature is not 
required: Judges’ Remuneration Reference at para. 115. 
117
Adjudicative Independence: Canadian Perspectives
normal, public method of correcting errors in the way in which a judge decided a 
case or conducted the proceeding.
However, judges should also be accountable to the public for behaviour, in and out 
of court, that falls short of the standards expected of judges, even if it is not so seri-
ous as to render them unfit to hold office and thus liable to dismissal. The tension 
between judicial independence and accountability has increased with the decline 
of public deference to authority figures, including judges, and a more democratic 
culture.
Not all kinds of judicial misconduct can be appropriately remedied through the 
appeal process, such as: allegations of racist or sexist comments; a pattern of 
chronic delays in rendering judgments or of rudeness to participants in a trial; a 
criminal conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol; and sexual harass-
ment of court staff.
The Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) is a statutory body composed principally 
of chief justices and associate chief justices.37 Its mandate is “to promote effi-
ciency and uniformity, and to improve the quality of judicial service, in superior 
courts …”.38 As part of this mandate the CJC receives complaints of judicial mis-
conduct from members of the public.39
A member of the Judicial Conduct Committee of the CJC reviews each complaint. 
Most complaints are dismissed summarily because, for example, they are about 
a judge’s decision rather than his or her conduct, or concern a provincially rather 
than federally appointed judge.
If a complaint is not immediately resolved in this manner, it is the subject of 
further investigation, sometimes by independent counsel. The report of the inves-
tigation is considered by a Review Panel of three or five judges. If the Panel finds 
the complaint to be unmeritorious, it is dismissed. If the Panel is of the view that 
the complaint has merit, but is not serious enough to warrant possible dismissal, 
the Panel will dismiss the complaint but may express concern or, with the judge’s 
consent, recommend counselling. Up to this point, the process is not public.
However, if the Panel is satisfied that the complaint is sufficiently serious that it 
could result in a finding that the judge is unfit to hold office, it refers the complaint 
to the CJC’s Inquiry Committee. The Committee holds public hearings on the 
complaints referred to it and prepares a report for the full Council of the CJC. If the 
Council concludes on the basis of this report that the judge’s conduct  constitutes 
37 Judges Act supra footnote 32, s. 59.
38 Id., s. 60(1).
39 For an overview of the complaints process, see Gélinas 2012 supra, p. 15-19. The CJC has pub-
lished a handbook or guide for judges, which is couched in general terms: Canadian Judicial 
Council, Ethical Principles for Judges, Canadian Judicial Council, Ottawa, 1998.
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misbehaviour for the purpose of section 99 of the Constitution Act, 1867, it may 
recommend to the Minister of Justice that a resolution be put before Parliament 
that the judge be dismissed from office.
Very few complaints have proceeded to a hearing before the Inquiry Committee; 
most are disposed of summarily by a member of the Judicial Conduct Committee 
without a formal investigation or, less often, by the Review Panel following an 
investigation. For example, in the 2010-2011 fiscal year, the CJC received approxi-
mately 150 complaints, closed 140 complaint files, and had 45 complaint files under 
review at various stages of the process.40 Only 8 complaints have been referred to 
the Inquiry Committee since the CJC’s inception.
These arrangements have attracted criticisms from different quarters. For exam-
ple, some commentators have criticised the process up to the point that a complaint 
is referred to the Inquiry Committee, on the ground that it is overly confidential. 
When the CJC describes in its annual reports the work of the Judicial Conduct 
Committee it does not publish the names of the judges against whom complaints 
have been dismissed. However, publication of more details may undermine a 
judge’s ability to continue in office, even if the complaint is dismissed. Others go 
further and argue that the public can have no confidence in a discipline system 
in which, for the most part, judges investigate each other; disciplinary bodies for 
other professions typically include representatives of the public.
Some judges have also expressed doubts about the complaints process, on the 
ground that the judge against whom a complaint is made is not sufficiently 
informed about the progress of the investigation; some have even questioned 
whether the whole process is compatible with the constitutional guarantee of judi-
cial independence.
All I would say is that balancing judicial independence and public accountabil-
ity in this context is extremely delicate; how much information should be made 
public, and at what stages of the process, can be a difficult judgment call. Further, 
both complainants and judges have an interest in seeing that complaints are pro-
cessed promptly and in a manner that is fair to both. Lay members should also be 
included in the discipline process to prevent it from seeming unduly protective of 
judges. Like any other administrative scheme, the CJC’s discipline process would 
benefit from regular, independent audits. Finally, it is widely acknowledged that 
the judicial irascibility and routine discourtesy to advocates, parties or their wit-
nesses is nowadays a relative rarity.
40 Canadian Judicial Council, A Strong, Effective and Efficient Judiciary: Annual Report 2010-2011, 
Canadian Judicial Council, Ottawa 2011, <www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca>.
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4. Conclusion
As the above examples show, it is never easy to achieve the right balance between 
judicial independence and accountability. In some situations, judicial indepen-
dence can be underweighted and in others, it is given too much importance. 








The judiciary is often characterised as the least dangerous branch of government; 
with the implicit (and sometimes explicit) corollary that the executive is the most 
dangerous branch – especially to the judiciary.1 Depicting relations between 
them might be expected to be a tale of tensions and recurrent conflict. But in 
practice the development of judicial policy and the running of the judicial system 
in the UK has long been managed as a partnership between government and the 
judiciary, which works because of mutual respect and understanding for each 
other’s roles.
Those roles have changed significantly following the greater separation of 
powers introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005. The purpose of this 
chapter is to explore how this changed the nature of the partnership between 
the executive and judiciary, and what impact it has had on their respective res-
ponsibilities for upholding judicial independence and ensuring proper judicial 
accountability. Both in upholding judicial independence and in ensuring judicial 
accountability, the executive will be found to play a stronger role than most lawyers 
and judges might have expected.
No country has a complete separation of powers. But the phrase is simplistic and 
not particularly helpful. (Even in the United States, Supreme Court Justices are 
dependent on the Executive for their appointment and Congress for their fund-
ing). It may be more useful to think in terms of division of powers and functions 
between the different branches of government; and also to be aware of shared 
responsibilities and overlapping functions, as implied by the ‘partnership’ pro-
claimed between the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice.2
* Prof. R. Hazell is Professor of Government and the Constitution, School of Public Policy, Univer-
sity College London, England.
1 In The Federalist no. 78, Alexander Hamilton suggested that the judiciary would always be the 
“least dangerous branch” of the federal government, since it had “no influence over either the 
sword or the purse” and had “neither force nor will, but merely judgment”.
2 Para 1.1 of the 2011 Framework Document for HM Courts and Tribunals Service; but for other 
references to partnership, see e.g. para. 28 of the 2004 Concordat between the Lord Chancellor 
and Lord Chief Justice.
*
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The UK flouted the separation of powers particularly badly, until big constitu-
tional reforms in 2005 which created much greater separation between the Judges 
and the Executive. The Judiciary are now a more separate branch of government, 
and senior judges have more direct responsibility for the leadership and manage-
ment of the Judiciary. This chapter will describe and analyse those reforms, and 
will ask:
– How much separation has there actually been? Who does what in the new divi-
sion of powers and functions?
– Does the new system strengthen or weaken judicial independence, and judi-
cial accountability?
– Have the Judges become more powerful? In what ways? And has the executive 
become less powerful as a result?
The chapter is primarily about the greater separation of powers in England and 
Wales, which is the main legal system in the UK: there are separate legal systems 
in Scotland and Northern Ireland. It focuses on the changed relationship between 
the mainstream judiciary and the Executive, not the new Supreme Court.
2. The ‘old’ Lord Chancellor
Until 2005 the Head of the Judiciary in the UK was a Cabinet minister, the Lord 
Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor was responsible for the judicial appointments 
system, and appointed the judiciary; he determined their pay and pensions; he 
was responsible for investigating complaints against judges, and imposing dis-
cipline; he could dismiss junior judges; he provided and managed the Courts 
Service. In an extraordinary breach of separation of powers, he could also sit as 
a judge in the highest court: the last Lord Chancellor to do so was Lord Irvine, 
in 2001.3 And, equally extraordinarily, he presided over the second chamber of 
Parliament, the House of Lords. He was a senior member of all three branches 
of government. The judiciary accepted this state of affairs, because they liked the 
head of the judiciary being a senior member of the government, who was able to 
defend their interests in Cabinet.
3. Greater Separation of Powers in 2005
In June 2003 Lord Irvine was dismissed by the Prime Minister Tony Blair. Blair 
also announced plans to abolish the office of Lord Chancellor, establish an inde-
pendent Judicial Appointments Commission, and a new Supreme Court. The 
Lord Chancellor was to be replaced by a Secretary of State for Constitutional 
Affairs, who need not be a lawyer, and could sit (like most government ministers) 
in the House of Commons. The sudden announcement of these reforms, and in 
particular the proposal to abolish the ancient office of Lord Chancellor, with no 
3 In the case: Uratemp Ventures Ltd v Collins [2001] UKHL 43.
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consultation, caused the Judges great alarm. The Lord Chief Justice Lord Woolf 
postponed his retirement to moderate the proposals and negotiate a new settle-
ment, and the result of his negotiations with Lord Falconer (the new Secretary 
of State for Constitutional Affairs) was published in a document known as the 
Concordat in January 2004.4
The Concordat set out the key responsibilities of the new Secretary of State and the 
Lord Chief Justice. Its contents and coverage can be judged by the headings of its 
different sections: Judicial Independence; Judicial Posts held by the Lord Chancel-
lor; Leadership of the Judiciary in England and Wales; Oath-taking; Provision of 
Resources; Deployment of Judges; Judicial ‘Leadership’ Posts; Appointments to 
Committees, and Similar Bodies; The Making of Procedural Rules for Judicial 
Fora; Rule Committee Appointments; Practice Directions; Education and Train-
ing; Judicial Complaints and Discipline; Judicial Appointments Commission – 
Process, and Membership.
One half of the Concordat was devoted just to the last two headings: the process 
for handling judicial complaints, and the new process for judicial appointments 
were covered in great detail.5 The rest was dealt with more succinctly. Under each 
heading the Concordat stated a general principle, and then explained how that 
principle would be applied in practice. For example:
Judicial Independence
Principle:
5. The new arrangements should reinforce the independence of the judiciary.
Application:
6. A general statutory duty will be imposed on the Government, all those involved 
in the administration of justice and all those involved in the appointment of 
judges to respect and maintain judicial independence.
7. In addition, there will be a specific statutory duty falling on the Secretary of State 
for Constitutional Affairs to defend and uphold the continuing independence of 
the judiciary.
The Concordat provided the basis for the subsequent legislation enacted as the 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005. It was in effect the White Paper which preceded 
the legislation. The only change was that the office of Lord Chancellor survived 
in attenuated form. The Act removed the roles of the Lord Chancellor as head of 
the judiciary and Speaker of the House of Lords, but otherwise left the office in 
being, albeit reduced by the transfer of functions to the Lord Chief Justice. The 
Act set out in detail the functions to be transferred to the Judiciary, implementing 
the agreement struck in the Concordat. The Act came into force in 2006, together 
4 The Lord Chancellor’s judiciary-related functions: Proposals, commonly referred to as ‘the 
Concordat’. 
5 40 paragraphs are devoted to judicial complaints and discipline (paras. 73-113), and 30 to judicial 
appointments (paras. 114-144).
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with the independent Judicial Appointments Commission created by the Act. The 
new Supreme Court (also created by the Act) came into being in 2009, when their 
new building was ready. The division of powers between the Executive and Judici-
ary was further refined in 2008 in a Framework Document for the management 
of the Courts Service (revised and updated in 2011 to incorporate the Tribunals 
Service). The Concordat, the 2005 Act and the 2011 Framework Document are the 
main documents setting out the new relationship between the Judges and the 
Executive.
4. Division of Powers between the Executive and the Judiciary
Under the Concordat and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, the division of 
powers is as follows. The Lord Chancellor6 is responsible for providing the courts 
system, and is accountable to Parliament for the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
system. He sets the framework for the organisation of the courts system, such as 
geographical and jurisdictional boundaries.7 He determines the overall number 
of judges, after consulting the Lord Chief Justice, including the number required 
for each region and at each level of the judiciary.8 He is also responsible for sup-
porting the judiciary in enabling them to fulfil their functions; and he provides 
the staff and resources for the Courts Service, and for the Lord Chief Justice. He 
sets the pay, pensions and terms and conditions of the judiciary.
The Lord Chief Justice9 is responsible for the deployment of the judiciary, the roles 
of individual judges, and the allocation of work within the courts. After consult-
ing the Lord Chancellor, he decides which individual judges should be assigned 
to which region, district or court; and he can authorise judges to sit in levels of 
court other than their usual level.10 He nominates judges to posts which provide 
judicial leadership, again in consultation with the Lord Chancellor. The judges are 
responsible for deciding on the assignment of cases before particular courts, and 
the listing of those cases before particular judges.11 The Lord Chief Justice also 
has a general responsibility for the well-being and training and providing guid-
ance for the judiciary.12
6 The Lord Chancellor’s responsibilities are set out in paragraph 4(a) of the Concordat, Part II of 
the CRA 2005 & paragraph 1.3 of the 2011 Framework Document.
7 Concordat para. 26.
8 Concordat para. 29.
9 The Lord Chief Justice’s responsibilities are set out in paragraph 4(c) of the Concordat, Section 
7 CRA 2005 & paragraph 1.2 2011 Framework Document.
10 The Lord Chief Justice’s allocation responsibilities were first laid out in paragraphs 29 – 33 of the 
Concordat ,and further in Section 7 (2) & Schedule 4 Part 1 paragraph 129 CRA 2005.
11 Concordat para. 36 & Schedule 2 Part 2 paragraph 6(6)(a) CRA 2005.
12 Section 7(2) CRA 2005.
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5. Complaints and Discipline
Responsibility for judicial complaints and discipline is a joint responsibility of the 
Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor.13 They are supported by a complaints 
secretariat (the Office for Judicial Complaints, staffed by civil servants), and the 
Lord Chancellor is accountable to Parliament for the effective and efficient opera-
tion of the complaints and discipline system. The OJC may filter out complaints, 
but refer serious ones to a nominated judge, who is a further filter; then an inves-
tigating judge. If the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor are considering disci-
plinary action, they must refer the case to a review body, composed of two judges 
and two lay members. They must decide jointly on any disciplinary sanction,14 
but cannot take disciplinary action more severe than that recommended by the 
review body. If the sanction is removal from office, the Lord Chancellor will invite 
both Houses of Parliament to approve dismissal of High Court judges and above. 
Judges below this level can be removed by the Lord Chancellor. Complainants or 
judges can complain about the handling of a complaint to the Judicial Appoint-
ments and Conduct Ombudsman, but he can only review the process, not the 
merits of the decision.15
6. Judicial Appointments Commission
Judicial appointments used to be a field in which the Lord Chancellor had com-
plete discretion. He was restricted only by the statutory criteria specifying the 
minimum level of experience for each post; and the strong convention that he 
would consult the senior judiciary before making any appointment. Now he has 
almost no discretion. Judicial appointments are regulated by an independent 
Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC),16 which has 15 members, of whom six 
are lay members, and five are judges, plus a magistrate, barrister, solicitor, and 
tribunal member.17
The JAC runs competitions for judicial vacancies, and submits a single name to 
the Lord Chancellor.18 The Lord Chancellor can appoint, request reconsideration, 
or reject the JAC’s candidate. But the grounds on which he can reject or request 
reconsideration are strictly limited by statute, and he must give reasons in writ-
ing. He is also strictly limited in the number of times he can reject or request 
13 Concordat para. 73 & Section 115 CRA 2005.
14 Concordat para. 80 & Section 108(2) CRA 2005.
15 Section 102 of CRA 2005.
16 Established by Section 61 CRA 2005.
17 This membership composition is set out in Concordat para. 132 & Schedule 12 Part 1 para. 2 CRA 
2005. 
18 The ‘single name’ rule applies to all levels of judicial appointments, for example see Section 
70(3) CRA 2005 (in relation to appointing Lord Justices of Appeal).
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 reconsideration (a maximum of twice for each appointment).19 In practice, in the 
2,500 or so judicial appointments made between 2006 and 2012, the Lord Chan-
cellor rejected just one nomination, and requested reconsideration twice.
The judiciary are closely involved in judicial appointments. They have five mem-
bers on the JAC, whose views carry disproportionate weight. Judicial members are 
included in all the JAC’s selection panels. For appointments to the Supreme Court 
there is a special selection committee, composed of the Court’s President and 
Deputy President, and the chairs of the JACs for England, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland.20 For appointments to the Court of Appeal the selection panel is the Lord 
Chief Justice, another senior Court of Appeal judge, the chair and a lay member 
of the JAC.21 The Lord Chief Justice must be consulted before any selection pro-
cess is initiated, and he must be consulted before any name is submitted to the 
Lord Chancellor. So the judiciary have a very strong input. When we interviewed 
members of the JAC, none could recall any appointment being made against the 
wishes of the Lord Chief Justice. Indeed, Ken Clarke as Lord Chancellor would not 
accept a recommendation from the JAC unless it had been approved by the Lord 
Chief Justice.22
7. Management of the Courts Service
The judiciary also have stronger input into the management of the Courts Service. 
Under its 2011 Framework Document the Courts Service ‘operates on the basis of 
a partnership between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice’.23 The Lord 
Chancellor remains responsible to Parliament for the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the courts,24 tribunals and the justice system. Staff of the Courts Service are 
civil servants, but they have a joint responsibility to the Lord Chancellor and the 
Lord Chief Justice for the effective, efficient and speedy operation of the courts 
and tribunals.25 All members of the judiciary have a similar responsibility to work 
with the staff to deliver these objectives. Staff work subject to the directions of the 
judiciary in matters such as listing, case allocation and case management.26
The Framework Document provides that the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief 
Justice will not intervene in the day-to-day operations of the Courts Service. 
They have placed responsibility for overseeing the leadership and direction of the 
Courts Service in the hands of its Board, and the Chief Executive is responsible 
19 Again the Lord Chancellor’s power to accept/reject/request reconsideration applies to other 
levels, for example see Sections 73-75 CRA 2005.
20 Schedule 8 CRA 2005.
21 Section 71 CRA 2005.
22 Interviews with MoJ officials.
23 Para. 1.1 Framework Document.
24 Para. 1.2 Framework Document.
25 Para. 2.4 Framework Document.
26 Para. 2.5 Framework Document.
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for day-to-day operations and administration.27 Three senior judges are on the 
Board, which has ten members,28 and the selection panel for the Chief Executive 
includes a senior judge.29 The judicial members are accountable to the Lord Chief 
Justice for their conduct as members of the Board,30 and the other members are 
accountable to the Lord Chancellor;31 but the Board have agreed to act collegiately, 
and not in representative capacities.32
For determining the budget of the Courts Service, the Framework Document pro-
vides that the Lord Chancellor must keep the Lord Chief Justice informed about 
his department’s resourcing discussions with the Treasury. The Lord Chief Justice 
may write to the Lord Chancellor representing the views of the judiciary, and the 
Lord Chancellor must forward any letter to the Treasury.33 If the Lord Chief Jus-
tice has concerns about the budget allocated to the Courts Service, he may record 
his position to the Lord Chancellor, and to Parliament.34
The Courts Service produces monthly performance data for the Board on the 
workload and efficiency of each court centre. The judicial members of the Board 
take this data back to the Lord Chief Justice, and he or his deputies can talk to 
judges about improving the performance of their courts. This may involve talking 
to individual judges about their performance in terms of case management, delays 
etc. The Judiciary do not feel that this trespasses on judicial independence, so 
long as it is senior judges managing judicial performance, not court administra-
tors. The Framework Document provides: “Performance measures that have an 
impact upon the judiciary only bind the judiciary when the Lord Chief Justice has 
expressly agreed that they do so. No performance measure fetters the exercise of 
judicial discretion or the interests of justice in any individual case”.35
8. The Executive Works to Uphold Judicial Independence
Lawyers tend to view the Executive as a threat to judicial independence; but this 
account shows how the Executive works systematically to support and uphold judi-
cial independence, in a range of different ways.
First, the Lord Chancellor, all government Ministers and everyone with responsi-
bility for the administration of justice is under a statutory duty to uphold judicial 
27 Para. 1.6 Framework Document.
28 Para. 4.5 Framework Document.
29 Para. 3.5 Framework Document.
30 Para. 4.11 Framework Document.
31 Para. 4.12 Framework Document.
32 Foreword from the Chairman to Annual Report of HM Courts and Tribunals Service 2011-12.
33 Para. 7.1 Framework Document.
34 Para. 7.2 Framework Document.
35 Para. 7.17 Framework Document.
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independence.36 Ministers are specifically enjoined not seek to influence particular 
judicial decisions through any special access to the judiciary.37 Other guardians of 
the rule of law and judicial independence within the Executive include the Attor-
ney General, as the government’s senior Law Officer; Parliamentary Counsel, in 
their drafting of legislation; and the Government Legal Service, who will remind 
Ministers if they risk crossing the line.
The Lord Chancellor has additional duties to have regard to the need to defend 
judicial independence, and the need for the judiciary to have the support neces-
sary to enable them to exercise their functions.38 ‘Defending’ judicial independ-
ence means defending the judges and their role when they come under attack, 
from the media or from ministerial colleagues who publicly criticise a judicial 
decision. The defence can be in public or in private. The Lord Chancellor’s officials 
will be alert to forthcoming court decisions which might embarrass the govern-
ment, and seek to dissuade ministers in other departments from venting their 
frustration in public. If they fail, the Lord Chancellor will privately have a word 
with the minister, to discourage a repeat offence; he will not reprimand a minister 
in public. A difficulty arises when the offending minister is the Prime Minister, as 
has happened with both Tony Blair and David Cameron. The Lord Chancellor can 
still try, and has done so; but it is difficult to admonish a political superior.
Second, the Executive has designed and introduced a new system for judicial 
appointments which removes any scope for political patronage. The Lord Chancel-
lor’s discretion is extremely limited, and although he is nominally still the deci-
sion maker, when presented with a single name he effectively has very little choice. 
[insert Ken Clarke quote ?to Lords Const Cttee] The judges have a lot of involvement, 
and influence, by being directly involved in devising the selection processes and 
sitting on the selection panels which produce the single name. Judges have criti-
cised the cumbersome and slow nature of the new process, but they all recognise 
how the independence of the Judicial Appointments Commission helps to under-
pin the independence of the judiciary. Critics on the other side say that the new 
system has tilted power too far towards the judges, who are now dominant in the 
selection process; and that the Executive has lost the ability to take effective action 
to promote more diversity in the judiciary.39
Third, there are stronger systems in place to ensure that the courts and the judicial 
system will be adequately resourced, that the judges are consulted about resourc-
ing, and involved in the allocation of resources through their involvement in 
the management of the Courts Service. The Lord Chancellor is under multiple 
36 Concordat paras. 5, 6, 7, Section 3(1) CRA 2005 & Paras. 1.2, 2.3 Framework Document.
37 Section 3(5) CRA 2005.
38 See Section 3(6)(a) & (b) CRA 2005. The Lord Chancellor also swears this as part of an oath, see 
s17(1) CRA 2005.
39 Alan Paterson & Chris Paterson, Guarding the Guardians? Towards an independent, accountable 
and diverse senior judiciary. CentreForum, London, 2012.
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 statutory duties to ensure that there is an effective system of courts and tribunals, 
and that the judges have the support they need.40 Under the Framework Docu-
ment, he must keep the Lord Chief Justice fully informed about his discussions 
with the Treasury. This does not mean that the courts are immune from budget 
cuts; but the judges have the opportunity to spell out in advance any adverse conse-
quences for judicial independence, and through their representatives on the Board 
of the Courts Service they have the opportunity to minimise the damage.
Fourth, the independence of the judiciary is reinforced by the creation of new 
bodies whose function is to help protect judicial independence. That is clearly the 
role of the Judicial Appointments Commission, which is required to select candi-
dates solely on merit. That is clearly the role of the Judicial Appointments Com-
mission, which is required to select candidates solely on merit. It is also the role of 
the Office for Judicial Complaints, with its three stage process, each stage involv-
ing an independent judge, to ensure that judges judge the conduct of other judges, 
and ensure that judicial independence is preserved. And it is also in part the role 
of the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman. Disappointed candidates 
can complain to the Ombudsman; and judges who have been unfairly complained 
against, or unfairly disciplined, can also complain. In all these cases the indepen-
dence of the new body helps to buttress the independence of the judiciary.
9. The Executive Helps to Ensure the Accountability of the Judiciary
The Executive also plays an important role in ensuring the accountability of the 
Judiciary. The judiciary is not purely self-regulating, but is held to account by the 
other two branches of government. The role of the Executive in checking the judici-
ary is recognised in statute. The same section which requires the Lord Chancellor 
to defend judicial independence and provide the judiciary with adequate support, 
goes on to require him to have regard to the public interest in decisions affecting 
the judiciary or the administration of justice.41 The statute does not spell it out, 
but the public interest is different from the interests of the judiciary: in terms of 
pay and pensions, it includes what the nation can afford, as well as what the judges 
might want to have. Similarly with the programme of court closures: the courts 
exist for the convenience of the public, not the judges. In terms of judicial recruit-
ment, it includes the need for greater diversity, as well as appointment on merit. 
The Lord Chancellor is the ultimate judge of the public interest, and accountable 
to Parliament for his decisions on where the public interest lies.
Accountability involves giving an account (explanatory accountability), and being 
held to account, and possibly paying a penalty (sacrificial accountability). The judi-
ciary give an account of their work through publishing annual reports, which the 
40 Section 1 Courts Act 2003, Section 3(6)(b) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Section 39 of 
the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
41 Section 3(6)(c) CRA 2005.
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Lord Chancellor lays before Parliament. So the Supreme Court produces an annual 
report for the Lord Chancellor, which also goes to the First Ministers in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland (whose governments help to fund the court).42 Below 
that level the annual reporting has become more ragged since the Lord Chief 
Justice became head of the judiciary. Whereas there used to be annual reports 
by the Civil and Criminal Divisions of the Court of Appeal, by the Commercial 
and Admiralty Courts, and the Technology and Construction Court, together with 
regional reports by the Crown, County, Family and Magistrates Courts, now only 
two of those produce an annual report.43 The Lord Chief Justice produces a review 
of the administration of justice every two years or so, but it is a selective, high 
level account, and the irregular basis makes it impossible to compare performance 
with earlier periods.44 The annual report of HM Courts and Tribunals Service 
does not bridge the gap, being mainly financial.45 For detailed information on the 
workload of the courts, the reader must turn to the Judicial and Court Statistics 
produced by the Ministry of Justice. They reveal the management challenge from 
changing workloads: whereas the number of cases in the Crown Court in 2011 was 
little different from 2001, in the country court the number of claims brought fell 
by 25% between 2006 and 2011.
The Judicial Statistics and Courts Service reports are important tools for external 
scrutiny, with data on waiting times, costs per sitting day, etc. They provide essen-
tial information for the Executive to work with the judges in seeking to improve 
the efficiency of the courts, and judicial performance. Court performance and 
judicial performance are closely linked; but to preserve judicial independence, 
improving judicial performance is seen as the judiciary’s business. The Execu-
tive acts as constructive critic, and coach, and there are many different forums in 
which it can make suggestions and put its point of view across, from the formal 
Board meetings of the Courts Service to the informal meetings which take place 
every month between the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice. The Executive 
can also offer help and advice, as it has done recently over introducing appraisal 
systems for evaluating individual judicial performance; and developing more sys-
tematic succession planning for recruitment to the senior levels of the judiciary. 
These are matters where the judiciary have no experience, but the Executive have 
valuable expertise.
In terms of regulating misconduct in the judiciary, the Executive still plays a 
 central role. The Lord Chancellor used to be solely responsible for investigating 
complaints and imposing discipline. He now shares that responsibility jointly with 
42 Section 54 CRA 2005.
43 Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), and Technology and Construction Court.
44 There have been three such reports, covering the periods April 2006 to March 2008; April 2008 
to February 2010; January 2010 to June 2012. The intention is to bring these onto an annual basis, 
perhaps matching the annual Business Plan produced by the Judicial Office.
45 The budget of HMCTS was reduced by 9 per cent in 2011-12. The annual report contains five 
pages on Workload and Performance Summary, and six on Performance Review; with over a 
hundred on the annual accounts, and notes to the accounts.
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the Lord Chief Justice, under detailed procedures set out in the Concordat46 and 
implemented in the Judicial Discipline (Prescribed Procedure) Regulations 2006. 
Under those procedures all decisions on complaints and discipline have to be taken 
jointly. But at the end of the process only the Lord Chancellor may formally remove 
a judge from office47 (and only Circuit judges or equivalent and below: High Court 
judges and above are removable only by resolution of both Houses of Parliament). 
And as the new head of the judiciary, the Lord Chief Justice can impose lesser 
penalties: suspension, or a formal warning, reprimand or advice. The Lord Chief 
Justice may do this only with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor.48 Agreement 
is not merely formal: the Lord Chancellor has adjusted penalties both upwards 
and downwards.49 So in terms of complaints and discipline, the judiciary is more 
self-regulating than it used to be; but the system operates under the close eye of 
the Lord Chancellor, who must agree to any disciplinary sanction, and only he can 
impose the ultimate sanction of removal from office.
Finally brief mention should be made of the accountability of the Judges to Parlia-
ment. That is not the focus of this chapter, but again it is more than just a formal-
ity. Parliament has shown a lot of interest in the work of judges and the courts: 
especially the House of Commons Justice Committee, and the House of Lords 
Constitution Committee. The Lord Chief Justice regularly appears before those 
two committees, but that is not all. Since 2003, eight different Select Committees 
have heard oral evidence from judges on some 80 different occasions, and from 
around 80 different judges. The topics covered include judicial appointments, 
human rights legislation, the family justice system, asylum and immigration, 
delays, and sentencing policy.
10. Have the Judges Become More Powerful? In what Respects?
The final part of this chapter considers whether the judges have become more 
powerful as a result of the constitutional changes described above. It is widely 
accepted that British judges have become more powerful as a result of other 
factors: the relentless growth of judicial review, the introduction of EU law, the 
Human Rights Act 1998. But this analysis focuses just on the changes flowing 
from the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and the establishment of the judiciary 
as a more separate and autonomous branch of government.
Asking whether the judges have become more powerful requires a conceptual 
definition of power. It is a complex concept, much debated in the politics literature. 
Power was originally related to concepts of authority and the use of force, and 
46 Concordat paras. 73-113 & Section 115 CRA 2005.
47 Concordat para. 81 & Section 108(1) CRA 2005.
48 Section 108 CRA 2005.
49 Information from interviews.
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defined as the ability to carry out one’s will.50 But it has since been understood 
in more subtle ways. Steven Lukes identified three faces of power: the ability of 
governments to make decisions; to set and control the agenda; and to influence 
people’s thinking.51 The last two are forms of what Nye has called soft power.52
These more subtle definitions provide a better framework for understanding 
judicial power. But to apply them empirically, we need something with a sharper 
edge. That can be supplied by Rhodes’ resource-dependency model of power.53 
In Rhodes’ model power is a function of the resources available to the different 
actors: but building on the earlier definitions, he uses ‘resources’ in a wide sense 
to include authority, information etc. His model also involves a concept closely 
related to power, that of autonomy: a party possesses autonomy if it is able to exer-
cise power in relation to its own functions without requiring the support of the 
other party in doing so.54 Weaving together these different models, power can be 
said to consist of the following main elements:
Constitutional autonomy. (a) Autonomy from interference by another branch of 
government; (b) power to alter internal arrangements without reference to another 
branch of government.
Legal and hierarchical authority. The ability to set the agenda; initiate and make 
policy; issue directions or guidance to others; and make final decisions.
Resources. Having sufficient finance and staff to discharge core functions; the abil-
ity to adjust resources between functions; and to select and direct staff.
Informational power. Understanding the thinking of other branches of govern-
ment; and having the ability to shape their thinking, and influence public debate.
Each element of power will be considered in turn, asking how much power is 
possessed by the Judiciary, and how much by the Executive, in determining judi-
cial policy, running the justice system, and upholding judicial independence and 
accountability. In terms of constitutional autonomy, the Judges are clearly more 
autonomous now that the Lord Chancellor is no longer head of the Judiciary. The 
Lord Chief Justice is their head,55 and exercises internal and external leadership. 
He leads the judiciary with the advice of the Judicial Executive Board, selected by 
him, and supported by the Judicial Office, which in 2012 had grown to 200 staff. 
But he has little power to alter the internal structures or arrangements of the 
50 M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations (T. Parsons ed.), Free Press, New 
York, 1947.
51 S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View (2nd ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
52 J. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, PublicAffairs books, New York, 1974.
53 R.A.W. Rhodes, Control and Power in Central-Local Government Relations, Gower, Aldershot, 
1981, chapter 5.
54 A. Trench, Devolution and Power in the United Kingdom. Manchester University Press, 2007, p. 17.
55 Para. 11 of the Concordat & Section 7(1) CRA 2005.
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courts, or the judiciary. The Executive, through the Lord Chancellor, still deter-
mines the geographical distribution of the courts, and the jurisdiction of each 
court. The Executive determines the number of judges, and sets their terms and 
conditions. It is only over judicial appointments that the Judiciary has more power 
than the Executive: the Executive still formally makes the appointment, but the 
Judiciary now has a lot more influence over the selection process. And in future 
the Judiciary will itself make all appointments at the level of Circuit Judge and 
below.56
The size of the judiciary and the extent of its constitutional autonomy has been 
vastly extended by the creation of the Tribunals Service, and its incorporation into 
the Courts Service in 2011. This development is so recent that its implications have 
not yet been fully realised. The inclusion of the tribunals judiciary has increased 
the total size of the judiciary from 3575 to 5635.57 And the inclusion of tribunals in 
the justice system has increased the total number of civil cases handled each year 
from 1,643k to 2,524k.58
The Executive by contrast has greater constitutional autonomy: as seen in the deci-
sion by the Executive to create the Tribunals Service, and then merge it into the 
Courts Service. The Prime Minister has full autonomy to alter the structure of the 
government, and to create, merge or close departments. That was vividly seen in 
the 2003 decision to abolish the office of Lord Chancellor, and the 2007 decision 
to bring responsibility for prisons and the criminal justice system into the new 
Ministry of Justice. The judges disliked both decisions, and succeeded in modify-
ing the first; but they recognised the Prime Minister has the right to make such 
decisions.
Generally the Executive suffers from little interference by the Judiciary, save for 
the constant pinpricks of judicial review to ensure that it follows due process. The 
pinpricks clearlyhurt, to judge from the occasional howls of ministerial outrage; 
but they seldom prevent the Executive from doing what it planned to do – with 
rare high profile exceptions, like the court decisions after 2001 curbing the deten-
tion of terrorist suspects. Empirical research suggests that just under half of judi-
cial review cases against central government are successful, but only a quarter 
to a third of successful cases call for changes in procedure or the government’s 
approach to decision-making.59
In terms of legal and hierarchical authority, the Executive is also more powerful. 
The Judges are primarily reactive, both in their judicial work, in terms of the 
cases that come before them, and in terms of policy. Even on judicial matters, 
56 Under the Crime and Courts Bill 2012 Part 2 clause 19.
57 Judicial Appointments for England and Wales by type, April 2012.
58 HMCTS Business Plan 2012, pp. 12-13.
59 Initial findings from Essex University/Public Law Project research on the effects of judgements 
of the Administrative Court 2010-12. Final results expected May 2013.
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the lead on policy generally comes from the Executive. The Executive leads on 
macro policy, or policy involving other government departments or external stake-
holders. So the 2010 Norgrove review of family justice was initiated by Jack Straw 
as Lord Chancellor, and confirmed by his successor Ken Clarke, and its central 
recommendation of a single Family Court was included by the government in the 
Crime and Courts Bill 2012. But some policy reviews are initiated by the judiciary, 
such as the 2009 Jackson review of civil litigation costs, which was ordered by the 
Master of the Rolls. But whatever the genesis of a review, the Executive will consult 
the judiciary, or vice versa, to ensure that a review will not be opposed, and that 
its results are likely to be implemented. And on small things like guidance for the 
courts, the majority of guidance comes from the Executive: the power to allow and 
disallow Court Rules rests with the Lord Chancellor.60 The judiciary make final 
decisions in court cases; but under the UK doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
it is always open to the Executive to reverse those decisions by passing amending 
legislation through Parliament.
By contrast the legal and hierarchical authority of the Executive is immense. It 
sets the agenda on most legal and judicial policy; it can make policy through leg-
islation, as it has done through successive Courts Acts, restructuring the courts 
system; or by legislating in fields like family law; and it has wide authority to issue 
directions or guidance.
As for resources, here too the Executive is more powerful. The Lord Chancellor 
determines the budget for the courts system, not the Lord Chief Justice. The 
Lord Chief Justice can go public if he considers the budget insufficient, but that 
is recognised as a weapon of last resort. It is only in relation to the allocation of 
the budget within the Courts Service that the judges have an equal say, through 
their participation in the management and operation of the Courts Service as a 
partnership between the Lord Chancellor and Lord Chief Justice. The judges do 
not choose the staff of the Courts Service, and do not choose the staff working in 
the Judicial Office (save for the chief executive). All staff in the Judicial Office are 
civil servants, as are the staff working for independent bodies like the JAC, OJC 
and JACO. The Executive chooses the staff, and the Executive is responsible for 
their careers, deployment and promotion.
However once posted to the Judicial Office the staff’s primary loyalty is to the judi-
ciary. As more and more functions have been transferred across from the Ministry 
of Justice to the judiciary, the staffing of the Judicial Office has grown and grown. 
The ‘old’ Lord Chief Justice before 2005 had a private office of half a dozen people. 
In 2006 the Directorate of Judicial Offices serving the ‘new’ Lord Chief Justice 
opened with 145 staff; in 2012 it had over 200.
This gradual transfer of staffing and expertise has meant that in relation to power 
as knowledge and information, the playing field is a bit more even. In interviews 
60 Paras. 50-55 of the Concordat.
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some senior officials in the Ministry of Justice have acknowledged that their 
knowledge of the judges and judicial issues is not what it used to be, and this 
might sometimes place them at a disadvantage. As successive functions have 
transferred out of the Lord Chancellor’s Department/Ministry of Justice, the 100 
or more officials who supported the Lord Chancellor on judicial matters in 2005 
have shrunk to just 15 or so in 2012 (the largest loss being the 90 staff who worked 
on judicial appointments, who went to the JAC). It is no surprise that the Ministry 
has lost some of its intelligence and expertise.
But informational power also includes the power to project information and ideas, 
to shape the thinking of others, and influence public debate. Here the Executive 
once again is dominant. Although judges give more speeches and lectures than 
they used to, and they now have a Judicial Communications Office, it is tiny by 
comparison with the much larger publicity machine available to the government. 
The Executive largely sets the terms of public debate about the judicial system and 
the criminal justice system.
11. Conclusion
This chapter has charted the greater separation of powers and functions flowing 
from the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, and evaluated the nature of the new 
partnership between the Executive and the Judiciary. Despite the greater formal 
separation, the partnership relies on close working between the two branches of 
government. In some areas (the Courts Service, judicial appointments, complaints 
and discipline) there is joint responsibility, with a mutual veto. But in other areas 
where one side or the other is formally in the lead, there is consultation and co-
ordination before most important decisions are made.
But the situation is still evolving. Ken Clarke (Lord Chancellor 2010-12) was less 
interested in judicial matters as Lord Chancellor than Jack Straw (2007-10), and 
his officials found it hard to interest him in judicial appointments, discipline, post-
ings and promotion. Chris Grayling, the new Lord Chancellor appointed in 2012, 
may be less interested still, having no background in the law or the legal profes-
sion. The direction of travel has been and continues to be all one way, with the 
Executive showing less and less interest. The risk to the judiciary, as the Executive 
also shrinks its capacity, is that the Executive becomes less capable of showing 
an intelligent interest, and its occasional interventions become clumsy and ill 
informed.
The Judiciary have become more powerful. They have acquired greater constitu-
tional autonomy; they now have more resources under their control, in the Judicial 
Office; they have developed more informational power vis-a-vis the Executive. But 
much of this is soft power. In terms of hard power, and in particular the capacity 
to set the agenda on legal and judicial policy, and to change the law and the legal 
framework, the Executive is still dominant.
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Finally, does the new system strengthen or weaken judicial independence, and 
judicial accountability? Formally judicial independence has been strengthened, 
through the multiple statutory duties laid on the Lord Chancellor and all ministers 
and those involved in the administration of justice to uphold it; and through the 
multiple independent bodies (HMCTS, JAC, OJC, JACO) which help in part to 
safeguard it. The judiciary still bemoan the passing of the old Lord Chancellor; 
but they would not wish any of these independent bodies to be abolished. As for 
judicial accountability, that also remains strong, not least because the Lord Chan-
cellor still has to agree all important decisions about the financing, management 
and direction of the justice system. The one aspect of judicial accountability which 
has weakened is that the Lord Chief Justice no longer gives an adequate account 
of his leadership of the judiciary through his occasional reviews. But that is easily 
remedied, through making the reviews annual, and more systematic.
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The Different Levels of Protection of National 
Supervisors’ Independence in the European 
Landscape
Annetje Ottow
1. Restricting the Principle of Autonomy
EU law is based on the principle of material norms being anchored in European 
law and on their transposition being based on the national legal order. The effect 
of European law on the national legal order is felt via national rules of law. This 
applies both with respect to national institutional structures and national pro-
cedural rules and is referred to in European law as the principle of institutional 
and procedural autonomy of the Member States.1 Looking, however, at various 
European rules adopted in recent years, it seems there are now a number of excep-
tions to this principle. Although the European Court of Justice (ECJ) consistently 
emphasises that the respect EU law has for the institutional structure of the 
Member States, secondary European legislation (in the form of regulations and 
directives) contains more and more stipulations that undermine this autonomy 
and significantly curtail the freedom available to the member states at a national 
level.2
* Prof. dr. A.T. Ottow is Professor public economic law at the European Institute, Utrecht Uni-
versity, the Netherlands and member of the board of the telecommunications authority in the 
Netherlands (OPTA) until 1 April 2013. This Article is a revision of A.T. Ottow & S. Lavrijssen, Het 
Europese recht als hoeder van de onafhankelijkheid van nationale toezichthouders, Tijdschrift 
voor Toezicht 2011, No. 3, p. 34-50 and based on the speeches given by the author at the Centre 
For Media Pluralism and Media Freedom of the European University Institute, Fiesole, Novem-
ber 12, 2011 and the International Conference on Judicial and Quasi-Judicial independence, Uni-
versity of Groningen, Groningen, May 25, 2012.
1 J.H. Jans et al., Europeanisation of Public law, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2007, p. 40-42.
2 For a discussion of the European influence on the principle of legality via ECJ case law and vari-
ous European Directives, see S. Lavrijssen & A.T. Ottow, The Legality of Independent Regulatory 
Authorities, in L.F.M. Besselink, F. Pennings & S. Prechal (eds.), The Eclipse of the Legality Princi-
ple in the European Union, Kluwer International, The Hague, 2010, pp. 73-96.
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2. National Supervisors’ Independence: the Rationale
The move towards curtailing national autonomy is particularly evident where 
various sectors – including telecommunications,3 energy, the media and, more 
recently, the railways – are regulated.4 These fields are interesting from the per-
spective of independence as it is specifically in these sectors that European law 
has had a substantial influence on the requirements set in respect of national 
supervisors’ independence. This is because national and local governments have 
traditionally played an important role, as shareholders in enterprises operating in 
these sectors. In many cases, state-owned entities, often operating as monopolies, 
were felt to be the most appropriate means of providing services of general interest 
to the public. Over time, however, technological developments and ideas on com-
petition led to many of these traditional monopolies being dismantled and priva-
tised. An important issue then was to prevent unfair competition from the state 
and to ensure that the state’s involvement in the sector was placed at arm’s length. 
This resulted in various supervisors being established to oversee the liberalisation 
process and these bodies required the ability to operate independently of the state.
The European legislator included various requirements for independence in the 
liberalisation directives adopted for the infrastructure sectors. These require-
ments have become increasingly stringent; whereas they originally focused only 
on the need for supervisors to be independent of market parties,5 they have since 
been extended to include independence from the political arena.6
Independence from market parties
It was deemed necessary for the supervisors to be independent of market par-
ties in order to ensure that all the interests at stake in the various markets and 
in potential conflict situations would be given proper consideration and without 
3 A.T. Ottow, Telecommunicatietoezicht. De invloed van het Europese en Nederlandse bestuurs(process)
recht (‘Supervising telecommunications – The influence of European and Dutch administrative 
(procedural) law’), Sdu Uitgevers, The Hague, 2006.
4 See A.T. Ottow, Europeanization of the Supervision of Competitive Markets, European Public 
Law, Vol. 18, 2012, No. 1, p. 191-221.
5 In France v. Commission, ECJ 19 March 1991, case C-202/88, ECR 1991, I-1223, the ECJ derived the 
principle of independence from the EC (now EU) Treaty. See also ECJ 27 October 1993, Decos-
ter, case C-69/91, ECR 1993, I-5335. The principle of independence was subsequently developed 
in more detail in various European Directives. See A.T. Ottow, Onafhankelijkheid van toezicht-
houders. Hof van Justitie EU 9 maart 2010, Commissie/Duitsland, zaak C-515/07, Tijdschrift 
voor Toezicht, 2010, No. 3, pp. 78-86, A.T. Ottow & S.A.C.M. Lavrijssen, Het Europese recht als 
hoeder van de onafhankelijkheid van nationale toezichthouders, Tijdschrift voor Toezicht, 2011, 
No. 3, p. 34-50 and S. Lavrijssen & A.T. Ottow, Independent supervisory authorities: a fragile 
concept, Legal issues of Economic integration Vol. 39, 2012, No. 4, p. 419-446.
6 For these two aspects of independence see Ottow 2010 supra; Lavrijssen & Ottow 2012 supra, 
p. 427-430; T. Tridimas, Community Agencies, Competition Law and ESCB Initiatives on Secu-
rities Clearing and Settlement, in P. Eeckhout & T. Tridimas, Yearbook of European Law 2009, 
Vol.  28, 2009, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 216-307 and T. Prosser, The regula-
tory enterprise. Government, regulation and legitimacy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, 
p. 226-235.
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interference by states, many of which still held stakes in market parties in these 
sectors. No conflicts of interest were permitted. Not only were supervisors required 
to be legally separate from and functionally independent of market parties, but 
there also had to be a genuine structural separation between the regulatory (and 
supervisory) tasks and a Member State’s shareholding in a market party.7 These 
provisions did not, however, extend to stipulating how supervisors should be 
incorporated into the constitutional order of a Member State. It remained unclear, 
therefore, as to whether a supervisor could be a body falling under ministerial 
responsibility in a Member State or even be part of a ministry.8
Independence from the political arena
Over time, the European Commission indicated that political interference, too, 
should be excluded as this represented an obstacle to an objective assessment by 
supervisors. Politics driven by short-term interests can create regulatory uncer-
tainty and is often driven by political or other specific interests, rather than being 
based on a balanced analysis by experts. The requirement for independence from 
the political arena is, however, more controversial in that it results in direct inter-
ference in the institutional, democratic systems of the Member States.
Despite the sensitivity of this issue, the European legislator has since further 
tightened the requirements for independence, as well as imposing far-reaching 
obligations on Member States in the new telecommunications and energy direc-
tives so as to ensure supervisory independence from the political world. Staff at 
the supervisory authority are not permitted to “seek or take direct instructions 
from any government or other public or private entity when carrying out the regu-
latory tasks”.9 In order to safeguard supervisors’ independence, Member States 
must ensure that the authority “can take autonomous decisions, independently 
from any political body, (…) with autonomy in the implementation of the allocated 
budget, and adequate human and financial resources to carry out its duties”.10 
These changes mean the new directives go significantly further in terms of the 
degree of independence required as they now also include independence at a 
political and institutional level.
7 Article 3(2), Framework Directive (Directive 2002/21/EC, OJEC, L108/33).
8 For a more recent case, see ECJ 6 March 2008, Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones 
v. Administración del Estado, case C-82/07, at <www.curia.europa.eu>. The ECJ found in this 
case that the Framework Directive did not require the assignment of the national numbering 
resources and the management of the national numbering plans to be allocated to separate 
regulatory authorities. 
9 See Article 35(4)(b)(ii) of Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Direc-
tive 2003/54/EC (OJEC 2009, L 211/55). See also Article 3(3)(a) of Directive 2009/140/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directives 2002/21/
EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications net-
works and services (OJEC 2009, L 337/37).
10 Article 35(5)(a) Directive 2009/72/EC.
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Complete independence
The ECJ seemingly followed the same line of increasing independence in the sig-
nificant judgment reached in March 2010, in which it ruled that the authorities 
responsible for monitoring the processing of personal data (pursuant to Article 
28(1) Directive 95/46/EC)11 were expected to perform their tasks ‘with complete 
independence’.12 The ECJ concluded from this that the supervisory authority 
should be able to fulfil its obligations objectively and impartially; in other words, 
without being exposed to any direct or indirect influence. The Court rejected Ger-
many’s claim that this broad interpretation represented an infringement of the 
principle of democracy in Europe. The Court found that a broad interpretation of 
the term ‘complete independence’ did not violate the principle of democracy as 
the legislator is permitted to define the powers available to the supervisor and can 
also require it to report on its activities to parliament. Similarly, parliament or the 
government may appoint the board members of the supervisory authority. This 
judgement is recently confirmed in the case of October 16th, 2012 Commission vs 
Austria.13
These judgments clearly constitute interference in the institutional autonomy of a 
Member State, as the ECJ concludes that any form of influence – whether direct or 
indirect – is prohibited. This case should, however, be viewed in the context of the 
relevant directive and the need to protect personal data. The question remains as to 
whether these far-reaching requirements will also apply in other situations, such 
as in the regulation of network sectors and the media sector.14 The more recent 
directives in these sectors have not yet imposed such far-reaching restrictions. It 
was expected that the same high level of protection seen in the data protection 
regulation, would be implemented in the media regulation. This would have been 
relatively straightforward from the perspective of protecting media pluralism and 
the freedom of expression and free speech. Also these fundamental rights (such 
as in the case of privacy protection) should be safeguarded against direct or indi-
rect influence of the state by sufficient independence requirements. However, for 
the media sector, there has been no such high level of protection of independence 
explicitly laid down in the media directives.15
11 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data (OJEC 1995, L 281/31.
12 ECJ 9 March 2010, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, case C-518/07, annotated in Tijd-
schrift voor Toezicht; Ottow 2010 supra.
13 ECJ October 16, 2012, Commission v. Austria, case C-614/10, not yet published. 
14 See the annotation with regard to the judgment in A.T. Ottow & M. Aelen, Commission v. Federal 
Republic of Germany, European Human Rights Cases, Vol. 11, 2010, No. 6, pp. 679-688.
15 See the report for the media sector: Hans Bredow Institute for Media Research/Interdisciplinary 
Centre for Law & ICT (ICRI), KU Leuven/Center for Media and Communication Studies (CMCS), 
Central European University/Cullen International/Perspective Associates (eds.), INDIREG. Indi-
cators for independence and efficient functioning of audio-visual media services regulatory bodies for 
the purpose of enforcing the rules in the AVMS Directive (Study conducted on behalf of the Euro-
pean Commission), February 2011.
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3. Central Question
What effect do these requirements actually have on national market authorities 
in practice? This is the central question in this paper. Five published cases are 
used here to illustrate the impact of these provisions on national practices.16 All 
these examples relate to the regulated sectors; in other words, to the areas where 
the influence of the state has traditionally been felt.17 The liberalisation of these 
markets that has resulted from European rules and regulations makes these fields 
particularly interesting from a perspective of supervisory independence. As these 
examples show, national governments in various Member States have sought to 
establish the extent of their boundaries and to use their influence to exert pressure 
on the independent supervisors. These cases serve to emphasise how important 
the various European requirements are with respect to independence. These cases 
concern the independence of national authorities only.18 The independence of 
European agencies are not dealt with here. Another caveat must be made. This 
article deals with the de jure independence (legal requirements). The de facto inde-
pendence is not considered in this article.19
4. Case 1: Dutch Gas Case
This particular case involved a policy rule issued by the Dutch Minister of Economic 
Affairs instructing the Board of the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) on 
how to deal with the rates charged by the state-owned company GTS (Gas Trans-
port Services BV). The Office of Energy Regulation, which is the body responsible 
for enforcing sector-specific regulation, is part of the Netherlands Competition 
Authority. The Dutch Gas Act of 200020 gives the Competition Authority statu-
tory powers to set gas transport rates. The party bringing the action, EnergieNed 
(the Dutch Association of Energy Producers), claimed that this policy rule should 
not be regarded as a general policy rule, but instead as an individual instruction to 
the Board with respect to the transport rates charged by GTS, given that the policy 
rule set such specific parameters that the Board had virtually no scope to include 
considerations of its own.
16 Other cases can be found in the implementation overviews of the Commission, although 
not many details can be derived from the published information. See e.g. Commission staff 
working paper. Situation in the different sectors accompanying the Report from the Commis-
sion: 28th annual report on monitoring the application of EU law (2010)’, COM(2011) 588 final, 
SEC(2011) 1094 final and Electronic Communications – Revised Regulatory Framework Infringe-
ment procedures opened for non-communication of transposition measures.
17 See for more sectors: Hanretty et al., Independence, Accountability and perceived Quality of Regu-
lators (Report Study 15), Centre on Regulation in Europe (CERRE), 2012.
18 For the independence of European authorities see Lavrijssen & Ottow 2012 supra.
19 Gilardi & Magetti use the term de facto independence for their effective autonomy in the day-to-
day practice: F. Giraldi & M. Magetti, The independence of regulatory authorities, in D. Levi-Faur 
(ed.), Handbook of Regulation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012, p. 204.
20 Article 12f Gaswet.(Dutch Gas Act).
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Dutch requirements
EnergieNed claimed that the minister had contravened Article 5 of the Dutch 
Competition Act by essentially issuing instructions to the Board of the Competi-
tion Authority in an individual case, rather than limiting herself to general policy 
rules. As a result, EnergieNed claimed, the minister had exceeded her authority by 
wholly taking over the Board’s powers to set rates, whereas Article 5d of the Dutch 
Competition Act only authorised the minister to issue general policy rules. Indeed, 
in 2001, when the Competition Authority was transformed into an autonomous 
administrative authority, it was stated that independence is required to ensure 
specific expertise. The minister cannot give instructions in individual cases. The 
legislator had deemed it important for there to be no scope for political interfer-
ence in individual decisions taken by the Board of the Competition Authority. The 
state believed in this case, however, that there was no question of an individual 
policy rule and that the instructions were purely of a general nature.
The Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (CBb) disagreed with the state’s 
view and ruled the decision taken by the Board in respect of this ‘general’ policy 
rule to be invalid. The Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal believed, therefore, 
that the instructions constituted individual instructions, and that would be incom-
patible with the Dutch Competition Act.
European requirements
Article  25(1) of the European Gas Directive applying at the time (Directive 
2003/55/EC) stated the following with respect to national regulatory authorities’ 
independence:
1. Member States shall designate one or more competent bodies with the function of 
regulatory authorities. These authorities shall be wholly independent of the interests 
of the gas industry.21
The Board of the Netherlands Competition Authority is a designated regulatory 
authority and therefore needs to be able to operate independently. EnergieNed 
claimed that the minister, as the shareholder of GTS, was not authorised to adopt 
the specific policy rule as it resulted in the Board – in other words, the regulatory 
authority – no longer being able to set the rates charged by GTS on the basis 
of cost. By issuing an individual instruction (in the form of a policy rule) the 
minister violated the Board’s independence and denied it the opportunity to adopt 
an independent position. Being able to issue individual instructions in this way 
would also have contravened Article 25(1) of the Gas Directive in that it allowed the 
state’s role as a shareholder to become blurred with the tasks of the supervisor (in 
other words, the regulatory authority).
21 Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concern-
ing common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJEU 
2003, L 176/57.
145
The Different Levels of Protection of National Supervisors’ Independence in the European Landscape
The examination conducted by the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal 
was based directly on the Dutch Competition Act and no account was taken of the 
Gas Directive. Nevertheless, the message conveyed was clear: there was a conflict 
of interests, with the minister having issued an individual instruction in respect 
of the rates charged by GTS, an entity with the Dutch state as its sole shareholder. 
Even if Article 5d of the Competition Act had not contained such a prohibition, 
the Tribunal would nevertheless have had to declare the policy rule invalid on 
the grounds that it contravened the Gas Directive. The Board of the Netherlands 
Competition Authority, as the regulatory authority designated responsible for 
implementing the provisions of the Gas Directive, has to be able to perform these 
tasks independently of any interest in a market party. And the policy rule issued 
constituted an obstacle in this respect.
The parliamentary history of the review of the Dutch Competition Act shows that, 
as well as the requirement for independence from market parties, there is also 
a prohibition on political interference. The Competition Act goes further in this 
respect than the old Gas Directive. The requirement for independence from politi-
cal influence has since also been incorporated into the recast Gas Directive,22 
which contains more stringent requirements, in Article 39(4) and (5), with respect 
to national regulatory authorities’ independence. These requirements cover 
aspects such as the performance of regulatory tasks ‘independently from any 
political body’, the funding of the regulatory authority and the appointment and 
periods in office of board members.
These requirements for independence had to be transposed into national legislation 
by 3rd March 2011. According to the minister, the provisions of the European direc-
tive would not result in any substantial changes in the case of the Netherlands,23 
although it will need to be stated in the Electricity Act (Elektriciteitswet) and the 
Gas Act (Gaswet) that ‘Our minister will refrain from issuing instructions relating 
to an individual case’.24
The minister believes that Article 21 of the Dutch Framework Act on Autonomous 
Administrative Authorities (Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen) continues to 
allow the minister the right to determine the range of interests to be taken into 
22 Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJEU 
2009, L 211/94. See also Article 35(4) and (5) Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity 
and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJEU 2009, L 211/55.
23 Amendment of the Electricity Act 1998 and the Gas Act, Parliamentary Papers II 2010-2011, 
32  814, No.  3, p.  5  ff. Since the Framework Act on Autonomous Administrative Authorities 
(Kader wet zelfstandige bestuursorganen) came into force, the minister’s power to adopt policy 
rules relating to the exercising of powers assigned to the Netherlands Competition Authority has 
been included in this Framework Act rather than in the Competition Act. 
24 See Articles I C and II B of the Amendment to the Electricity Act 1998 and the Gas Act, Parliamen-
tary Papers 2010/11, 32 814, No. 2 (Bill).
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account by the Netherlands Competition Authority when performing its tasks. It 
would appear that the minister is authorised to issue general policy rules, provided 
certain limits are respected. The text of the new energy directives can be read in 
such a way that policy rules are not allowed to extend to the regulatory tasks of 
the national supervisor. The minister does not wish, however, to impose such a 
restriction ex ante on the right to issue policy rules. Policy rules may in any event 
relate to the parameters of government policy in the energy market within which 
the national regulatory authority (‘NRA’) has to operate.25
This is also confirmed in a European Commission staff working paper:26
The Electricity and Gas Directives do not deprive the government of the possibility 
of establishing and issuing its national energy policy. This means that, depending 
on the national constitution, it could be the government’s competency to determine 
the policy framework within which the NRA must operate, e.g. concerning security 
of supply, renewables or energy efficiency targets. However, general energy policy 
guidelines issued by the government must not encroach on the NRA’s independence and 
autonomy.’27
Although general policy rules are, therefore, permitted within certain limits, the 
question of whether the Competition Authority’s discretionary powers are being 
too severely restricted, thus leaving it too little freedom to take decisions in indi-
vidual cases, needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis. The above working paper 
also states that the requirements should apply to the entire staff and management 
and not only to board members:
‘The new legislation also prohibits the NRA’s staff and the persons responsible for 
its management from seeking or taking direct instructions from any government 
or other public or private entity. This provision aims to tackle the situation where 
someone working for the NRA is seeking or taking direct instructions. According to 
the Commission’s services, this provision also implies that it is forbidden for anyone 
to give such instructions. An instruction in this context is any action calling for com-
pliance and/or trying to improperly influence an NRA decision and thus includes 
the use of pressure of any kind on NRA’s staff or on the persons responsible for its 
management. In the view of the Commission’s services this requires Member States 
to provide for dissuasive civil, administrative and/or criminal sanctions in case of vi-
olation of the provisions on independence as well as for any attempts by public and 
private entities to give an instruction or to improperly influence an NRA decision.’28
25 See also the opinion of the Dutch Council of State in this respect, Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 
32 814, No. 4, pp. 7-8.
26 Commission staff working paper, Interpretative note on Directive 2009/72/EC concern-
ing common rules for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas, The Regulatory Authorities, Brussels, 
22 January 2010.
27 Commission staff working paper, p. 7 (emphasis added).
28 Commission staff working paper, p. 7.
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It follows from these new provisions of the recast Gas Directive (and the corre-
sponding provisions in the Electricity Directive) that it is not only the Board of 
the Netherlands Competition Authority that has to comply with the requirements 
for independence but also the other staff at the Office of Energy Regulation. This 
is a sensitive issue in the Dutch context since only the Board of the Competi-
tion Authority constitutes an independent administrative authority (a so called 
‘small’ independent authority) and not the entire Competition Authority. The bill 
implementing the energy directives consequently states that “The Board of the 
Competition Authority and the staff available to the Board will not demand or 
receive instructions relating to an individual case.”29 The Competition Authority’s 
staff regulations will therefore have to take account of these new requirements as 
all staff involved with implementing the Gas or Electricity Directives will have to 
be able to act independently.
This Dutch case illustrates the importance of independence requirements for 
autonomous decisions by a national regulatory authority – in this case, the Office 
of Energy Regulation (and the Board) of the Netherlands Competition Author-
ity. The new energy directives set stringent standards for this independence and 
the way in which it is implemented in day-to-day practice. The Dutch Trade and 
Industry Appeals Tribunal rightly found the general policy rule in the GTS case 
to constitute an individual instruction and subjected it to stringent review. The 
Dutch legal framework itself provided sufficient scope for this. If, however, this 
had not been the case, the Tribunal would have had to declare the policy rule and/
or the decision by the Competition Authority to be invalid on the grounds that it 
contravened the then applicable Gas Directive.
5. Case 2: German Telecommunications Case
Rather than a ‘general’ policy rule this case involved statutory provisions with 
which the German legislator issued an instruction to the German telecommu-
nications supervisor on how to deal with specific rules and regulations. In these 
new legislative provisions the German legislator specified how the term ‘new mar-
kets’ should be defined, how the principle of non-regulation in these new markets 
should apply, and imposed more restrictive conditions on the German telecom-
munications supervisor than provided for in the European Telecommunications 
Directives. In addition, it imposed a specific objective of regulation on the German 
supervisor instead of the various objectives set in the European Directives. These 
statutory provisions significantly curtailed the discretionary powers the telecom 
supervisor normally enjoys. According to the German government, this legisla-
tion simply provided more precise clarification of the European rules. Germany 
claimed that the Telecommunications Directives allowed sufficient freedom to 
29 See Articles I C and II B of the Amendment to the Electricity Act 1998 and the Gas Act, Parlia-
mentary Papers 2010/11, 32 814, No. 2 (Bill).
148
III – Independence of Regulatory Agencies, Supervisory and Enforcement Authorities
national legislators to define abstract concepts. The European Commission, how-
ever, disagreed and submitted the case to the ECJ for consideration.
In the recent judgment Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany the ECJ gave a 
number of important findings in support of national supervisors’ independence. 
The Court imposed limits on the extent to which national legislators could seek 
to influence these supervisors and stated that European law had assigned respon-
sibility for supervising the telecom sector to an independent supervisor, which 
should have broad discretionary powers. The national legislator was not permit-
ted, therefore, to exclude certain markets from regulation in advance or to specify 
ex ante that only certain objectives should be taken into account. The Court’s find-
ings included the following:
54 Pursuant to Article 3(2) and (3) of the Framework Directive and recital 11 in its 
preamble, in accordance with the principle of the separation of regulatory and opera-
tional functions, Member States must guarantee the independence of the national 
regulatory authority or authorities with a view to ensuring the impartiality and trans-
parency of their decisions. (…)
61 In carrying out those regulatory functions, the NRAs have a broad discretion 
in order to be able to determine the need to regulate a market according to each 
situation on a case-by-case basis30 (...)
74 It should be added that, in any event, (…) the Framework Directive confers on 
the NRA, and not on the national legislature, the task of determining the need for 
regulation of the markets.
78 Therefore, by laying down a legal provision, according to which, as a general rule, 
the regulation of new markets by the NRA is excluded, Paragraph 9a of the TKG 
[German Telecommunications Act] encroaches on the wide powers conferred on 
the NRA under the Community regulatory framework, preventing it from adopting 
regulatory measures appropriate to each particular case. (…) the German legislature 
cannot alter a decision of the Community legislature and cannot, as a general rule, 
exempt new markets from regulation.
79 It follows that Paragraph 9a(1) of the TKG, by establishing a principle of non-
regulation of new markets, is not compatible with Article 16 of the Framework 
Directive. (…)
83 However, it must be held that the limitation of the German NRA’s discretion as 
a result of Paragraph 9a(1) of the TKG necessarily affects the NRA’s ability to define 
the market’ (emphasis by author).31
In this case the German legislator had sought to circumvent the supervision 
provided by its own independent national regulatory authority by including cer-
tain instructions already in the applicable telecommunications legislation. This 
30 The ECJ in this respect referred to the judgment of 24 April 2008 in Arcor, C-55/06, ECR I-2931, 
paras. 153 - 156.
31 ECJ 3 December 2009, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, case C-424/07 (emphasis 
added). 
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 significantly reduced the discretion available to the telecommunications super-
visor. The ECJ saw through this attempt and declared it to be in contravention of 
the applicable European Telecommunications Directives. As the Court stated, the 
European legislator has conferred on the independent national regulatory authori-
ties, and not on the national legislature, the task of determining the need for regu-
lation of the markets. If, by laying down a legal provision in national legislation, 
the German legislator was to be able to prevent the national regulatory authority 
from adopting the regulatory measures that the authority considered appropri-
ate, the national regulatory authority would be subjected to political influence that 
would restrict its powers and also constitute a threat to its independence.
The judgment in this case represents a significant curtailment of national auton-
omy as it means that national legislators are not free to disregard the system of 
independent supervision provided for in the European directives and to assign 
these powers to themselves. It can be concluded from this case that the ECJ regards 
the importance of independent supervision as a basic principle and will therefore 
closely examine any intervention by national legislators.
6. Case 3: Dutch Television Case
The above German case is of importance for a case – the Dutch television case – 
currently attracting attention in the Netherlands.
Influence of the Dutch House of Representatives
The central issue in this case concerns the extent to which cable companies should 
be required to allow their competitors to access their networks. The issue of cable 
networks has been politically very sensitive in the Netherlands for many years. 
Although OPTA, the Dutch Independent Post and Telecommunications Author-
ity, had earlier decided to require access to the cable networks to be granted,32 
its decisions were subsequently overturned by the Trade and Industry Appeals 
Tribunal33 and in 2011 OPTA was forced to review its decision. Shortly before 
OPTA was due to announce its new decision, the Dutch House of Representatives 
adopted two amendments34 in which the obligation to grant access was laid down 
in law (in the Dutch Media Act (Mediawet) and the Dutch Telecommunications 
32 OPTA’s decisions of 17 March 2006, 21 December 2007 and 5 March 2009, <www.opta.nl>. The 
first and third of these decisions were overturned by the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals Tri-
bunal. The new decision that OPTA was consequently forced to take in 2011 resulted in a draft 
opinion on regulation of the television market being published on 23 June 2011, submitted for 
consultation and finally adopted at December 20th, 2011, see: Trade and Industry Appeals Tribu-
nal 5 November 2012 Tele 2 et al. v. OPTA, LJN: BY2135, para. 2.2.
33 Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal 24 July 2007, Casema et al. v. OPTA, LJN: BB0186; Trade and 
Industry Appeals Tribunal 17 December 2008, UPC et al. v. OPTA, LJN: BG7099, and Trade and 
Industry Appeals Tribunal 18 August 2010, Delta et al. v. OPTA, LJN: BN4243.
34 Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 32 549, No. 28 and 2010/11, 32 549, No. 18.
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Act (Telecommunicatiewet)).35 These amendments require large cable companies 
to cooperate in the resale of their standard packages. In this way the Netherlands 
has circumvented the discretionary powers available to OPTA under the European 
framework that allow it first to delineate the market and then to decide which 
measures are necessary and proportional. This Dutch case is very similar, there-
fore, to the German telecommunications case discussed above.
OPTA and the minister’s views
OPTA’s draft opinion on the market, in which it stated that the television market 
was by now sufficiently competitive and not in need of more regulation, was pub-
lished in the very same week as the amendment.36 As the opinion stated, it was 
not appropriate – in OPTA’s view – to impose an obligation to allow access to the 
television network. In a letter of 23rd June 2011 sent to the Dutch House of Rep-
resentatives concerning the amendments that had been adopted the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation stated that:
This amendment deviates, however, from a principle that I consider very important 
and that is also established in European law, being the requirement for an indepen-
dent regulatory authority to decide on whether and how competition in markets should 
be regulated, with all the safeguards that this entails. In my view this basic principle is 
of great importance in giving market parties the assurance that regulation will be ap-
plied professionally and consistently. This is also the reason why we have designated 
OPTA as the authority responsible for regulating the cable market. OPTA bases its 
opinions on in-depth market analyses and its decisions are subject to judicial review. 
My predecessors and I have emphasised this point, with reference to the legal risks 
involved. I will arrange for this issue to be discussed with the administrations of the 
European Commission, specifically with regard to the legal viability of this aspect of 
the Bill.37
As the legislative amendment allows the Dutch legislator and not, as required by 
the European telecommunications framework, the national independent regula-
tory authority (in this case, OPTA) to decide whether to impose a specific obliga-
tion (in this case the obligation to allow access to the network), the Commission 
initiated an infringement procedure against the Netherlands.38 The Commission 
alleges that the new legislation consequently contravenes the provisions of the 
European Telecommunications Directives.39
35 This was achieved via an amendment to the Media Act in the form of the addition of Article 6.14 
and an amendment to the Telecommunications Act in the form of the addition of Article 6a.21.a.
36 OPTA’s draft opinion on its analysis of the television market of 23 June 2011, <www.opta.nl>. This 
draft decision is confirmed in the final decision of OPTA of December 20, 2011, <www.opta.nl>. 
This decision of OPTA is uphold by the CBb in its judgement of 5 November 2012, Tele 2 et al. v. 
OPTA, LJN: BY2135, <www.rechtspraak.nl>.
37 Emphasis added.
38 Case number 2012/4144, Brussels 24.10.2012, C(2012) 7394 final.
39 Specifically Articles 7(a) and 16 of Directive 2009/140/EC. 
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7. Case 4: French Government Commissioner of Autonomous Administrative 
Authorities
The issue of the appointment of government commissioners at various autono-
mous administrative authorities in France (Autorités Administratives Indépendan-
tes, ‘AAI’) has recently garnered considerable attention. This attention was directly 
triggered by an amendment to the French telecommunications legislation that 
affected the telecom regulator ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications 
Électroniques et des Postes). The amendment, which was approved by the Assem-
blée Nationale,40 allowed the government to appoint an official at ARCEP. Many 
people saw this as compromising the telecom regulator’s independence. Under 
the amendment, the government official would be responsible for announcing 
details of the government’s analyses of the postal and electronic communications 
markets to ARCEP. In addition, the official would be authorised to include any 
question relating to this field on the agenda, while a request for investigation of 
such a question could not be refused. The government official was not permitted, 
however, to attend consultations of the telecoms regulator. The brief explanatory 
notes to the amendment stated that it was based on a recent parliamentary report 
on the French AAI, in which the appointment of a government official at each AAI 
was recommended.41
This amendment is certainly questionable from a European perspective. Indeed 
a European Commission telecommunications spokesperson indicated that the 
Commission would examine the amendment to see whether it was compatible 
with European legislation:
La Commission Européenne va examiner “de très près” un projet français visant 
à nommer un commissaire du gouvernement au sein de l’Autorité de régulation 
des communications électroniques et des postes (Arcep), car elle veut s’assurer de 
l’indépendance de cet organisme, a indiqué jeudi un porte-parole.42
Catherine Trautmann, a member of the European Parliament, described herself 
as absolument ahurie et scandalisée (absolutely stunned and shocked) by the amend-
ment.43 Éric Besson, the initiator of the amendment, defended the move by stating 
that he was seeking to reinforce the dialogue between the regulatory authority and 
the government and to increase the effectiveness of the work. He also stated that 
40 The amendment was approved during the night of 13 January by six votes to five: Les députés vali-
dent la création du commissaire du gouvernement à l’Arcep, Le Monde 14 January 2011, <www.
lemonde.fr>.
41 Assemblée Nationale, Rapport d’information fait au nom du comité d’évaluation et de contrôle des 
politiques publiques sur les autorités administratives indépendantes, Vol. I – Report, No. 2925, filed 
on 28 October 2010, pp. 101-102.
42 Bruxelles veillera à ‘l’indépendance et l’impartialité’ de l’Arcep, Le Monde 13 January 2011, <www.
lemonde.fr>.
43 Guerric Poncet, Amendement – Le gouvernement va limiter l’indépendance du gendarme des 
télécoms, Le Point 13 January 2011, <www.lepoint.fr>.
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the appointment of a government official at a regulatory authority was nothing 
new as such an official had already been appointed at other important regulatory 
authorities such as the French Authority for the Financial Markets (Autorité des 
marchés financiers), the Competition Authority (Autorité de la concurrence) and the 
Energy Regulation Committee (Commission de Régulation de l’Energie).44
The appointment of a government official to such a position was clearly very much 
at odds with the requirement for independence stipulated in the telecom and 
energy directives. Although this official would not have had any formal powers 
and would not have been permitted to attend board meetings, his presence would 
obviously have put indirect (and maybe even direct) pressure on the activities of the 
independent regulatory authority. Appointing such an official in order to increase 
effectiveness was also unnecessary as there are other means of achieving this, and 
these other means respect the need for independence. Following a warning by 
European Commissioner Kroes that she would initiate infringement proceedings 
if this amendment was adopted, the French Senate voted against the amendment 
and the idea of appointing this new government commissioner (at least in the 
case of ARCEP) has now been abandoned.45 In view of the strict requirements 
imposed, as discussed above, in the European energy directives, the government 
commissioner at the French energy regulator should also be removed from office.
8. Case 5: Hungarian Media Case
In December 2010 the Hungarian parliament passed a law, which came into force 
on January 1st 2011, which severely tightens indirect government control of the 
media.46 This legislation also changes the supervisory regime of the country’s 
media. It creates a new Media Council, elected by Parliament, and whose chair-
man is directly appointed by the Prime Minister for a nine year mandate. Since 
the current (right-wing) party is in power and has a vast majority in Parliament, 
no representative of the opposition will sit on the Media Council for at least nine 
years. This new organisation is supposed to emerge as the modernised head of 
media supervision in the country, including both analogue and electronic media. 
The scope of the new legislation is large, as it is including every kind of media 
(press, television, internet media as well as online media).
44 See footnote 35.
45 <www.senat.fr/amendements/commissions/2010-2011/225/jeu_complet.html>.
46 Act CLXXXV of 2010 on media services and mass media,  Magyar Közlöny  (Official Journal) 
31 December 2010, Act LXXXII of 2010 on the amendment of certain acts on media and telecom-
munications, Magyar Közlöny (Official Journal) 10 August 2010 and Act CIV of 2010 on the free-
dom of the press and the fundamental rules on media content, Magyar Közlöny (Official Journal) 
9 November 2010.
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Commissioner Kroes called47 the new legislation ‘unsatisfactory’ and urged 
Hungary to bring the new act in conformity with European legislation, more spe-
cifically with the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.48 It was announced by 
the Hungarian State that proposals were made to change the new legislation and 
bring it in conformity with EU law.49 However, there was no mention of the origi-
nal compliant by the Commission about the composition of the new members of 
the Media Council.50
What does EU law require with respect to the independence of media regulators? 
The only requirements for independence and efficient functioning of national 
regulatory bodies in the audiovisual media sector are found in Article 30 of chap-
ter XI (Cooperation between regulatory bodies of the Member States) of the Media 
Service Directive. This article provides:
Member States shall take appropriate measures to provide each other and the Com-
mission with the information necessary for the application of the provisions of this 
Directive, in particular Articles 2, 3 and 4 hereof, in particular through their compe-
tent independent regulatory bodies.
The scope and impact of this provision is further explained in two specific recitals 
of the directive:
(94) In accordance with the duties imposed on Member States by the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, they are responsible for the effective implemen-
tation of this Directive. They are free to choose the appropriate instruments accord-
ing to their legal traditions and established structures, and, in particular, the form of 
their competent independent regulatory bodies, in order to be able to carry out their 
work in implementing this Directive impartially and transparently. More specifically, 
the instruments chosen by Member States should contribute to the promotion of 
media pluralism.
(95) Close cooperation between competent regulatory bodies of the Member States 
and the Commission is necessary to ensure the correct application of this Direc-
tive. Similarly close cooperation between Member States and between their regula-
47 N. Kroes, State of play of Commission’s examination of Hungarian Media Law, Extraordinary 
meeting of the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee Stras-
bourg, 17 January 2011, SPEECH/11/22: “the Media Law does not appear at first sight to be 
satisfactory”.
48 Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2010 on the 
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in 
Member States concerning the provision of audio-visual media services, O.J. 2010, L 95/1, here-
after and the Media Service Directive.
49 Act XIX of 2011 on the modification of Act CIV of 2010 and Act CLXXXV of 2010  Magyar 
Közlöny (Official Journal) 22 March 2011. See also: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
MEMO-11-89_en.htm>.
50 Financial Times February 16, 2011.
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tory bodies is particularly important with regard to the impact which broadcasters 
 established in one Member State might have on another Member State. Where li-
censing procedures are provided for in national law and if more than one Member 
State is concerned, it is desirable that contacts between the respective bodies take 
place before such licenses are granted. This cooperation should cover all fields co-
ordinated by this Directive.
The current text of Art. 30 Media Services Directive reflects a difficult compro-
mise between the different visions of the European Parliament, the Commission 
and the Council. Recital 94 and Article 30 do not impose a formal legal obligation 
on Member States to create an independent supervisor where these do not yet 
exist.51 However, if a new supervisory body is created, this authority should be 
independent. But what does that mean? The Media Services Directive does not 
provide – contrary to the communications and energy directives – specific legal 
requirements.
It is questionable whether the Media Services Directive provides sufficient safe-
guards to intervene in the Hungarian case with regard to the independence of the 
new Media Council. Nonetheless, the Commission has started an infringement 
procedure.52 As media pluralism and the freedom of expression must be consid-
ered fundamental rights, it is at the very least remarkable that the media directive 
does not provide stricter provisions and safeguards to ensure the ‘depolitisation’ of 
media regulation and independent supervision. Lessons have to be learned from 
other sectors, such as the communications sector, to amend the legal require-
ments of the Media Service Directive in that respect.
9. Conclusion: Three Levels of Protection
As the examples discussed in this paper demonstrate, the independence of 
national supervisors is fragile and can come under pressure, not only from market 
parties, but also from the legislator and the political sphere and administration. 
Experience in various Member States prompted the European Commission to 
issue proposals designed to reinforce the independence of the national super-
visors in various sectors. These more stringent requirements have since been 
incorporated into various European directives and not only provide for indepen-
dence vis-à-vis market parties, but also vis-à-vis the political arena. To date, the 
ECJ has recognised the importance of and actively sought to protect the indepen-
51 See the Preliminary report by Hans Bredow Institute et al., Indicators for independence and effi-
cient functioning of audiovisual media services regulatory bodies for the purpose of enforcing 
rules in the AVMS Directive, SMART 2009/001, January 2011, p. 323.
52 1 September 2011, IP/11/1002. See also IP/11/1173 and report Hungarian media laws in 
Europe. An assessment of the consistency of Hungary’s media laws with  European prac-
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dence of national supervisors in its case law. The approach adopted by the Court 
is expected to continue in the future. Overlooking the European landscape of the 
above-mentioned regulated areas, three levels of protection can be distinguished. 
First, there is the area of data protection, where the European legislator and court 
have recognised the importance of independence and have secured a high level of 
protection of independence. A middle category is the energy and communications 
area, with legal requirements, which qualify as a medium level of protection of 
independence. Finally, there are sectors, such as the media sector, where so far the 
level of protection is low.
What lessons can we learn from the discussed cases? There will certainly be a ten-
dency for governments, particularly in areas in which they have interests at stake, 
to seek a degree of involvement. There are various ways in which this involve-
ment manifests itself. From a European perspective, however, any involvement by 
a government in individual cases in markets in which the state is also a market 
party is forbidden. Although general instructions (policy rules) may be issued to 
independent supervisors, the question of whether these instructions go too far in 
addressing concrete situations, will always be assessed critically. Political influ-
ence, even if the state is not a market party, is not allowed in the telecommunica-
tions and gas sectors on which the European directives have imposed far-reaching 
requirements. The legislator is not permitted to curtail the activities of the super-
visors in these sectors either via legislation or policy rules in individual cases, but 
the legislator and the minister may define a general policy framework supervisors 
have to take into account in matters of general interest, such as security of supply 
and sustainability. The independent supervisors need, however, to have sufficient 
discretion within this framework to be able to take autonomous decisions in indi-
vidual cases, based on the provisions of European law. A balance will have to be 
found between policy considerations from the legislator and ministries on the one 
hand and sufficient discretion for the independent authority on the other hand. 
Absolute independence is not realistic and can conflict with the democratic prin-
ciple of the Member States.
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In this chapter, the issue of independence of regulators will be addressed. Three 
questions are answered. First, what is the degree of independence of the politico-
administrative system of inspections and authorities in the Netherlands? Second, 
the question of what degree of independence is needed is discussed. Third, an 
answer is given to the question of how this desired degree of independence can be 
accomplished.
The second paragraph starts by pointing out the motives for a discussion on this 
issue now. In the third paragraph the concept of independence is addressed. 
What is independence in relation to inspectorates and authorities? What are the 
constraints and incentives? In this paragraph the first question is answered. The 
second question is addressed in the fourth paragraph, where the official line of 
thought in the Netherlands will be described. Different scholars focus on the 
desirability of more independence of inspectorates and authorities. Paragraph 5 
focusses on different ways to safeguard independence. Then, of course, ministe-
rial responsibility is discussed as well as organising inspectorates and authorities 
at a certain distance of the departmental structure. Finally, some conclusions will 
be drawn and the discussion will be put into perspective (paragraph 6).
2. The Debate on (In)dependency: Three Motives
There are at least three motives for the urgency of a discussion on independence 
of regulatory enforcement in the 21st century. The first one can be labeled as the 
public discussion on inspectorates and authorities. The second motive makes a 
reference to the political and administrative interferences with regulatory enforce-
ment. The third motive focuses on the incentives from European law.
*
* Prof. dr. H.B. Winter is Professor of regulatory compliance at the department of administrative 
law and public administration of the Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, the Netherlands. 
He is also director of Pro Facto, a research and consultancy firm, active in the fields of public law 
and public administration.
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2.1 The Public Debate on Regulatory Enforcement
Over the past few years a fierce public debate is been raging in the Netherlands 
concerning the merits of regulatory enforcement in general and about the use and 
nuisance of inspectorates and authorities in particular. Fuel for the discussions 
was provided by an important government document, the second memo on regu-
latory enforcement from October 2005 (‘Kaderstellende visie op toezicht’, Parlia-
mentary Papers II 2005/06, 27 831, nr. 15). The title of this document is significant 
as it translates as ‘Less burden, more effect’. In my opinion this title symbolises 
the current situation of regulatory enforcement in the Netherlands. Inspectorates 
and authorities have to deal with different constraints and incentives. Less burden 
indicates that regulatory enforcement is supposed to function on a more limited 
scale. The regulated should be bothered less. In this respect, we encountered the 
rather surprising concept of an ‘inspection holiday’ in the previous Dutch gov-
ernment’s coalition agreement (Rutte I, 2010 – 2012). This meant that civilians, 
businesses and organisations that behave according to the law, will be trusted 
based on their previous performance and will be inspected in a lighter way than 
would usually be the case. In itself this of course is not a particularly controversial 
concept, but it leads to many potential misunderstanding and misinterpretations, 
which is understandable as it implies that inspectorates and authorities interfer 
too much with businesses and private citizens.
At the same time more effect should be brought about according to this vision 
memo. This means that if the inspector acts, it should be effective. Societal out-
comes of inspections need to be clearly recognisable and substantiated.
Both starting points are useful, one could argue, but in practice the combination 
leads to paralysing effects. In short: the inspector can do no good. He is always 
to blame. If there is an incident, he did not anticipate the risks and failed to take 
measures. If there is no incident, then the inspector will be accused of creating a 
burden of supervision, he is evaluated as being too expensive and the conclusion 
could be that we can do without him. There are currently several inspectorates 
are involved in such ambivalent discussions. The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate 
for instance, is an example of an inspectorate that attracts a great deal of public 
attention. It seems everyone disagrees with the organisation, from hospital man-
agement, patient organisations, consumer protection programmes on Dutch tel-
evision, Dutch parliament and the National ombudsman. The debate focuses on 
the intensity of the activities of the Healthcare Inspectorate: some argue it is too 
reluctant to impose sanctions and fails to address the real problems, others argue 
that the inspectorate interferes far too much.
The public focus on inspectorates and authorities leads to insecurity surround-
ing purpose and function in regulatory organisations. It results in budget cuts 
and reorganisation and in the Dutch parliament passing a resolution aiming to 
build one nationwide inspection in a big and comprehensive merger. Indeed, 
there was such a resolution a few years ago, initiated by parliamentarian Aptroot, 
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 unscrupulously aiming to form one inspectorate. We have seen deep budget cuts 
on inspectorates over the last few years and we also witness different inspectorates 
recently reorganising and merging. The argument for the independence of inspec-
torates and authorities find relevance in its function as a shield against these kinds 
of interventions.
2.2 The Political and Administrative Domain
The second incentive sparking public debate about regulatory enforcement and 
independence can be found in the way enforcement is executed within the politico-
administrative domain. Research on inspections and authorities tells us that inter-
ventions from politicians and administrators often results in preventing inspec-
torates and authorities from acting as they want to. Research in the field of local 
environmental enforcement suggests that aldermen and deputies are frequently 
reluctant to impose sanctions that can put regional employment or other public 
interests at risk.1 These concerns are raised by managers of firms complaining 
that the penalties civil servants threaten to impose and by counselors lobbying for 
(their own) agricultural interests. Businesses in this process threaten to leave the 
municipality or the province if the enforcement action is carried out. This lack of 
independence is one of the triggers that led to Biezeveld and Stoové coming up 
with their proposal of establishing an independent environmental authority.2
2.3 European Regulation and Jurisprudence
Third, the discussion on regulatory independence is relevant because of European 
regulation and jurisprudence by the European Court of Justice. An important 
milestone seems to be the EU Court’s verdict of March, 9th, 2010, Commission 
v Germany, concerning the independence of the privacy authority in the German 
Länder, who are subjected to a certain degree of administrative control.3 The ver-
dict addresses the interpretation of the term ‘full independence’ mentioned in the 
Privacy Directive. The EU Court of Justice is of the opinion that this term should 
be interpreted in a very strict sense which means that the privacy authority should 
be fully independent from state administration. Full independence thus can be 
compared with the independence of the judiciary. Other European Directives, for 
instance concerning energy or telecoms, are not as radical as the Privacy Directive 
but also in these fields independent enforcement seems not to be subjected to 
direct instruction from the government or by other public or private entities. This 
1 N. Struiksma, J. de Ridder & H.B. Winter, De effectiviteit van bestuurlijke en strafrechtelijke milieu-
handhaving (WODC-reeks Onderzoek en beleid, nr. 253), Boom Juridische uitgevers Den Haag, 
2007 en J. de Ridder, N. Struiksma & M.J. Schol, Grip op milieuzaken. Evaluatie van de strafrech-
telijke milieuhandhaving, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Groningen, 2009.
2 G.A. Biezeveld & M.C. Stoové, Naar een Nederlandse Omgevingsautoriteit. Een pleidooi voor 
onafhankelijk milieutoezicht, Tijdschrift voor Toezicht 2011, No. 3, p. 9-33.
3 ECJ 9 March 2010, C-518/07, Commission v. Germany. See also: A.T. Ottow, Onafhankelijkheid 
van toezichthouders, ECJ 9 maart 2010, European Cie. v. Germany, zaak C-515/07, Tijdschrift voor 
Toezicht 2010, No. 3, p. 78-86. 
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is illustrated by the Dutch case concerning a policy regulation by the Dutch Minis-
ter of Economic Affairs addressed to the board of the Dutch Competition Author-
ity on how to determine the rates for gas transportation. The Dutch court argued 
that the Minister lacked authority to issue such a policy regulation, as it interfered 
with the independent judgment of the board of the Competition Authority.4
3. Independence and the State of the Art in the Netherlands
What are the constraints to and the incentives for independence and what does 
independence really mean? To start with this last question, regarding regulatory 
enforcement independence has a twofold meaning. First, there is (in)dependence 
in the relationship to the regulated field or sector. A sufficient degree of indepen-
dence means that inspectorates are able to gather information on the behaviour of 
the regulated with little interference. Also, inspectorates should be free to come up 
with an analysis of this information and finally with the intervention they think 
is appropriate. When deciding upon interventions, independence usually is more 
endangered by more unobtrusive threats, like agency capture.
The other interpretation of independence of regulatory enforcement focuses on the 
relationship between the inspectorate on the one hand and politico-administrative 
leadership on the other. The most radical position would be that an inspectorate 
should be free to gather information it judged appropriate, and intervene when 
necessary, autonomous from the opinions of politicians and administrators.
3.1 Independence and the Regulated
First a few remarks on independence versus the regulated. In many evaluations 
of the financial crisis the world experienced following the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, we frequently saw reference made to the interdependence of the banking 
system and the supervisors. The relationship was tackled in terms of ‘regulatory 
capture’, did the financial inspectorates operate at a required distance from the 
regulated? There seems to be much evidence of close ties between the regulated 
and the regulators. We see a small world of bankers and inspectors, where job rota-
tion between the sectors is predominant and where professionals meet in different 
kind of gatherings. The mixture of financial institutions and supervisors made 
it very difficult for the regulators to intervene or even to clearly distinguish what 
exactly was going on. This was true worldwide, and certainly in the Netherlands 
where the analysis of DSB’s bankruptcy in 2009 by the commission-Scheltema5 
and the analysis of the crisis in the Dutch financial sector by parliamentarian 
4 CBb 29 juni 2010, LJN: BM9470 (Gaszaak).
5 Rapport van de commissie van Onderzoek DSB Bank, Den Haag, 23 juni 2010. <www.nuzakelijk.
nl/algemeen/2280594/rapport-commissie-scheltema.html> (last consulted on 29 March 2013).
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commission-De Wit6 came to similar conclusions. The financial supervisors 
maintained an old boys network with the financial institutions they were sup-
posed to supervise. A remarkable story comes from the report by the commission-
Scheltema on DSB where we witness a reverse case of capture. Auditors of the 
Dutch Central Bank had what they thought was a tough talk with bankers of DSB, 
pointing out that things had to change drastically within the bank. The DSB bank 
management interpreted this same encounter as a pleasant conversation about the 
state of affairs, resulting in the bank of course not reacting to the sharp criticism 
from the central bankers. The usual way of handling things, the close ties between 
central bankers and insurance companies and banks on which the central bank-
ers relied, did not work at all in this case because DSB was a newcomer in the 
financial market, an outsider headed by a general manager who worked his way up 
from an insurance salesman to a banker with an official banking permission. DSB 
did not understand the usual way of handling things between supervisors and 
bankers, representatives of the central bank also did not understand that customs 
in the financial sector had changed rapidly, so they did not anticipate the radical 
change in relationship.
There seems to be more sensitivity for this aspect of the functioning of inspector-
ates and authorities than used to be the case. In the past for instance, one and the 
same inspector of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education could supervise schools in 
a certain district during his whole career, without ever changing his working area. 
Most inspectorates and authorities nowadays have the risk of ‘capture’, and there 
being too close a relationship between the regulator and the regulated, much more 
in mind.
Of course independence from the field is an absolute pre-condition for effective 
inspections. Inspectors inevitably must rely on cooperation by the regulated. Such 
cooperation is not self-evident. In this respect, in May 2012, a significant incident 
attracted attention. A newspaper article reported the secretary of Justice’s with-
drawal of a protocol composed several years ago by the ministry of Justice. The 
protocol was directed to civil servants working in institutions for juvenile delin-
quents.7 The intention of the protocol was to brief the staff not to be too honest 
or too negative to the visiting inspectors. The personnel ought to stress what was 
going well and which measures for improvement had already been taken. Appar-
ently, cooperation is no automatism, as we all know.
6 Tijdelijke commissie onderzoek financieel stelsel, Verloren krediet, Parliamentary Papers II 
2009/10, 31 980, No. 4 and Verloren krediet II – de balans opgemaakt, Parliamentary Papers II 
2011/12, 31 980, No. 61.
7 <www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/12208602/__Teeven_trekt_handleiding_in__.html>, Tele graaf 
25 mei 2012, Teeven trekt handleiding bezoek inspectie in (last consulted on 16 October 2012).
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3.2 Independence and the Minister
The focus of this chapter is on the relationship between inspectorates and authori-
ties and the minister. These relationships are shaped in different ways depend-
ing on the jurisdiction where inspectorates and authorities operate, from a large 
degree of independence and autonomy to close relationships where elaborate 
interference by the ministers is possible. Close relationships exist for instance in 
the areas of health care, education, food safety and work safety. We can illustrate 
this by taking the Healthcare Inspectorate as an example. This inspectorate can 
be seen as the extended arm of the minister, some people argue. The close links 
to the minister could endanger the independence of the inspectorate. This can 
be substantiated by taking a closer look at the position of the Inspector-General, 
the CEO of the Healthcare Inspectorate. His office is partly in the ministry, in 
the surroundings of the staff of the minister. Moreover, he is part of the manage-
ment team of the ministry of Healthcare, Welfare and Sports. As a consequence 
he holds responsibility for management decisions affecting the health care sector 
in the Netherlands, the sector he has to supervise.
In general, there seems to be a strong tendency to pull the management of inspec-
torates towards the ministries, as Mertens earlier described.8 This is also the 
case with the ministry of Education and the ministry of Agriculture, Economics 
and Innovation, the Inspector-General of the Inspectorate of Education and the 
Inspector-General of the Food Authority as they are all part of the management 
team of the ministry. On the one hand, this is understandable. As an expert, the 
inspector can advise the minister on the policy to be issued, more specifically on 
questions of enforcement relevant for policy development. The question is whether 
it is sensible that inspectors are so closely linked to policymakers. Do they harm 
their independent position by doing so?
In contrast with inspectorates such as the Healthcare Inspectorate, the inspector-
ate of Education and the Food Authority, who seem to be closely linked to the 
departmental structure and to the minister, also through ministerial responsibil-
ity, the independence of several other authorities in the Netherlands is arranged 
for more formally. This for instance holds true for the Dutch Competition Author-
ity, the Privacy Authority and for the two supervisors of the financial system. The 
choice for this independent position is made on the basis of several arguments. 
In the first place there is the European perspective. Several European directives 
and regulations require authorities to be structured as independent from interfer-
ence from the minister. This is true for the Privacy Authority, for the Competition 
Authority and also for the Authority regulating the energy markets. In paragraph 4 
we will take a closer look.
8 Ferdinand Mertens, Inspecteren. Toezicht door inspecties, Sdu, Den Haag, 2011, p. 119-139.
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4. The Official Policy on Independence and the Degree of Independence 
Needed
What is the official line of thought on independence of inspectorates? Seen from 
the perspective of the previously mentioned Kaderstellende visie of October 2005, 
regulatory enforcement should be selective, determined, cooperative, transparent 
and professional. And it also should be independent. These are the six princi-
ples of good enforcement. Following this document, ‘independence’ means that 
inspectors function within the reach of ministerial responsibility. The minister 
has the authority to give general and particular instructions to the inspector and 
the inspectorate. This authority can be derived from article 44 of the Dutch Con-
stitution, unless the authority is limited by the law. The formal position of an 
inspectorate is thus more or less independent, following the wishes of the legisla-
tor in specific cases of certain authorities and inspectorates. I will make a few 
remarks on this issue later on.
The material independence of inspections is expressed in the way in which they 
fill in their role within the borders of ministerial responsibility. According to the 
Kaderstellende visie, society must be able to trust the independent judgment of 
inspectors. Inspectors need to independently gather information, come to conclu-
sions and formulate interventions. In other words, independence is part of the 
vision in this policy document, although not in the sense of a search for autonomy 
of inspectorates but more in a search for safeguards that can empower the inspec-
tor to gather information, come to conclusions and intervene.
At the same time, the Kaderstellende visie struggles with this issue. To cite: “The 
inspector plays his own role by determining the enforcement goals, the methods 
used and the capacity invested”. “The inspector formulates independent on the 
basis of his own professionalism his own independent judgment”. But at the same 
time it says: “The inspector plays his own role by determining the moment and 
the severity of a possible intervention; the minister is responsible”.
From a legal perspective, things are quite clear. Following article 44 of the Dutch 
Constitution, an inspectorate or authority functions under the umbrella of min-
isterial responsibility, which means the minister can give general and specific 
instructions to the organisation under his responsibility. This responsibility 
however, can be restricted, so it is not always the minister who is responsible. 
Following European legislation, for instance, it is sometimes required to set up 
and organise an inspectorate or authority at arm’s length from a minister. The 
independent administrative organisations (zelfstandige bestuursorganen) are 
organisations that play a role in the processes of national government but that 
themselves are not government departments or part of one, and that accordingly 
operate to a greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers Independent 
administrative organisations, in particular those for service delivery and policy 
execution used to be very popular organisations but recent years have seen their 
popularity in the Netherlands diminish. Recently, we have not seen many new 
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independent  administrative organisations emerging. The discussion on fading 
government control and fragmentation of government, as this phenomenon is 
labeled, seems to lead to a repositioning of these types of (quasi-) independent 
government organisations.
Even if an inspectorate or an authority is organised in a semi-autonomous way still 
the question remains of whether this correctly conforms to European legislation 
and jurisprudence. Recent jurisprudence seems to show that there is reason to 
doubt this. For all of these autonomous government organisations in the past one 
legal framework has been developed. This framework act for independent gov-
ernment organisations (Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen) contains provisions 
that have possible consequences for the material independence of these organisa-
tions. For instance: Article 12 of this framework says that the minister appoints, 
suspends and discharges the members of the independent government organisa-
tion. Article 21, first paragraph, makes it possible for the minister to issue policy 
rules for these organisations’ activities and Article 22, first paragraph, gives the 
minister the authority to annul their decisions. Discussing these authorities and 
with a reference to the decision by the European Court of Justice from March 9th 
2010, mentioned above, Ottow asks herself if the relationship between the Dutch 
Privacy Authority and the minister fulfils the obligations of the Privacy Directive 
and answers to the requirement of full independence.9 Her conclusion is that 
the privacy law (Wet bescherming persoonsgegevens) institutionalising the Privacy 
Authority in the Netherlands, needs to be changed.
The authority to determine policy rules that follow from Article 21 of the frame-
work for independent government organisations raises the question as to the 
character of these policy rules. Perhaps this authority fits the independence of 
these authorities if their character is a general one. When the policy rules tend to 
get rather specific, one doubts whether that still would be the case. In a dispute 
regarding a policy rule, issued by the minister of Economic Affairs, to the energy 
chamber of the Dutch Competition Authority the Trade and Industry Appeals Tri-
bunal (College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven) judged that a certain policy rule did 
not contain general rules, but specific rules and as such was unlawful.10
It is mostly European legislation that makes a radical choice for non-departmental 
organisations an inevitable one, for instance in the case of the Privacy Authority 
or with market authorities. Although perhaps that is not the only situation where 
formal independence is needed. I refer again to empirical data on environmental 
enforcement and interference from local government authorities who withhold 
inspectors to issue enforcement measures they deem necessary. The advisory 
committee-Mans named after its chairman, thought this was one of the reasons 
9 A.T. Ottow & S.A.C.M. Lavrijssen, Het Europese recht als hoeder van de onafhankelijkheid van 
nationale toezichthouders, Tijdschrift voor Toezicht, 2001, No. 3, p. 34-50.
10 CBb 29 juni 2010, LJN: BM9470 (Gaszaak).
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to plead for regional environmental enforcement agencies.11 As already mentioned, 
Biezeveld and Stoové believe we should go beyond that and establish an indepen-
dent Dutch Environmental Authority, an environmental agency, organised as an 
independent administrative organisation.
That more inspectorates will become formally independent is not very probable. 
On the contrary, the merging of several market authorities (NMa, OPTA en CA) 
into one larger new authority comes with a different organisational structure, 
which perhaps also diminishes the independence of the organisation, backs this 
up. In the context of the above – in short – described jurisprudence and the broader 
discussion on independence of inspectorates and authorities, the organisational 
change of these market authorities could become very interesting.
5. How to Safeguard Independence?
How to accomplish independence, is the third question to be answered in this 
contribution. The clearest way to safeguard independence is to set up and organ-
ise inspectorates and authorities as independent administrative organisations. 
Already above, it was concluded that at this time this is unlikely to be adopted. The 
task of establishing a certain degree of independence from the minister, when the 
inspectorate is not set up as a formally independent organisation, proves to be a 
challenging one. Which safeguards should apply in a situation of full ministerial 
responsibility where the inspectorate wishes to create material independence for 
its actions? Perhaps there are easier ways of realising independence. Since July 
2002, the work of the Inspectorate for Education is based on a law.12 This law 
states that the minister has no authority to give instructions to the inspectorate 
about the way the inspectorate judges educational quality.13 The parliamentary 
history of this article is interesting. Parliamentarians amended the law against 
the background of a discussion on independence of the education inspectorate. 
In the law a distinction is made between the gathering of information and the 
judgment. On this basis there is the exclusive domain of the inspectorate on the 
one hand and the intervention for which the minister should act on the other. In 
this sense, the ministerial responsibility for education inspections is made clear. 
Most other inspectorates lack such a legal basis for their activities, or, if they have 
such a basis it is much less precise. A few years ago several ministries were work-
ing on legislation concerning other inspectorates, but these proposals were never 
presented. The suggestion of working on a legislative framework for inspections 
that can offer minimal safeguards for material independence, while at the same 
time ministerial responsibility stays intact, could be very fruitful in this respect.14
11 Commissie-Mans, De tijd is rijp, Den Haag 2008.
12 Wet op het Onderwijstoezicht, Staatsblad 202, 387.
13 Article 8, third paragraph.
14 Ph. Eijlander, De ministeriële verantwoordelijkheid voor inspecties en inspectieoordelen. Naar 
een wettelijke basis voor onafhankelijk toezicht?, RegelMaat, 2003, No. 3, p. 94-99.
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6. Conclusions: Independence in Perspective
Even with formal independence as is the case with several inspectorates and 
authorities in the Netherlands, independence must be put into perspective. Can 
we imagine an inspectorate being independent when the Inspector-General is 
a member of the management team of the ministry? Aside from this, it is true 
that independence is not an absolute value. Independence towards civilians, busi-
nesses and institutions is important, but at the same time there is dependency 
high and low. Inspectors need information from and the cooperation of the regu-
lated. Independence from politicians is important too but at the same time inde-
pendent market authorities need budgets and the means to organise themselves. 
On this issue, we should talk about a continuum, upon which variation is possible. 
Sometimes more independence is needed, sometimes we are satisfied with an 
optimum position.
Independence, thus, is not an absolute quantity. Depending on the characteris-
tics of the task, the (European) legislation and the jurisprudence, either more or 
less independence is wanted. Autonomous government organisations could be an 
appropriate way for organising independence from the minister in certain fields 
of government activity. But even in these cases, as we have seen, it sometimes is 
questionable whether the status of autonomous government organisations fulfils 
all the requirements of European legislation. Some scholars of constitutional law 
in the Netherlands argue the re-installment of total political control. They seem to 
choose the wrong fight. From the other side: total independence as such does not 
exist either. It is always the material, factual situation that is decisive.
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Thirty years ago Dutch society was shocked by the first serious environmental 
crime that came to light.1 In 1982 police investigators discovered that over a ten 
year period a couple of companies belonging to Uniser Holding had emitted a 
great amount of dangerous substances into Dutch rivers. The companies involved 
had gone bankrupt leaving behind seriously polluted plants as well as tanks, cel-
lars, and ships full of chemical waste. In reaction to the so-called Uniser Case 
the Dutch Cabinet of Ministers asked an independent commission to analyse 
the causes of these crimes and recommend what should be done to prevent such 
environmental crimes. This commission concluded that fragmented operating 
governmental bodies and services involved had strongly contributed to the failure 
of the competent authorities in this case. I cite: “Public servants’ thinking and 
acting proves to be characterised to a great extent by orientation on their own 
formal responsibility. There proves to be little inclination to call in the help of 
other public services and get jointly a concrete result”.2 To change this situation, 
the commission recommended that from then on the social problem should be the 
starting point instead of fragmented public competences and services. Therefore 
the organisation of the government should match effective regulation of industrial 
activities.
The Uniser Commission’s report prompted the Dutch Minister of Environment 
to take action in order to encourage the competent authorities involved and their 
services to give more attention to environmental supervision and to promote co-
operation among them.3 Since then environmental supervision has been an item 
on the political agenda. A great deal of effort has been made and much money 
* Prof. dr. G.A. Biezeveld retired in 2012 as Professor of environmental law at the Faculty of 
Law, University of Groningen, the Netherlands and as environmental public prosecutor in the 
Netherlands. 
1 Report of the Uniser Commission (1983), Rapport van de onderzoekscommissie naar de bestuur-
lijke aspecten van de uitvoering van de milieu- en andere relevante wetgeving bij Drisolco BV, EMK, 
Uniser e.a., see: Parliamentary Papers II 1982/83, 17 600, chapter XI, No. 104.
2 Report Uniser Commission 1983 supra, p. 87.
3 Report of the Commission Mans (2008), De tijd is rijp, The Hague, 2008 (Annex to the letter 
from the Minister for Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment on 10 July 2008, Parlia-
mentary Papers II 2007/08, 22 343, No. 201).
*
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has been spent building up law enforcement capacity and expertise, in both the 
administrative and the criminal sector. Looking back it can be concluded that 
the Uniser Case was a wake up call for environmental law enforcement in the 
Netherlands.
However, in 2008 another independent commission reported to the Dutch Min-
isters of Environment and Justice that there was still a lot to do to improve the 
effectiveness of environmental supervision and guarantee a level playing field for 
the companies involved. So even after three decades both the organisational and 
the practical side of environmental supervision still require political attention and 
effort. How could this have happened?
In the first part of my contribution I give you an overview of the institutional 
features of environmental supervision in the Netherlands as well as the shortcom-
ings acknowledged by the Cabinet of Ministers, the Parliament and the competent 
authorities involved. When I refer to environmental supervision I use this term in 
a broad sense. It covers three subsequent actions:
(1) research by inspections or otherwise in order to determine if an action or situa-
tion or good meets the requirements, (2) to assess the results and (3) to intervene, 
if necessary.
In the second part my focus will be on a potential major cause of the shortcom-
ings. I conclude with a short survey of the possibilities and implications of restruc-
turing environmental supervision in accordance with the present standards of 
supervision on economic actors and activities. Although my contribution mainly 
deals with the Dutch situation I pay attention to the European context as well.
2. Features of Environmental Supervision in the Netherlands
In my view environmental regulation is mainly a specific kind of economic regula-
tion. The main objects of environmental regulation cover a great variety of eco-
nomic activities. The scale on which these activities take place varies from local 
to global. Therefore the scale on which environmental violations can be commit-
ted varies as well. This does require from the environmental supervision system 
that it covers the whole range of economic activities and matches with the various 
scales on which violations of environmental regulation may happen. However, it 
also requires from supervisory authorities that they can and will guarantee a level 
playing field for the companies involved.
Although environmental regulation of economic activities originates to a great 
extent from the European Union or its predecessor, the Member States are 
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 autonomous as far as the organisation of supervision is concerned.4 This is in 
contrast with the situation in other domains of European economic regulation.5
In the Netherlands no distribution of the parts has been made between the 
administrative and the criminal environmental law enforcement sector. Both the 
administrative and the criminal law enforcement system apply to the whole range 
of environmental regulations. This implies that with almost every violation of 
environmental law both an administrative authority and the environmental pros-
ecutor are competent to enforce. Both environmental law enforcement systems 
differ fundamentally on the institutional side. All environmental prosecutors are 
part of one organisation that is practically independent although it operates under 
the political responsibility of the Minister of Security and Justice. However, all 
supervisory authorities are political organs that are not exclusively focused on 
their responsibility for environmental supervision. In total there are roughly 450 
competent administrative authorities, spread over three levels of government: 
local, regional, and national. Most of these authorities are assisted by inspectors 
belonging to their own organisation. The others are assisted by joint inspection 
services, working for a number of municipalities.
Although the supervisory authorities at the provincial and municipal level behave 
as autonomous organs that are only accountable to the representative body at its 
own level of government, in constitutional terms they are not fully autonomous. 
For their actions the Minister of Environment is accountable to the Parliament 
as well, based on the concept that environmental management is essentially a 
responsibility of the State and competences in this field that have been entrusted 
to governmental organs at a lower level of government should be exercised in 
accordance with the public interest.
From the beginning institutional fragmentation of environmental supervision 
has been a complicating factor for co-operation between the various supervisory 
authorities as well as their inspectors. Their natural tendency to behave autono-
mously has been strengthened by potential frictions between their supervisory 
task and other political tasks and responsibilities. So it is not surprising that there 
have been many environmental scandals over the past few decades, such as the 
TCR-affair,6 and the Probo Koala case,7 and many other complaints by non gov-
ernmental organisations and companies expressing concern regarding the lack of 
effectiveness and a level playing field. The independent commission that reported 
4 R.H. Lauwaars & C.W.A. Timmermans, Europees recht in kort bestek, W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink, 
Deventer, 1999.
5 See the contribution of Annetje T. Ottow in this volume.
6 R.J.J. Eshuis & E.A.I.M. van den Berg, Dossier TCR. Tien jaar schone schijn, WODC, The Hague, 
1996.
7 Report of the Commission Hulshof (2006), Rapport van bevindingen naar aanleiding van het 
onderzoek rond aankomst, verblijf en vertrek van de Probo Koala in juli 2006 te Amsterdam, <www.
amsterdam.nl>.
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in 2008 to the Ministers of Environment and Justice came to the same  conclusion.8 
It recommended defragmentation by forming 25 regional supervision services on 
behalf of the supervisory authorities at the provincial and local level of govern-
ment. This network should create better conditions for environmental supervision 
as well as a level playing field for companies. Therefore, it should have a proper 
legal base. In the view of this commission there was no need to reshuffle or reduce 
the number of supervisory authorities.
Both the former and present Cabinet of Ministers agreed with this recommen-
dation but preferred voluntary development of regional services by means of a 
bottom up process over legislation. This preference was prompted by strong oppo-
sition from municipalities against new legal obligations.
It is expected that from the summer of 2013 in 28 regions at least a part of the 
environmental supervision tasks of provinces and municipalities will be executed 
by joint services. Yet it is still uncertain whether the regional services will result 
in better environmental supervision in co-operation with the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office and the police. Apart from shrinking budgets for environmental super-
vision a significant lack of enthusiasm among the majority of supervisory authori-
ties involved might become an obstacle for fully fledged and robust organisations 
with enough professional inspectors. At the very least it is disquieting there has 
been no discussion in most regions until now on questions such as:
– what conditions should be fulfilled for more effective environmental super-
vision and better guarantees for a level playing field for companies? and;
– what does the formation of joint services imply for the role and position of 
supervisory authorities?
Is this an indication that both the independent commission and the Cabinet of 
Ministers may have overlooked the political status of supervisory authorities as a 
major cause of the shortcomings of environmental supervision? In my view it is. 
To clarify this I must explain something about the Dutch and European standards 
for supervision of economic actors and activities.
3. Standards for Economic Supervision
In 2001 the Dutch Cabinet of Ministers published a white paper with standards 
for supervision on economic or social organisations by governmental bodies at 
the national level of government.9 Its key message was that it ought to be ensured 
to subjects of supervision as well as to citizens, responsible ministers and the 
8 Report Commission Mans 2008 supra; cf. A.B. Blomberg, Verplichte regionale omgevingsdien-
sten: een institutionele herziening van de uitvoering en handhaving van het omgevingsrecht, 
Tijdschrift Omgevingsrecht, 2008, No. 4, p. 125-135.
9 Parliamentary Papers II 2000/01, 27 831, No. 1 (Framing vision on supervision 2001).
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 Parliament that supervision will be independent, transparent, and professional as 
much as possible. This implies that:
a. the supervisor must be enabled to research the facts and make up his mind 
 without being influenced by the subject of supervision involved or the respon-
sible minister;
b. the supervisor’s objective judgement should be made public as much as pos-
sible, so that both the Parliament and the society can take note of it; and
c. a professional process of judging by the supervisor is required.
Therefore the supervisor’s organisation should be built in such a way that these 
standards for supervision can be guaranteed. At least this implies that within the 
government structure supervision is positioned as a recognisable entity, separate 
from policymaking and licensing.
The white paper gives no reason to assume that these standards do not apply to 
supervision exercised by provinces and municipalities under the responsibility of a 
minister. Therefore this Dutch government document provides strong arguments 
for the thesis that supervision of the observance of environmental law ought to be 
organised and exercised in a independent, transparent, and professional manner.
These Dutch standards for supervision coincide to a great extent with the European 
requirements on supervision of economic actors, as pointed out by prof. Ottow in 
her contribution to this book.
When we look at the public authorities that are competent concerning environ-
mental supervision, it becomes clear that these standards have not been applied to 
supervision on the observance of European and Dutch environmental law. Neither 
in the European Union nor in the Netherlands has any legal action been taken 
to guarantee independence of environmental supervision of economic actors and 
activities. This is particularly remarkable because according both the EC-Treaty 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, European environ-
mental regulations and directives must be compatible with the objectives of the 
internal market. In my view there is no good reason why supervision regarding 
environmental regulations and directives is treated as different to supervision 
regarding other kinds of economic European law.
An explanation for the different approach taken by the European legislator might 
be that generally speaking negotiations regarding a new environmental regulation 
or directive are focussed more on the intended environmental protection levels 
and the accompanying costs for companies than on guarantees for a level playing 
field in the supervision phase.
The conclusion of this short survey is clear: there is no legal obligation for inde-
pendent environmental supervision. At the same time we have not found good 
reasons why the standard of independence should not apply to environmental 
supervision. On the contrary. Therefore it seems worthwhile exploring whether 
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there might be a connection between the structural shortcomings of environ-
mental supervision in the Netherlands and the political position of supervisory 
authorities.
4. Environmental Supervision in Practice
As I mentioned before, since the Uniser Case a number of other serious environ-
mental cases have come to light.10 Most of these cases were analysed by an inde-
pendent research team. Each of them concluded that the supervisory authorities 
involved had let other interests – mostly economic or financial interests – prevail 
over the interest of human health or environmental quality. This outcome is not 
surprising in a situation where the supervisory authority is a political organ with 
a great variety of tasks and responsibilities on behalf of the public interest. In 
such circumstances each supervisory authority has no choice: it is always trying 
to balance various and often conflicting interests, mostly by compromise. Given 
the political importance of economic interests and employment it proves almost 
inevitable that these interests outweigh the interests served by environmental 
supervision. So it is understandable that for most politicians the supervision port-
folio is not an attractive one. Environmental offenses quite often place supervisory 
authorities in a difficult dilemma.
Their political position not only influences their performance as supervisor and 
their own decision making but it also influences the supervision culture within the 
government body involved as well as the attitude of inspectors towards economic 
actors that do not comply with environmental provisions. Most inspectors prefer a 
soft approach to companies above a strict one, even in contacts with evidently cal-
culating economic actors. So in my view environmental supervision in the Neth-
erlands can be characterised as highly politicised. Thanks to this the effectiveness 
of environmental supervision, as well as the willingness of economic actors to 
comply with environmental provisions, has been seriously affected. Under such 
circumstances the protection of human health and the environment as well as a 
level playing field can never be guaranteed.
In my opinion it is not fair to blame the supervisory authorities for this. It is the 
legislator who made the wrong choice by charging political organs with environ-
mental supervision of economic actors and activities. This choice has been taken 
for granted over many, many years. This explains why until recently no one pub-
licly linked the shortcomings of environmental supervision in the Netherlands 
with the political position of the supervisory authorities in this field. Although 
I worked for many years as an environmental prosecutor, my eyes were only quite 
recently opened when I was informed about the European legislation and juris-
prudence on independent supervision on economic actors and activities. I then 
10 G.A. Biezeveld & M.C. Stoové, Naar een Nederlandse Omgevingsautoriteit. Een pleidooi voor 
onafhankelijk milieutoezicht, Tijdschrift voor Toezicht, 2011, No. 3, p. 9-10.
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realised that the lack of independent supervisory authorities had been overlooked 
as a major cause of the shortcomings of environmental supervision in the Nether-
lands. It explains why for over thirty years the efforts made by successive Cabinets 
of Ministers to improve environmental supervision has failed.11 This insight has 
also helped me to understand the formation of regional supervision services as 
a process with great difficulty due to the fear that many supervisory authorities 
at the local level of government have of losing their control over inspectors and 
inspections. Although many authorities are not particularly happy with this task, 
as long as they bear the political responsibility for both economic development 
and environmental supervision most of them are inclined to defend their power 
to balance the various interests in individual cases. Therefore I foresee that many 
supervisory authorities will not be ready to voluntarily transfer their competence 
to impose sanctions on economic actors to the head of the regional service and 
make that a non-political supervisory authority. I fear that if I am right, the forma-
tion of regional services will not lead to effective environmental supervision and 
a level playing field.
I have done no research into the situation in other Member States of the EU 
without independent environmental supervision. Yet I assume that there are no 
significant differences from the Dutch situation. This implies that there are no 
guarantees for effective law enforcement of European environmental regulations 
and directives as well as a level playing field which is a prerequisite for the internal 
market. From this point of view the European level is the right level to agree on the 
necessity of independent environmental supervision by declaring the standards 
for supervision on economic actors and activities applicable for this field as well. 
However, in my view there are also good reasons for the Dutch legislator to review 
his choice for political supervisory authorities, in anticipation of future European 
legislation. Therefore, I conclude by presenting my ideas for a possible solution for 
the Dutch situation.
5. Towards Independent Environmental Supervision in the Netherlands
In a democratic constitutional state governing politicians must be accountable to 
the Parliament or a comparable representative body at a lower level of government 
for supervision of the compliance of legal provisions. This accountability regards 
at least the conditions and means for supervision as well as the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the supervision in practice. For failing supervision in general or in 
individual cases the responsible politicians can be held accountable as well. How-
ever, this does not imply that they should have the power to intervene in individual 
cases as this would be incompatible with the concept of independent supervision.
Therefore the first question to be answered is: who should be accountable for 
environmental supervision? In my view in the Dutch context the best option 
11 Biezeveld & Stoové 2011 supra.
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would be the Ministers of Environment and Nature management. This is in line 
with the present system based on the concept that environmental management 
is essentially a responsibility of the state. Moreover, given the various scales on 
which economic actors operate and economic activities take place, it is wise to 
organise responsibility and accountability for supervision at the highest level of 
government.
As mentioned before, the environmental supervision system should cover the 
whole range of economic activities and have the ability to respond to the vari-
ous scales on which environmental violations may happen. In my view only a 
nationwide organisation can meet these requirements.12 Therefore I would prefer 
an organisation comparable to the organisation of the Public Prosecutors Service 
that is headed by an, in principle, independent board and consists of a combina-
tion of national and regional units. Incidentally, the organisation for the police, 
which until 2013 consisted of 26 autonomous police forces, is being changed into a 
national police force and will also consist of a combination of national and regional 
units.
In my view the board of the ideal national environmental supervision organisation 
that should become the new competent authority for environmental supervision, 
should take over all the powers on environmental supervision that now belongs to 
approximately 450 political competent authorities. This will provide better condi-
tions for both effective supervision as well as a level playing field.
The inspectors, lawyers and staff that now work partly at the national level, partly 
at the provincial and local level should become officials of the new organisation. 
This will provide better conditions for professionalism, co-operation, the gather-
ing and exchange of information and similar responses in comparable situations.
What does this imply for the on going formation of regional supervision services? 
Should this process be considered out of date by new insights? Certainly not. In my 
opinion the implementation of the decision to build a network of regional supervi-
sion services can serve as a first, important step towards a national environmental 
supervision organisation. When these regional services operate, further steps can 
be made by harmonising procedures and IT-systems, by pooling expertise and by 
integrating management and information activities. In addition to this the legisla-
tor should make a provisional regulation on the transfer of the power to impose 
sanctions from the present supervisory authorities to the heads of the regional 
services. This would be a first step towards independent supervision.
12 Compare the reform of the Dutch police that came into force in January 2013. The previous 
organisation that consisted of 25 autonomous regional police forces and a national police force 
proved to be inadequate for the abatement of crime that exceeded the regional scale. Therefore 
the legislator decided to form a national police.
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To be successful and efficient within a period of four to six years such a process of 
organic development should be furthered and directed by the national government.
Still one difficult question remains: will all supervisory authorities be ready to 
transfer their powers to the heads of the regional services? To be honest, I am 
not sure. So in my view European rules on independent environmental super-
vision are indispensable. The implementation of the Seventh Environment Action 
Programme of the European Union provides an excellent opportunity to present 
a view on this.13
6. Closing Remarks
In this contribution I have shown that independent environmental supervision 
is not primarily a political or public management concept. In the Netherlands we 
have experienced that independence is a prerequisite for both effective supervision 
and a level playing field. The economic and social costs of a lack of independent 
environmental supervision are enormous. Hopefully the Dutch and the European 
legislator will acknowledge this soon and take adequate action.
13 Proposal for a decision of the European parliament and of the Council on a General Union 
Environment Action Programme to 2020, Living well, within the limits of our planet, Brussels, 
29 November 2012, COM(2012) 710 final, 2012/0337 (COD), priority objective 4: To maximise the 
benefits of EU environment legislation, p. 23-26.
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Advisory Objection Procedures in the Netherlands: 
A Case Study on their Usefulness in Dutch 
Competition Law
Jan Jans and Annalies Outhuijse
1. Introduction
Article 7:1 of the Netherlands General Administrative Law Act (GALA) states one 
of the principles of judicial protection in Dutch administrative law: before you can 
appeal against a decision of an administrative authority to an administrative court, 
you must first lodge an objection with the administrative authority that adopted 
the decision.1 Consequently, there is no access to the courts until the administra-
tive authority has reviewed its decision, and this also applies to fines imposed by 
the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa). The value of this procedure has 
regularly been questioned in the past; one of its most notorious critics is a lead-
ing Dutch competition lawyer, Mark Biesheuvel, who expressed his dissatisfaction 
with the objection procedure in the Dutch legal journal Nederlands Juristenblad 
more than 15 years ago. To quote:
Generally, the procedure involves a time-consuming and wholly unnecessary ritual 
filing past public servants who have dug themselves into entrenched positions (…)
(…) in practice, the procedure regularly amounts to a legal restraining order which 
wrongly denies individuals access to the courts for long periods of time, sometimes 
years.2
On 1 January 2013, the Netherlands Competition Authority is merging with the 
Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority of the Netherlands (OPTA) 
and the Netherlands Consumer Authority (CA). The new organisation is to be 
known as the Consumer and Market Authority (ACM). To enable the ACM to 
operate effectively and efficiently, a bill is currently being prepared which will 
* Prof. dr. J.H. Jans is Professor of Administrative Law at the University of Groningen, the Nether-
lands, and Vice Chair of the Advisory Commission on Competition Act Objections (Adviescom-
missie bezwaarschriften Mededingingswet), but this article is written in a purely personal capacity. 
A. Outhuijse is a student at the Law Department of the University of Groningen. The article has 
been written within the context of the faculty research programme Public Trust & Public Law.
1 Art. 7:1.1 GALA: “A person who has the right to appeal a decision to an administrative court, 
must first lodge an objection, unless: [there follows a list of decisions in relation to which this 
does not apply]”.
2 M. Biesheuvel, Weg met bezwaarschriftenprocedure, Nederlands Juristenblad, 1996, p. 930. 
*
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streamline the procedures and enforcement instruments available to the ACM.3 
One of the proposed changes concerns abolishing the objection phase for deci-
sions imposing fines.
The aim of the present article is to discuss the reasons for this proposed change. 
We will be concentrating on sanctions under the Netherlands Competition Act 
(Mw) and the role played by the Advisory Commission on Competition Act Objec-
tions (Adviescommissie bezwaarschriften Mededingingswet (AbM)). As not all read-
ers will be equally familiar with the objection procedure in Dutch law we shall 
first discuss it briefly.
2. The Objection Procedure in the GALA4
2.1 General
As noted above, under the GALA, an interested party can only contest an admin-
istrative decision before a court if he has previously lodged an ‘objection’ with the 
administrative authority that took the decision in the first place. This means the 
administrative authority is required carry out a ‘full review’ of the decision being 
contested. By contrast with a judicial appeal, the administrative authority must 
consider not only the lawfulness of the contested decision, but also policy aspects. 
Moreover, the review must be carried out with regard to the situation, both in fact 
and in law, applying at the time of the review, in other words ex nunc: in principle 
this means taking changed policies, changed legal rules, and also changed cir-
cumstances into consideration. The objection procedure is thus both about legal 
protection and extended administrative decision-making.
Under Article 7:2 GALA, before giving a decision on the objection, the administra-
tive authority must give interested parties the opportunity to be heard. For this, 
it has two options. First, under Article 7:5 GALA, it may conduct a hearing itself, 
as the OPTA does. Alternatively it can appoint an external advisory committee 
under Article 7:13 GALA, as the competition and consumer authorities (NMa and 
CA) do. Under article 7:13 GALA, an advisory committee must consist of a chair 
and at least two members, and the chair must not be a member of the administra-
tive authority or work under its responsibility. The chair should not have had any 
previous involvement in the matter. Although not a requirement, in most cases 
all members of an advisory committee are independent, as is the case for the 
 competition authority. It is entirely up to the administrative authority whether or 
not to appoint an advisory committee.
3 Wetsvoorstel stroomlijning markttoezicht ACM, at <www.internetconsultatie.nl/materielewetacm>.
4 See generally: H.B. Winter, De Awb-bezwaarschriftprocedure: een praktische handleiding, Kluwer, 
Deventer, 2003; L.M. Koenraad, K.H. Sanders, Besluiten op bezwaar, Kluwer, Deventer, 2006; 
Handreiking bezwaarschriftprocedure Algemene wet bestuursrecht, Ministerie van Justitie, The 
Hague, 2004.
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It is clear from the legislative history of the GALA that the original purpose of the 
objection procedure – offering an easily accessible, informal procedure – was to 
avoid large numbers of appeals to the administrative courts.5 During the objec-
tion procedure, the administrative authority would have the opportunity to repair 
obvious and simple errors by either taking a new decision or giving better reasons 
for the original decision, so that disputes between individuals and the admin-
istration could be resolved more effectively and the number of judicial appeals 
reduced. In addition, the objection procedure would serve to ensure that cases that 
do come before the courts are more clearly defined and better presented. This was 
supposed to reduce the length of judicial procedures significantly.
2.2 Pros and cons of external advisory committees in objection procedures
The administrative authority is free to decide whether or not to appoint an external 
committee to hear objections. The literature mentions a number of advantages 
of appointing an external committee.6 In the first place, an external committee 
acts as ‘a fresh pair of eyes’. If the aim of the objection procedure is to be able to 
correct errors as simply as possible, this can best be achieved if the reassessment 
is carried out by an external, independent body bringing a new perspective to the 
situation.
A second advantage is that an external committee is preferable from the point of 
view of procedural justice.7 An external committee is independent and has no 
axe to grind, and, because an advisory committee is itself also deemed to be an 
‘administrative authority’,8 its members must perform their duties impartially, 
as required by Article 2:4 GALA. It may be supposed that the person or persons 
lodging an objection and any other interested parties will be more willing to accept 
the decision on the objection if it is based on the advice of an external committee 
than if it was handled entirely by the administrative authority itself.
A third advantage can be described as the ‘mediator function’ of an advisory com-
mittee. In accordance with the intention of the GALA objection procedure, the 
advisory committee must seek to find a solution for the dispute.
Finally, it has been noted as an advantage that an external committee brings exper-
tise into the organisation. This is particularly relevant where the ‘ administrative 
authority’ is only a relatively small entity, such as a committee in one of the smaller 
municipalities.
5 PG Awb I, p. 279; available at: <www.pgawb.nl>. 
6 See footnote 4.
7 See in general on procedural justice: N. Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (6th ed.), 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 2001 (1969); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1971.
8 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 19 March 2003, AB 2003/301 with 
note by Peters.
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Obviously, there are also disadvantages to appointing an external advisory com-
mittee. Objections take longer to deal with, are more expensive and, as will be 
explained below, the committee may not carry out a full review.
Generally, external members of an advisory committee take on the job in addition 
to other work and so are not available on a full-time basis. This means that the 
organisation cannot dispose of their time freely, and this may result in longer 
objection procedures. Another possible disadvantage is the cost. Members of an 
external advisory committee generally receive a fee for preparing and attending 
meetings and drafting recommendations. This inevitably leads to higher costs 
compared to procedures where there is no external advisory committee. Finally, 
the procedure involves a full review of the decision, which means an evaluation 
both of the lawfulness and the merits of the decision. Although an external advi-
sory committee is also required to carry out a full review, such committees often 
fail to review the merits of a decision.9 This is because committees of this kind 
often feel uncomfortable commenting on what they regard as the policy and/
or decision-making discretion of the administrative authority, and thus gener-
ally confine their recommendations to factors concerning the lawfulness of the 
decision.
2.3 Relationship between Advisory Committee and Responsible Authority
After the hearing, the advisory committee reports to the administrative authority. 
It advises the authority how to deal with the objection and makes a proposal for 
the decision to be made on the objection. Under Article 7:13.6 GALA, the recom-
mendation must be given in writing and include a record of the hearing. The 
administrative authority must consider the review on the basis of the committee’s 
recommendation. As an advisory committee is deemed to be an ‘adviser’ for the 
purposes of the GALA, the administrative authority must satisfy itself that the 
advisory committee prepared its recommendation with due care, both as regards 
the way it performed its duties and the content of the recommendation (Art. 3:9 
GALA). The administrative authority must read the recommendation with a 
critical eye, as it retains primary responsibility for the decision on the objection. 
It must always form its own judgment on the objection and must decide what the 
right decision is in law. Only when the administrative authority has satisfied itself 
that the examination was carried out with due care and is not defective may it base 
its decision on the committee’s recommendation. If the decision is based on the 
committee’s report, interested parties must be informed of the recommendations 
(Art. 3:49 GALA).
The committee’s recommendations are not binding and the administrative 
authority is not required to adopt them. However, if an administrative authority 
9 See on this concerning review at the municipal level: A. Schwarz, De adviescommissie in bezwaar: 
inrichting van de bezwaarprocedure bij gemeenten (PhD. Groningen), The Hague, 2010, p. 273 et 
seq.
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chooses to involve an advisory committee in dealing with an objection, it cannot 
simply ignore the committee’s recommendations. Under Art. 7:13.7 GALA, it is 
then obliged not only to state the reasons for its decision on the objection, but also 
for its departure from the recommendation, and it must enclose the recommenda-
tion with its decision.
3. The Advisory Committee on Competition Act Objections
3.1 General
According to Art. 5 of the decree establishing the Advisory Committee on Compe-
tition Act Objections (AbM),10 the Advisory Committee is responsible for advis-
ing the Netherlands Competition Authority on objections against sanctions (fines 
and orders subject to a financial penalty) the authority has imposed under Article 
62(1) of the Netherlands Competition Act. Currently, the Committee consists of 
15 members (lawyers and economists). Six of these have a primarily academic 
background, seven a judicial, and two are in public service. Its members are inde-
pendent and have no ties with the Competition Authority.11 All its members have 
special experience or expertise in the field of administrative law, European law 
(specifically competition law), and/or the economy.
The Committee is responsible for hearing interested parties under Art. 7:2 GALA, 
and this means both the companies concerned and the Competition Authority. 
Generally, objections are heard by a subcommittee of three or five members. The 
members involved in handling a case decide the Committee’s recommendation 
by majority vote. If there is an even number of members involved in a case, the 
subcommittee’s chair has a casting vote in the event of a tie. Like other external 
committees, the Advisory Committee on Competition Act Objections reports to 
the administrative authority (in this case the Competition Authority) in writing. 
Here too, the Competition Authority is not bound by the Committee’s recommen-
dations and it will be shown below that the Competition Authority relatively often 
departs from the Committee’s recommendations. As explained above, this means 
that it must give reasons not only for its decision but also for its departure from 
the Committee’s recommendations, and must enclose the report with its decision.
3.2 Relationship to Direct Appeals Act
As noted above, the bill currently before Parliament aims to abolish the objection 
procedure in relation to sanctions imposed by the new Netherlands Consumer 
10 Besluit tot instelling Adviescommissie bezwaarschriften Mededingingswet, Stcrt. (Government 
Gazette) 1998, nr. 146, p. 3.
11 Under Art. 6 of the decree, they must ensure they do not “deal with any case they have in any way 
been involved in”. This obligation also follows from Art. 2:4 GALA. Members of the Committee 
regularly declare themselves unavailable on this ground when the cases are being allocated.
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Authority. It is, however, important to add that it is already possible under current 
legislation to bypass the objection procedure. Under the Wet rechtstreeks beroep 
(Direct Appeals Act), which entered into force on 1 September 2004, Art. 7:1a was 
inserted in the GALA, by which a person lodging an objection may, in derogation 
from Art. 7:1, request the administrative authority to consent to direct appeal to 
the administrative courts. Under the third paragraph of Art 7:1a, the administra-
tive authority may consent to the request if the case lends itself to such a proce-
dure, but must refuse the request if another objection has been lodged against 
the decision which does not contain a similar request (second paragraph). It is 
Competition Authority policy to consent to such requests as a rule. At the time the 
provision entered into force, the Advisory Committee on Competition Act Objec-
tions believed – no doubt encouraged by the many lawyers at hearings moaning 
about the pointlessness of the whole objection procedure – that this would result 
in a substantial reduction in the number of objections. Nothing could have been 
further from the truth.
From the evaluation of the Direct Appeals Act, it emerged more generally that only 
sporadic use was made of the possibility of bypassing the objection procedure.12 
This reticence was due not to ignorance, but was often a deliberate choice. Attor-
neys regarded skipping the objection procedure as a missed opportunity. From 
the evaluation of the Act, it also emerged that where an independent commit-
tee advised during the objection procedure, the procedure was more likely to be 
regarded as a success.
We would add that the Competition Authority regularly departs from the recom-
mendations of the Advisory Committee, particularly where the Committee recom-
mends declaring an objection well founded in whole or in part.13 Our hypothesis 
is that the parties believe they have more chance of a successful appeal to the 
administrative courts if they have the backing of an ‘expert report’ from the Advi-
sory Committee. From this perspective, the objection procedure affords an addi-
tional opportunity for objectors to be ‘proved right’, albeit only in a favorable report 
from the Advisory Committee. The worst that can happen is that the Committee 
will recommend declaring the objection unfounded. In other words, given that 
reformatio in peius is not allowed, objectors stand only to gain from the objection 
procedure. Add to this the fact that objections and appeals have suspensory effect 
on a decision imposing a sanction (Art. 63 Competition Act) and it is clear why the 
objection procedure is so popular in relation to Competition Authority  decisions 
and why so little use is made of the possibility of appealing directly to the admin-
istrative courts, avoiding the objection procedure.
12 B.M.J. van der Meulen, M.E.G. Litjens & A.A. Freriks, Prorogatie in de Awb, Invoeringsevaluatie 
rechtstreeks beroep, WODC, The Hague, 2005.
13 See below.
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3.3 The Advisory Committee as a ‘Zero Tier’ Administrative Court
If we look at the practice of the Advisory Committee, there are several points worth 
mentioning. These are above all based on the experience of the first author as 
a long-standing member of the Committee. The first is that the Advisory Com-
mittee objection procedure is very similar to a first instance appeal before the 
administrative courts. Its approach is what could be termed ‘semi judicial’. After 
the written objection and the grounds upon which it is based have been received, 
an ‘instruction note’ is written, generally by the secretary, for the subcommit-
tee charged with the hearing. An instruction note basically sets out the points 
that need to be decided and generally takes the form of a draft recommendation. 
It is, of course, intended only for internal use within the Advisory Committee. 
Before the hearing is held, the Competition Authority responds within the 10 days 
referred to in Art. 7:4.1 GALA by sending the parties and the Advisory Committee 
a written explanatory note. The explanatory note generally addresses the grounds 
put forward for the objection and is often the central document in the discussion 
at the hearing. The hearing itself is also similar to a hearing before an administra-
tive court: the objector explains his case, the authority responds, the Committee 
questions the parties, and the objector may be given the opportunity to reply. This 
format is reinforced by the fact that the ‘individual’ in the proceedings is almost 
always a professional organisation represented by highly qualified lawyers and 
other legal professionals. The Competition Authority is generally represented by 
at least a lawyer from its legal department, sometimes supplemented by economic 
expertise from within the organisation. In other words, the debate at the hearing 
is a professional one between subject material experts.
It will be clear from the above that, as a rule, the objection procedure is supposed 
to facilitate a full ex nunc review of the original decision. However, in proceedings 
before the Advisory Committee there is no question of a full review in the sense 
originally intended by the legislature. In the first place, this has to do with the type 
of decisions that are subject to the advisory opinion of the Committee. Generally 
only two questions are in fact relevant: can the authority prove the facts alleged, 
and do they constitute an infringement of the provisions of the Competition Act? 
The Committee is, as it were, virtually compelled to carry out an ex tunc review. 
Moreover, given the size of the dossiers, a full integral review of the complex of facts 
is not really possible. The Committee does not feel it has to repeat the examination 
of the facts all over again and generally confines itself to deciding whether the 
authority has proved the facts alleged to the Committee’s satisfaction and, bearing 
in mind the authority’s duty of care and/or to give reasons for its decisions, if the 
Committee is not convinced it will recommend reviewing the case further in this 
respect. Though Art. 9 of the decree establishing the Advisory Committee does 
give it the power to hear witnesses and experts even where Art. 7:8 GALA does 
not apply (i.e. other than at the request of interested parties), this power has never 
been used as far as we are aware. The main reason for this, in our view, is that an 
independent investigation of the facts by the Advisory Committee would result in 
too big a delay in decision-making. Moreover, it is felt that correctly establishing 
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the facts is above all a matter for the administration. Nor do the purely policy 
aspects of decisions imposing sanctions really qualify for full review by the Advi-
sory Committee. Though the statutory power to make decisions imposing fines 
is a discretionary power,14 this discretion is significantly hedged in by policy rules 
(e.g. guidelines for fines, leniency reductions etc.) which the Competition Author-
ity is obliged to apply under Art. 4:84 GALA except in ‘special circumstances’. 
Once it has been established that the guidelines for fines are generally adequate 
for determining the size of the fine, the Advisory Committee is no longer in a 
position to question the appropriateness of the policy rules in any specific case. Its 
recommendations are therefore confined, as a rule, to whether or not the admin-
istrative authority has applied the guidelines correctly and whether or not there is, 
in the particular case and having regard for the proportionality principle, a ‘special 
circumstance’ which would justify a departure from the policy rules. Essentially, 
in our opinion, this differs little from way the first-instance administrative courts 
operate. In short: the objection procedure before the Advisory Committee is very 
similar to the procedure before a first-instance administrative court, both in terms 
of procedure and of what is reviewed.
4. The Reasons Given in the Bill for Abolishing the Objection Procedure in 
Relation to ACM Decisions Imposing Fines
Against the background of the above, more general comments, we shall now dis-
cuss the reasons given in the bill for abolishing the objection procedure in relation 
to ACM decisions imposing fines.15 The most important reason given is ‘that the 
benefits of the objection procedure in general do not apply to objections to ACM 
decisions imposing fines’. Apparently, decisions of the ACM imposing sanctions 
are of such a specific and special type that the usual benefits of an objection pro-
cedure do not apply.
The proposal also notes ‘that abolishing the objection procedure is expected to have 
a positive effect on the time taken to process cases, so that the ACM will be able to 
keep within the reasonable time required by Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights in more cases’. The explanatory memorandum notes that both 
parties and non-parties benefit from obtaining the earliest possible clarity and 
legal certainty concerning the interpretation of a rule by the administrative courts.
Finally, the explanatory memorandum mentions as an ‘important’ advantage that 
scrapping the objection procedure will lead to a reduction in costs both for trade 
and industry and for the ACM itself. Let us consider these arguments more closely.
14 See Articles 56 et seq. Competition Act.
15 Explanatory memorandum, point 2.3.2 at pp. 14-15.
187
Advisory Objection Procedures in the Netherlands
4.1 Objection Procedure Does not Operate as ‘Sieve’ in Relation to ACM Decisions
One of the most important advantages of the objection procedure is said to be 
the way it may act as a ‘sieve’, offering a way of resolving disputes without the 
intervention of an administrative court. However, according to the explanatory 
memorandum, it emerges from figures from the Competition Authority, the 
Telecommunications Authority and the Consumer Authority for the period 1 July 
2009 to 1 July 2011 that this effect is relatively small for decisions imposing fines: 
71% of infringers who lodge an objection against a Competition Authority deci-
sion end up making an appeal, for the Telecommunications Authority the figure is 
91%, and for the Consumer Authority 67%. In our view, this shows that the objec-
tion procedure does in fact work for ACM decisions, but to a lesser extent than 
by comparison with decisions in other areas.16 A possible explanation, at least as 
regards Competition Act related decisions, may be that the Competition Authority 
relatively often departs from the Advisory Committee’s recommendations. This 
point will be discussed in more detail below. Also worth noting is that the effect 
is even less notable in relation to decisions of the Telecommunications Author-
ity. One possible explanation could be that the Telecommunications Authority 
does not work with an external advisory committee at all, whereas both the other 
authorities do. If this hypothesis is correct, it is quite possible that appeals to the 
courts against decisions of the competition and consumer authorities imposing 
fines could rise by approximately 20% when the bypass procedure is abolished. In 
other words, even though the effect is relatively small, it does exist and particularly 
where use is made of an external advisory committee.
The supposedly special nature of decisions imposing sanctions in competition 
cases is also demonstrated by the way the Competition Authority treats recom-
mendations of the Advisory Committee. A recommendation is, after all, exactly 
that: a recommendation, and can thus be departed from. From research currently 
being carried out at Groningen University into municipal objection procedures, 
it emerges that municipal authorities depart from advisory committees’ recom-
mendations in fewer than 2% of cases.17 From an analysis of 34 normal Competi-
tion Authority cases in the period 1999 to 2009,18 it emerged that the authority 
departed, to a greater or lesser extent, from the recommendation of the Advisory 
Committee in 50% of the cases. In only nine of the 17 cases in which the Authority 
followed the recommendation did it to do this without any reservation at all. In 
the other eight cases, it gave different and/or additional reasons for its decision 
16 An effect (also referred to as a ‘filter’ effect) of more than 90% is certainly no exception. See 
particularly K.H. Sanders, De heroverweging getoetst. Een onderzoek naar de functies van bezwaar-
schriftprocedures (PhD Groningen), Kluwer, Deventer, 1998; J.G. van Erp & C.M. Klein Haarhuis, 
De filterwerking van buitengerechtelijke procedures. Een verkennend onderzoek (WODC Cahiers 
2006-06), The Hague, 2006.
17 Further information on this study can be obtained from Ms. Rink herself at: e.m.rink@rug.nl.
18 The list was made available to us by the Competition Authority. These were all the ‘normal’ cases 
that were handled in that period. Cases involving a sanction imposed via the ‘accelerated proce-
dure’ (the construction industry fraud) were kept out of the study.
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on the objection. Notably, it followed the recommendation in all cases where the 
Advisory Committee advised declaring the objection unfounded. In other words: 
the Competition Authority only departed from the recommendation when the 
Advisory Committee advised that all or part of the objection should be declared 
well founded. These data provide sufficient basis, in our view, for the hypothesis 
that the relatively limited effect of the objection procedure as a sieve in relation to 
decisions imposing sanctions under the Competition Act can to some extent be 
explained by the fact that the Competition Authority departs from its Advisory 
Committee’s recommendations relatively frequently.
We have, incidentally, also taken a look, albeit a cursory look, at how the admin-
istrative courts – both at first instance (Rotterdam district court) and on appeal 
(Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal, CBb) – view the differences in opinion 
between the Advisory Committee and the Competition Authority. From our very 
provisional analysis, it emerges that the district court took the side of the Com-
petition Authority in approximately 60% of cases, while sharing the view of the 
Advisory Committee in 35%, whereas on appeal the tribunal took the side of the 
Advisory Committee in 60% of cases and that of the Competition Authority in 
20%. These figures afford some basis for the hypothesis that the Competition 
Authority may well adopt too rigid a position during objection procedures. Further 
research is, however, necessary on this point.
From our analysis, it also emerges that in 50% of cases the differences of opinion 
between the Competition Authority and the Advisory Committee concerned fac-
tual and evidentiary issues, and the classification of facts in the light of statutory 
concepts (was X present at meeting Y?; what is the relevant market?; does action 
X constitute a noticeable restriction of competition? etc.). In 25% of cases the dif-
ference of opinion concerned the proportionality of the fines imposed: have the 
guidelines been correctly applied (was the infringement minor or serious?; has 
the appropriate multiplication factor been applied?); is the case a ‘special case’ 
within the meaning of Art. 4:84 GALA? In only 10% of cases was the difference 
purely on a matter of law (what is the correct interpretation of Art. 34 Competition 
Act?). During the passage of the Direct Appeals Act through Parliament it was 
noted that direct appeal to the administrative courts is particularly valuable ‘in 
cases where the dispute is in any case no longer capable of resolution during the 
objection phase’,19 for example ‘in cases where there is a fundamental difference 
of opinion on a question of law, in which it is clear from the start that the parties 
want the opinion of a court’.20 In our study, as will be clear from the above, we did 
not come across many cases of the type: ‘fundamental differences of opinion on 
points of law’. Most objections could be summarized as: ‘I did not do it; if I did, it 
was not wrong; and if it was, the fine is too high.’
19 Memorandum further to the report, Parliamentary Papers II, 27 563, p. 6.
20 Memorandum further to the report, Parliamentary Papers II, 27 563, p. 2.
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4.2 No Dossier Building in ACM Cases?
Another benefit of the objection procedure generally also proves less prominent 
in relation to decisions of the Competition Authority, the Telecommunications 
Authority and the Consumer Authority, again according to the explanatory memo-
randum. In general, objection procedures ensure that, where a dispute is never-
theless brought before the administrative courts, the court receives a more clearly 
defined and better presented case (dossier building). According to the explana-
tory memorandum this is less the case in relation to fines imposed by the three 
authorities referred to above. To quote: “The practice at the Competition Author-
ity, the Telecommunications Authority and the Consumer Authority shows, 
however, that, as a rule, infringers do not present new grounds in the objection 
procedure compared to the views expressed under Art. 5:50 in conjunction with 
Art. 5:53 GALA. Infringers have had more than sufficient opportunity to present 
their views in the pre objection procedure. Moreover, after the parties have been 
offered the opportunity to present their views in writing, it is customary for the 
three authorities to organise a hearing at which the parties have the opportunity 
to explain their views orally. All the arguments of infringers are thus generally 
already known before the objection procedure.”
Although some degree of repetition cannot be denied, it must be said that the objec-
tion procedure is in fact the first opportunity for parties to present their objections 
to the size of the fine imposed. The views expressed concern the inspector’s report 
(Art. 59 Competition Act in conjunction with Art. 5:48.1 GALA). Such reports 
generally contain information about the procedure and the nature of the evidence, 
an extensive review of the facts and circumstances of the case (organisation, anti-
competitive behaviour, agreements, market sharing etc.), a legal determination of 
these facts (decision, concerted practice, abuse etc.) and an assessment in the light 
of the relevant statutory provisions (Art. 6 Competition Act, Art. 101 TFEU, etc.), 
and the allocation of blame among the parties. The report does not contain a draft 
decision or other information about the fine to be imposed. Indeed, the admin-
istrative authority is not obliged to give this information except where specific 
statutory requirements apply.
Questions of law will therefore land fairly and squarely on the plate of the first 
instance courts, unless there is some form of ‘compensation’ in the sense of adjust-
ing the primary decision-making phase. The Dutch competition law association 
(Vereniging voor Mededingingsrecht) has observed: “that the ACM will design the 
procedure following the report phase in such a way that the parties concerned will 
be able to express their views on all formal and substantive matters in the decision 
to be taken. For this, the decision will have to be fully open to inspection. The par-
ties concerned should, for example, be able to comment on the fine and its basis; 
it should also be possible to hear witnesses at Competition Authority hearings”.
In our view, the explanatory memorandum does not give a wholly accurate descrip-
tion of the function of ‘dossier building’. It is indeed, particularly as regards 
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 decisions of the Competition Authority and the Telecommunications Authority 
where parties are generally represented by highly qualified legal practitioners, not 
surprising that the grounds for appeal submitted to the courts do not differ greatly 
from the views expressed and the grounds for objection. It is also true that there is 
a danger of repetition in the three phases of an administrative appeal (expression 
of views, grounds for objection and grounds for appeal). Nevertheless, as far as dos-
sier building is concerned, it is also important that the often numerous grounds 
for objection are reduced to a few crucial ones (objections of 100 plus pages, with a 
recent high of 460 pages are no exception at the Competition Authority). It would 
be better to describe this as the ‘reduction function’ of the objection procedure. In 
other words, a large dossier (in exceptional cases 1 m3 of paper) is regularly reduced 
to several manageable points of dispute in the objection phase. If this phase goes, 
then so does this simplification and the first instance courts will be faced with the 
full burgeoning dossier.
4.3 Length of Objection Procedure
Under Art. 7:10.1 GALA, the administrative authority must give its decision within 
six weeks from the day after the day on which the time limit for filing an objection 
has expired, or within 12 weeks if a committee has been established as referred 
to in Art. 7:13. Art. 7:10.3 provides that the administrative authority may postpone 
the decision for not more than six weeks. These time limits are almost never met 
in objections against Competition Authority decisions imposing a sanction. From 
data made available to us by the Competition Authority, it emerges that the average 
period from the time the objection is received until the recommendation is given 
is 8.9 months. This picture is to some extent distorted by the fact that in most 
cases a pro forma objection is lodged first, and the grounds for objection are then 
filled in after a time limit set by the authority, sometimes much later. The time 
the Competition Authority then needs to take a decision on the objection varies 
from case to case, most cases being concluded within five months of receipt of the 
recommendation, but more than 12 months (with a high of more than two years)21 
is no exception.
It is clear from the decisions of the trade and industry appeals tribunal that it is 
impossible to determine in the abstract what a reasonable time is for procedures 
under Art. 6 of the Competition Act (and the same applies to Art. 101 TFEU), “but 
that this must in each case be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the 
specific case. Account must be taken of the complexity both in fact and in law of 
the case and the conduct of both the company concerned and the administrative 
authority, and it is also relevant what is at stake for the company concerned.”22 The 
21 See, for example, District Court Rotterdam 4 March 2008, LJN: BC8958: objection lodged on 
14 January 2004, AbM report of 29 September 2004, followed by the decision on the objection, 
dated 9 November 2006.
22 See e.g. Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal 3 July 2008, AB 2009/305 with note by I. Sewan-
dono, LJN: BD6629; Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal 7 July 2010, AB 2010/235 with note by 
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diversity and the fact that these proceedings are not very repetitive mean “that it 
cannot be assumed as a general rule that a reasonable time has been exceeded if the 
court has not given its decision within two years after the start of the time limit.” 
In two recent decisions dating from August 2012 – relating to fines in connection 
with fraud in the construction industry – the tribunal arrived at the conclusion 
that the reasonable time should be set at three and a half years, of which two years 
could be attributed to administrative decision-making and review in respect of an 
objection and eighteen months to the first instance judicial proceedings.23
Although it cannot be denied that the length of the review in objection proceed-
ings is much greater than the standard period allowed by the GALA, it cannot be 
said, based on the information made available to us and the published case law, 
that the duration of the objection procedure has caused great difficulties in rela-
tion to Art. 6 ECHR.
4.4 Lower Cost: No Demand for Low Threshold Procedure
According to the explanatory memorandum, creation of a low threshold procedure 
is also less important in relation to ACM decisions imposing fines. To be sure, 
an objection procedure is cheaper and thus more accessible than an appeal to an 
administrative court. Clearly, abolishing the objection procedure would result in 
doing away with the direct costs accompanying the procedure, namely:
– Costs of the advisory committee (fee and secretariat);24
– Organization of hearing (report, logistics costs, possible translation fees);
– Competition Authority costs (preparation, hearing, assessment of recommen-
dation, drafting decision on the objection);
– Cost of legal practitioners of objectors and possible other interested parties.
It must, of course, first be noted that the initial costs concerning the preparation 
of the case, which are currently incurred during the objection procedure, both by 
the Competition Authority and interested parties, will shift to the judicial proce-
dure. Interested parties’ costs for drafting an objection will now be made when the 
appeal is made to the court. Nor will this be very different for the administrative 
authority. Little is thus to be expected in the way of benefit or cost saving. Above, 
we have argued that if the objection procedure were abolished, this should be cou-
pled with ‘compensation’ in the primary decision-making phase. Obviously this 
R. Stijnen, LJN: BN0540. Recently confirmed in Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal 28 August 
2012, case numbers AWB 09/982 and AWB 09/983.
23 Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal 28 August 2012, case numbers AWB 09/982 and AWB 
09/983. In the earlier decision of 3 July 2008 (see previous footnote), a period of 2 years and 
6 months was regarded as reasonable for the administrative phase, given the complex nature of 
the case. 
24 When asked, the Competition Authority informed us that there were no public data which would 
make it possible to work out the cost of the objection phase, for example the total cost of the 
Advisory Committee.
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would entail new costs, both for the administrative authority and for interested 
parties.
The cost saving anticipated by the government does not therefore appear to be very 
substantial and will have to be set off against expected higher judicial costs. We 
have argued above that more appeals will be made to the courts, particularly where 
competition and consumer authority decisions imposing fines are concerned, and 
we also expect, certainly in relation to competition decisions, that the work will 
become more complex for first instance administrative courts, because the ‘reduc-
tion function’ of the objection procedure will have disappeared. In other words, 
abolishing the objection procedure will mean a shift in costs from the administra-
tive authorities to the courts.
5. Conclusion
It is not our intention in this article to express a preference about the proposed 
abolition of the objection procedure in relation to ACM decisions imposing sanc-
tions as entertained in the bill to streamline the procedures and enforcement 
instruments available to the ACM. Our aim is to give a more complete and accu-
rate picture of the pros and cons than the bill does.
The arguments for abolishing the objection procedure can be summarised as fol-
lows: it is true that some of the general aims of the legislature in creating a manda-
tory objection procedure in the GALA feature less prominently in relation to ACM 
decisions imposing sanctions. Access to an informal, low threshold, cheap review 
procedure to repair manifest errors of the administration is simply less important 
in relation to these decisions. If we confine ourselves to competition decisions:
– the decisions are made by a professional, competent organisation and address 
professional market parties which call in the assistance of qualified legal pro-
fessionals, generally also during the preparation of the primary decision;
– the decisions are made after a thorough preprocedure, including a hearing at 
which interested parties can express their views on the report on which the 
decision-making is based. To a certain extent the exchange of arguments in 
the objection procedure can be regarded as repetitious. However, if the objec-
tion procedure is abolished in relation to these decisions, it will in our view be 
necessary to reinforce the primary decision-making phase and give interested 
parties the opportunity to present their views further to a draft decision which 
includes the size of the proposed fine. If no such changes are made in ‘com-
pensation’, abolition of the objection procedure will imply a loss of legal protec-
tion for companies that are fined;
– the objection procedure in competition cases is highly formalised and judicial-
ised. There is hardly any question of an informal exchange of opinion between 
the ‘individual’ and the ‘administration’ (mediator function);
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– the review of competition decisions during the objection procedure leaves little 
room for a genuine, integral review and is essentially no more than a lawful-
ness test.
Another advantage of abolishing the objection procedure would on the face of it 
seem to be a significant time gain, even if the limits set by Art. 6 ECHR do not 
pose a real problem here.
One of the advantages of appointing an external advisory committee – that exper-
tise is brought in that is lacking within the organisation – is hardly relevant in 
relation to competition decision-making. However ‘expert’ the members of the 
Advisory Committee may be, it cannot be said that they bring expertise into the 
decision-making process that is lacking at the Competition Authority.
The disadvantages of abolishing the objection procedure can be summarized as 
follows. Though the objection procedure only operates as a sieve to a limited extent 
compared to decision-making at the local and regional levels, it cannot be denied 
that this effect does exist and particularly in relation to the Competition Authority 
and the Consumer Authority, organisations where the procedure is farmed out to 
external advisory committees. As regards the limited effect in relation to competi-
tion decisions imposing a sanction, this can to some extent be explained by the way 
the Competition Authority so conspicuously ignores the Advisory Committee’s 
recommendations. We would expect that the effect would be greatly en hanced 
if the Competition Authority were to follow the recommendations more often. 
It seems as if the authority, once it has adopted a particular position, is reluctant 
to review a contested decision on substantive grounds. Abolishing the objection 
procedure, in particularly in relation to competition and consumer authority deci-
sions where an external advisory committee is involved, must be expected to have 
a negative impact on the legitimacy of the decision-making process in the eyes of 
interested parties. It would be well to remember: “that justice should not only be 
done, but should […] be seen to be done”.25
If the objection procedure is abolished, it is also to be expected that the first instance 
administrative courts will face a significantly increased caseload. Not only because 
the number of appeals against decisions imposing sanctions will increase, but 
also because the courts will more often be faced with dossiers that have not yet 
been reduced to the main points at issue. Certain grounds for appeal (for example 
concerning the size of the fine) are only independently reviewed for the first time 
by the first instance courts. In other words, the administrative courts will have to 
deal with more cases, and each case will take longer to deal with properly, which 
may in turn give rise to difficulties in relation to Art. 6 ECHR.
It is indeed debatable whether abolishing the objection procedure will result in 
a substantial cost saving, or whether the costs will not simply be shifted from an 
administrative authority (ACM) to the judiciary. In our view, the cost benefit for 
25 R v Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259. 
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the parties concerned must also be examined more closely. If the costs of objecting 
were truly a factor of importance, it would have been reasonable to expect much 
more use to have been made of Art. 7:1a GALA (application to bypass objection 
procedure) in the past. Apparently, the companies concerned feel no great need to 
bypass the objection procedure.
Finally, it is perhaps worth returning to the parliamentary handling of the Direct 
Appeals Act. After the Act had been debated in the Senate of the Dutch Parlia-
ment, the justice minister wanted to clarify one or two points and stressed that 
direct appeal had to remain the exception:26
Only in very special cases, in which the objection procedure must be regarded as a 
needless delay in the resolution of the dispute, should it be possible to do without it. 
Two examples were mentioned in the Parliamentary discussion:
– cases (...) “in which all concerned have already exchanged arguments during 
the preparation of the decision so exhaustively that it is already certain that an 
objection procedure will have no added value”;
– cases in which there is no difference of opinion whatever concerning the 
determination and interpretation of the factual constellation, but parties need a 
judicial decision on a point of law to end their dispute.
How special are ACM decisions imposing sanctions in actual fact? And are they so 
special that departure from the general regime under the GALA is justified? We 
eagerly await the opinion of the legislature.
26 Parliamentary Papers I, 27 563, F.
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This contribution concerns advisory committees on damage compensation in 
zoning and infrastructural planning.1 Only recently have they been regulated 
in a formal act despite having existed in practice for over 20 years. Based on my 
experience with several damage compensation committees over the years I will 
make some observations within the framework of this conference. Although there 
are mainly two reasons for establishing such committees: independence and com-
petence, I will focus on the first aspect. I will defend the position that, although 
neither the legislator nor the jurisprudence is convincingly clear in this respect, 
independence is needed and that in practise this independence is not always 
guaranteed and sometimes threatened. To develop a convincing argument for this 
position the reason for independence has to be discussed and the practice of these 
committees has to be evaluated. To be able to do this properly a short description 
of the development of the pertinent regulation in Dutch law is useful.
2. Development of Damage Compensation in Spatial Planning Law and the 
Position of Advisory Committees.
Aside from some rare early examples, the theory and practise of compensation for 
damages caused by per se lawful decisions in the field of physical planning devel-
oped in the second half of the 20th century. The predecessor to the current Spatial 
Planning Act 20082 is the Spatial Planning Act 1962.3 The latter contained, for 
the first time, a provision for damage compensation (planschade). However, there 
was no legal obligation based on the act to install an advisory committee in the 
decision-making process.
* Prof. dr. D.A. Lubach is Professor of construction law at the University of Groningen, the Nether-
lands, and Of Counsel for Damsté Advocaten en Notarissen in Enschede. He is chairman of 
several municipal advisory committees on damage compensation. He is also member of the 
Decision-making committee (DMC) of the Schadeschap Schiphol.
1 Planschade- en nadeelcompensatiecommissies.
2 Wro: Wet ruimtelijke ordening, Stb. (Law Gazette) 2006, 566 
3 WRO: Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening, Stb. (Law Gazette) 1962, 286.
*
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These advisory committees were first introduced in several municipal by-laws and 
later the administrative courts held that advisory committees had to be consulted 
in order to comply with the demand of an accurate way of decision-making.
This resulted in specific legal provisions issued in 2008. The Spatial Planning 
Act 2008 provides the legal basis for national, provincial and municipal orders.4 
These orders contain among others rules for establishing of advisors or advisory 
committees. Municipalities are bound by the (national) Spatial Planning Order5 
where rules are given for the content of provincial and municipal orders. These 
are mainly procedural provisions. Most importantly, rules shall be given based on 
the competence and independence of the advisor.6 An example of these rules can be 
found in the relevant Municipal Order of the city of Groningen:7
A (subsidiary) member of the committee does not work under the responsibility of 
the municipal council or the board of mayor and aldermen.
A counseling member of the committee shall not be involved in the project for which 
damage compensation is asked.8
Another example can be found in the Order on the Damage Compensation Coun-
cil (Schadeschap) Schiphol Airport.9
3. Why an External Advice?
From the examples mentioned above we can say that at least10 two reasons play 
a role: competence and independence. Apparently the legislator thought it neces-
sary to call upon external advice to deal with a presumed lack of expertise and/or 
independence. However, a lack of expertise does not as such bring about the need 
for external advice. It is possible to provide the necessary expertise from within 
4 Art 6.7 Spatial Planning Act 2008.
5 Art 6.1.3.3 Besluit ruimtelijke ordening (Bro), Stb. (Law Gazette) 2008, 145.
6 Art. 6.1.13 section 2 sub a Spatial Planning Order 2008.
7 Art. 5 sub 4 Procedureverordening voor de advisering tegemoetkoming in planschade, Gemeen-
teblad Groningen 2009, 144.
8 Art. 6.2 provides for a possibility to challenge the nomination of one or more members of the 
committee.
9 Stcrt. (Government Gazette) 2012, 8910. In art.7 the following provisions are given in order 
to assure competence and independence of the advisory committees: the advisory committee 
gives advice to the Decision-making Committee (DMC, the Besliscommissie is the competent 
administrative authority). The advisory committee is nominated by the DMC. The advisory com-
mittee consists of three independent experts. There is a list of experts (not composed by the 
DMC) from which they have to be chosen. The nomination of experts can be challenged.
10 Yet another reason for external advice might be to put policy aspects at a distance. The policy 
aspects mainly have been dealt with in the decision-making process of the decision that causes 
the pretended damage. In deciding on the damage compensation claim these aspect do not play 
a role. At least they should not. Therefore that reason as such does not play a role here and is 
therefore not dealt with.
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the public authority itself. Of course there can be all sorts of good reasons for 
this to not be feasible, especially in smaller organisations. Since the focus in this 
contribution is on the aspect of independence we will not elaborate on this issue.
The issue of independence is to be dealt with in a more specific way. First of all, 
we have to know what is meant by ‘independent’. The example of the Groningen11 
order shows that the meaning is twofold:
– An independent counselor does not work under the responsibility of the deci-
sion-making public authority;
– An independent counselor is not involved in the project at stake.
This clarifies how ‘independence’ can be organised. Namely, by putting the coun-
selor at a distance from the subject and object of the decision-making. This aspect 
of distance is in my opinion important. That is, at least in the type of decision-
making discussed in this paper. I will elaborate on that later.
The Groningen order does not however, make clear why we need ‘independence’. 
That is as such rather obvious because – as we have already seen – it has to comply 
with the rules of the Spatial Planning Order.12 Nevertheless, it seems appropriate 
to elaborate on that question.
The notion of independence is related to unbiased decision-making and made 
without prejudice. That this is important under the rule of law is almost self-
evident.13 Less evident is that external advice is needed to guarantee such of 
behaviour from a decision-making authority.
De Graaf and Marseille take the position that there is a need for independent 
external advice only if it is not possible to provide a nonbiased civil servant.14 And 
they cannot think of a good reason to prefer external advice when it comes to the 
issue independence.15 In that respect they state rather straightforwardly:
Regardless the position of the expert opinion – intern or extern – it has to deal with 
and to focus only on the common interest. And as their definition of independent deci-
sion-making is: decision-making in the common interest without the influence of other 
(individual) interests, every advice -intern or extern-has to be independent. Hence the 
demand for independence does not ask for external advice. (translation by author)
This reasoning seems at first conclusive but it does not answer the question at 
stake here. How can the development described in paragraph 2 be explained? The 
11 See footnote 8.
12 See footnote 6.
13 As shows art. 2:4 General Administrative Law Act (GALA).
14 K.J. de Graaf & A.T. Marseille, Over onafhankelijk en deskundig voorbereide overheidsbesluiten, 
in: Bart Krans et. al.(eds.), De deskundige in het recht, Zutphen 2011, p. 21.
15 Id.
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answer given by De Graaf and Marseille16 that it is a matter of ‘tradition and coin-
cidence’ is not satisfactory. To find a more conclusive explanation we have to look 
into the nature of decision-making when it comes to damage compensation claims 
resulting from changes in zoning and infrastructure.
4. The Nature of Decision-Making on Damage Compensation Claims and the 
Need for Independence
First of all we have to keep in mind that in the case of damage compensation as 
dealt with in art 6.1 Wro17 we do not discuss the lawfulness of the decision that 
causes the damage for which compensation is requested. The decision to change 
a zoning plan for example as such requires balancing the different interests at 
stake.18 And although financial aspects play a role in finding the appropriate 
balance,19 the decision to change a zoning plan is not unlawful because damage 
compensation ex art 6.1 Wro has not (or not yet) been given. Nor is it mandatory 
to challenge the decision that causes the alleged damage, to be entitled to damage 
compensation. In short, in cases dealt with under art 6.1 Wro concern compensa-
tion for damages caused by a per se lawful decision.20
That a decision to change a zoning plan is lawful means that the inherent balance 
of different interests is correct, not only in the sense that it complies with the law, 
but also that it is the most appropriate way of serving the common interest.
Serving the common interest is the core business of a public authority, in fact it is 
the only thing it has to do. In cases such as changing zoning plans it is sometimes 
rather complicated and difficult to find the proper balance that best serves the 
common interest. Almost every decision in this field is apt to be challenged. Once 
a decision has been made and has been held as lawful by a court the decision-
making authority is satisfied that the decision has come a long way.
Worthy of discussion is whether the decision-making authority being in that ‘state 
of mind’ is able to decide on damage compensation claims completely on its own 
and still be truly ‘independent’.21 Unlike in a situation where it is confronted with 
a judgment where what it has done is unlawful and damage compensation is an 
almost ‘logical’ consequence, a change of mind is required. The lawful decision 
has to be checked on a, from the claimants point of view, drop in the desirability 
16 Id, p. 33
17 See footnote 3.
18 See also footnote 11.
19 A zoning plan has to have a sufficient economic base; its realisation has to be financially feasible.
20 Damage in this sense is referred to in Dutch as ‘nadeel’ and is distinguished from damage caused 
by an unlawful act, which is called ‘schade’. In this paper ‘damage compensation’ has to be trans-
lated from ‘nadeelcompensatie’ and not in the more common terminology ‘schadevergoeding’.
21 ‘Independent’ in the sense of De Graaf & Marseille 2011 supra.
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of the area and potential harmful effects on his privacy, view etc. all resulting in a 
possible decrease in the value of his property.
It is clear that in these cases an opinion from an independent and completely 
separate actor can be useful in order to come to the right decision; although the 
decision has to be made by the public authority itself. And from the claimant’s 
point of view, they tend to mistrust the appeal decision that comes from the same 
authority that may have ignored their demand to adapt the zoning plan in the first 
place.
My experiences over the years show that claimants appreciate members of the 
advisory committee not being civil servants and not working under the respon-
sibility of the public authority that has made the harmful decision. The very fact 
that the advisory committee is not seen as a part of the public authority contributes 
to the acceptance of a decision that is made in accordance with the given external 
advice.
However, the position of the external advisory committee should not be mistaken. 
The committee does not represent the claimant’s interest. Although at a distance 
from the public authority he does not defend the claimant’s interests. Nor does 
he defend the interests of the public authority of course. I do not follow De Graaf 
and Marseille in the cases discussed here, where they state that a close connection 
between the advisory committee and the public authority is desirable as it shows 
that the advisor is capable of giving advice ‘in the spirit of the common interest, 
served by the public authority’.22
This does not mean that an external advisor does not have to acknowledge the 
public authority’s obligation to serve the common interest and that its advice has 
to contribute to reaching that goal. But at least in the cases we are discussing here 
its position is not the same as the position of the public authority itself.
In my opinion there is a relevant distinction here. A distinction originating from 
private law could be helpful in this context. In the theory of the legal nature of 
binding advice a distinction is made between ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ binding advice. 
The first category is advice that is meant to establish a missing element in a legal 
relationship. Often such advices are asked to provide (expert) information to be 
able to make an initial decision. The latter is actually a form of litigation.23 Indeed, 
also in administrative law the first category is present. For example, expert advice 
is involved with establishing the degree of disability someone has which pre-
vents them from working entitling them to a disability benefit. Indeed in these 
 situations it is not obvious that distance to the decision maker is required. The 
22 Id, p. 33.
23 I do not discuss here the question whether or not advices in administrative law can be seen as 
binding advices in private law. See A.H. Santing-Wubs, Bindend advies en deskundigenbericht, 
in: Bart Krans et al. (eds.), De deskundige in het recht, Zutphen, 2011, p. 85.
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reason for the advice is the lack of expertise on the part of the decision maker. 
In these situations that expertise can be provided for internally and there is little 
reason to avoid having a close relationship between advisor and decision maker.
The questions of damage compensation are however of a different nature. As 
explained earlier they relate to a decision already made that is later judged as 
lawful. The question of whether or not somebody is entitled to damage compensa-
tion has therefore more the character of litigation. And advice in this field resem-
bles in my opinion an ‘impure’ binding advice, although the advice for the public 
authority on damage compensation is not binding.
Following this opinion the advice plays an important role in litigation. And in 
that sense, the appreciation of the independent nature of the committee should 
not come as a surprise. In these situations it is undesirable that the advisory com-
mittee has a (too) close relationship with the public authority. This being so, it 
might provide an explanation for the described development,24 leading to the legal 
obligation to obtain external advice from an external advisory committee, whose 
independence has to be guaranteed.
5. Practices Menacing the Independency of the Advisory Committee (?)
Jurisprudence rarely rewards complaints regarding to a lack of independence25 
of an advisory committee. In the cases discussed here the explanation for that 
attitude given by De Graaf and Marseille is unsatisfactory. They state that the 
court’s rather lenient attitude towards an advisory committee’s supposed bias be 
explained by the fact that a close connection between advisor and public authority 
is an indication of the capability of giving advice ‘in the spirit of the common inter-
est, served by the public authority’. That reasoning only applies to the first category 
of advice as indicated earlier. In those cases the court can judge that a lack of inde-
pendence is not problematic and therefore dismiss the complaint even in cases 
where there is indeed a close connection between advisor and public authority.26
In the cases at stake here however, the lack of independence can indeed harm the 
credibility of the committee and the acceptance of the decision in accordance with 
the advice. Therefore, it has to be seen if there are circumstances that threaten the 
independence of the advisory committee. Or at least contribute to the idea with the 
claimant that the committee is not independent.
24 See par. 2.
25 See De Graaf & Marseille 2011 supra, p. 31.
26 See footnote 23.
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In this respect the following issues prompt discussion:
a. The set-up of the committee and the way their decisions are (pre) structured;
b. The position of the committee towards the claimant on one hand and towards 
the public authority on the other;
c. The role of the committee in the phases of review and appeal;
d. The role of the committee in mediation.
Ad a. In general there are two options when it comes to establishing an advisory 
committee in the field of zoning and infrastructure.27 The first option is to refer 
to a professional expert bureau that serves several public authorities all over the 
country. The second is to establish a local committee that only serves the local 
authority.28 I will not discuss here the pros and cons of the two options in general 
but focus on the question of independence. It is clear that when it comes to the 
question of independence the two options are different. In the first, the advice is 
prepared and formulated separately and at a distance from the public authority.29 
In the case of a local committee the administrative support often comes from 
within the municipality itself. The secretary is often a civil servant that works for 
the municipality. Although obviously he or she is not a member of the committee 
it is almost inevitable that there is some influence. The relevant documents are 
compiled and often initially interpreted by the secretary. He or she – especially 
a (hopefully) very competent person – usually participate in the discussion. And 
sometimes the committee has to remind itself that the secretary is not a voting 
member of the committee. Eventually the text of the advice is edited by the sec-
retary, which gives him or her another potential means of exerting influence. In 
this respect it is advisable that the committee provides a format that can be used 
in standard cases. In my own practice I have not seen examples of problems in this 
respect but both the administrative secretary and the members of the committee 
have to keep their different positions in mind.
Ad b. Claimants are different. Sometimes they are affluent individuals or enter-
prises who are represented by a lawyer and the expertise of the claimant is not 
unlike that of the committee. In those cases the committee tends to keep the con-
tact fairly formal. In local practice however, these claimants are a minority. In most 
cases the claimants are middle class individuals who do not have much expertise, 
nor the financial means to gain that expertise from a professional lawyer.30 In 
these cases a committee must be aware of their position as an independent body. 
That means that there is a limit to the extent a committee can be ‘user friendly’. In 
this respect it important that the rather lenient position the committee has taken 
27 Theoretically establishing an ad hoc committee is not excluded but they are rare and I will not 
discuss them here.
28 Almost always a municipality.
29 For instance the bureau SAOZ, a bureau based in Rotterdam which works for a municipality in 
the northern part of the country.
30 Although since the Spatial Planning Act 2008 came into force the legal demands for justification 
of the claims are more severe (formerly one phrase: ‘Help, your decisions cause damage to me’ 
was sufficient to start up the case). Legal assistance or an evaluation report is not obligatory.
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in the past towards claimants who fail to comply with the demands to provide the 
necessary information is now restricted by the legal obligation for the committee 
to come forward with their advice and for the public authority to decide within the 
proper time frame.31
Ad c. The legal position of the advisory committee is limited to the phase of the 
initial decision-making process. Strictly speaking, it does not have a role in the 
following phases of the procedures for legal protection. The objection procedure 
that aims at reviewing the initial decision provides its own advisory committee.32
In the process of appeal it is the public authority that has to, without advice, defend 
its decision although in practice this is not as clear cut as it may seem here. The 
objection procedure is designed as an opportunity to rethink the initial decision 
in full scope. It is obvious that also merits of the advice given in the initial phase 
will be reconsidered. It is often the case that in the objection procedure the advi-
sory committee in that procedure contacts the advisory committee of the initial 
decision to discuss the way they have to deal with the points of view expressed in 
the initial advice. As such that is not surprising. The committee in the objection 
procedure is a more general advisory committee that is involved in all kinds of 
cases on a wide scale of subjects. It does not have the specific expertise of the 
initial advisory committee.
At the appeal phase the complaints often specifically regard the value that can be 
attributed to the advice. The question is often whether the public authority could 
have reasonably made the allegedly unlawful decision following the initial advice. 
Nor should it come as a surprise that the public authority once more contacts the 
advisory committee to discuss the arguments brought forward in the court proce-
dure to see if these cause a change of opinion with the committee.
As long as one regards the position of the advisory committee as a ‘lengthening 
piece’ of the public authority all this does not pose a problem. But it can easily be 
understood that the independent position of the advisory committee is at risk. It 
is the public authority that has the opportunity to contact and discuss with the 
advisory committee in two subsequent phases of the procedure of legal protection. 
Obviously that opportunity does not exist for the claimant. He will tend to see the 
committee as a barely independent counselor to his opponent.
Ad d. There is still another position that the committee can take in the relation-
ship between claimant and public authority. That is the role of mediator. To 
comply with the call for alternative dispute resolution sometimes the members of 
the committee are asked (by both parties of course) to take the role of mediators. 
It cannot be the committee itself taking that position because the law does not 
31 From 1 October 2009 art. 4:17 GALA provides for financial consequences in the case of a not 
timely decision.
32 Art 7:13 GALA.
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attribute that role to the advisory committee. The members of the committee are 
asked for their expertise and indeed because of their independence from both 
parties and ‘independence’ from their previous position as advisory committee. 
The role of mediator presupposes a certain distance from the reasoning that is 
the base of the initial advice leading to the disputed decision. So this role requires 
independence, it does not threaten it.
6. Summary and Conclusions
Since 2008 specific legislation has called for external advisory committees in the 
decision-making process concerning compensation for damages resulting from 
changes in zoning and infrastructural planning. Both expertise and independ-
ence can be reasons for the obligatory installment of such committees.33 Neither 
the jurisprudence nor the lawmaker is convincingly clear on why exactly the 
independence of those committees is required. This paper tries to find the reason 
for advisory committee independence in the litigious nature of the decision on 
compensation for damages caused by lawful decisions. The idea that the advisory 
committee can be seen as a ‘lengthening piece’ of the public authority whose man-
date it is to advise ‘in the spirit of the common interest’ does not take into account 
that the advice basically is meant to serve the resolution of a dispute.34
Once convinced that independence is a value that should not be neglected the 
existing practice is evaluated. It appears that in particular the local committees 
are susceptible functioning too close to the public authority. Both the members of 
the committee themselves as the administrative secretarial support have to keep 
in mind that they are supposed to take an independent position. The fact that the 
expertise of the committee is also invoked in the phase of the objection procedure 
and appeal reinforces the threat to independence. It is clear it is independence that 
is required if members of the same committee are to play a role as mediator.
33 See footnote 7.
34 I am grateful to my colleagues Kars de Graaf and Bert Marseille for the possibility they unknow-
ingly gave me to develop and clarify my rather dormant ideas on this subject by taking the oppo-
site position in their article mentioned in several footnotes above.
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Final Dispute Resolution by Dutch Administrative 
Courts: Slippery Slope and Efficient Remedy
Kars de Graaf and Albert Marseille
1. Introduction
Dutch administrative authorities are competent in a number of fields to decide 
on the legal position of citizens, either in response to an application or ex officio. 
Sometimes the legislator grants discretionary power to a public authority and 
sometimes the law leaves no room to balance the interests involved. In most cases 
the decision-making process will lead to a decision that is potentially the subject 
of judicial review by an administrative court. The classic role of administrative 
courts is simply to assess the lawfulness of the decision taken. The judgment 
entails either the statement that the challenged decision is lawful, or the annul-
ment of the challenged decision. If the latter is the case, the public authority will 
have to decide on the matter again at a later date. At least until that date, there is 
no final resolution to the dispute.
The courts are independent and impartial with regard to administration in the 
classical ‘separation of powers’ sense. The call for final dispute resolution within 
a reasonable time however calls for effective and efficient administrative adjudica-
tion and demands of courts that they direct the plaintiff and the public authority 
towards a final resolution of their conflict. A simple annulment of the decision 
by the court is no longer sufficient. Ideally the procedure will end with clarity on 
the legal position of both parties. This means that it is clear which decision of the 
public authority applies in the future.1 If the contested decision is upheld by the 
court, the decision that applies in the future is of course the contested decision. 
But what if the contested decision is annulled? The Dutch General Administrative 
Law Act (GALA) under certain conditions grants administrative courts the power 
to bring about the final settlement of the dispute even when the contested decision 
is annulled.
* Dr. K.J. de Graaf is Associate Professor of administrative and environmental law at the University 
of Groningen, the Netherlands. Prof. dr. A.T. Marseille is Professor in Empirical Studies of 
Administrative Law at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. They thank Derek Sietses and Jasper 
Wesselman for their help in preparing this chapter.
1 B.J. Schueler, J.K. Drewes et al., Definitieve geschilbeslechting door de bestuursrechter, Boom Juri-
dische uitgevers, The Hague, 2007.
*
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This chapter deals with the question of how much effort administrative courts 
should invest in final dispute resolution and how the use of the powers to bring 
about final dispute resolution relates to the classic ideas of independence and 
impartiality and the relationship between administrative courts and administra-
tion. To that end, we discuss recent amendments in the GALA that provide courts 
with more effective instruments and powers to bring about final dispute resolu-
tion and case law that proves courts either too careful or surprisingly careless. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, we will explain what the powers of 
the courts to bring about the final settlement of the dispute imply. Second, we will 
examine the extent to which those powers are used. Third, we will show the crite-
ria the courts apply when deciding whether they should use these powers in their 
quest for the efficient offer of effective remedies. We will indicate the limitations 
of the courts’ powers and show that Dutch case law is in some respects moving 
towards a ‘slippery slope’.
2. The Powers of the Court to Bring about Final Dispute Resolution
When an administrative court in the Netherlands comes to the conclusion that 
the contested decision of a public authority is unlawful and has to be annulled, it 
has three instruments to prevent the dispute between the parties from continuing 
while the citizen waits for a new decision by the public authority. These powers are 
awarded to the courts in Article 8:72 and Article 8:51a GALA.
First, administrative courts can decide that the legal consequences of the annulled 
decision shall be allowed to stand (Article 8:72(3)(a) GALA). The court can use 
that power when it is certain that the defect can be repaired and the content of the 
repaired decision will be exactly the same as the contested decision.
For example,2 before appealing to a court against a public authority’s decision 
an objection usually has to be lodged against that decision. Before deciding on 
that objection, the interested parties have to be given the opportunity to be heard 
(Article 7:2 (1) GALA). When the public authority fails to meet this obligation and 
subsequently an appeal is lodged against the decision of the public authority on 
the objection, one of the grounds of that appeal can be that the public authority 
violated the law by not hearing the person that lodged the objection. The court 
will certainly award this ground and as a consequence, it will annul the contested 
decision. Subsequently, it has to decide whether the legal consequences of the 
annulled decision will be allowed to stand (Article 8:72(3)(a) GALA). There is a 
fair chance that the court will apply Article 8:72(3)(a) GALA. When the court con-
cludes that in other respects the decision of the public authority is lawful, it is 
certain that the public authority will take exactly the same decision again. In that 
2 This example was already given by government when the competence of the courts was intro-
duced in the GALA in 1994, see E.J. Daalder, G.R.J. de Groot & J.M.E. Breugel, De parlementaire 
geschiedenis van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht. Tweede tranche, Alphen a/d Rijn 1994, p. 470.
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case it is more efficient that the court decides that the legal consequences of the 
annulled decision will be allowed to stand.
Second, the court can determine that its judgment shall take the place of the 
annulled decision (Article 8:72(3)(b) GALA). The court can only use that power 
when it is certain which decision the public authority should take to replace the 
decision that it annulled. Because it is clear which decision has to be taken instead, 
the court has the power ‘to step into the shoes’ of the public authority, and to 
decide the matter in a lawful manner instead of the public authority. The court has 
this power because it is deemed to be inefficient for the public authority to take a 
new decision when it is crystal clear what the content of the decision will be. In 
such a situation, it is far more efficient for the court to take the decision – by deter-
mining that its judgment will take the place of the annulled decision – instead of 
prescribing that the public authority take a new decision.
For example,3 when a public authority decides that an objection is unfounded 
and the court has to give judgment concerning the appeal against that decision, 
the court can conclude that the objection should have been declared inadmissible. 
The court will of course annul the public authority’s decision. Because there can 
be no discussion regarding the decision the public authority will have to take after 
the annulment (the objection will have to be declared inadmissible), the court 
will decide that its judgment shall take the place of the annulled decision and will 
decide that the objection is inadmissible.
A third, relatively new power of the court is that it can allow the public author-
ity the opportunity to repair shortcomings or unlawful elements that the court 
found in the contested decision; in Dutch this procedure is called a bestuurlijke 
lus, an administrative loop. This power is not mentioned in Article 8:72 GALA, 
but in Article 8:51a GALA. If the court uses this power, it will state in a specific, 
interim judgment that it has found unlawful elements in the contested decision 
and that it will annul the decision in its final judgment. Until the final judgment 
the court will however award the public authority time to try and repair the unlaw-
ful elements. The public authority’s response to the administrative court of first 
instance could be that it doesn’t agree with the assessment of the court and that 
there is no need to repair any unlawful element. The public authority could also 
respond either by offering further information or giving improved reasons for 
the contested decision or it could take a new decision that will be added to what is 
subject to judicial review by the court. The court can use the power to allow the 
public authority an opportunity to repair the decision any time it concludes that 
the contested decision is unlawful and it argues that allowing the public authority 
that opportunity could be efficient for reaching a final resolution to the dispute. 
The court is supposed to use the power in situations where it fears that if it does 
not take control over the settlement of the dispute, the decision-making process 
3 See E.J. Daalder, G.R.J. de Groot & J.M.E. Breugel, De parlementaire geschiedenis van de Algemene 
wet bestuursrecht. Tweede tranche, Alphen a/d Rijn 1994, p. 470.
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necessary for the new decision by the public authority will take too much time. 
This power was introduced in 2010 in order to reiterate the notion that administra-
tive courts have a responsibility for final dispute resolution.
The Dutch legislator is keen to support the idea that administrative courts have 
an important role to play in finding ways to stimulate final dispute resolution. 
On January 1st 2013 it introduced a new relevant article in that respect. Article 
8:41a GALA states that administrative courts will resolve the dispute of the parties 
where possible.
3. Empirical Data: the Use of the Powers to Bring about Final Dispute 
Resolution
How often do administrative courts make use of their powers to bring about final 
dispute resolution? To answer this question, we will compare court activity in 2012 
with activity in 2007. The years between 2007 and 2012 ushered in two impor-
tant developments. In the first place, the administrative courts were provided 
with additional powers (the administrative loop) to try to bring about the final 
resolution of the dispute, as we have seen in section 2. In addition, since 2008 the 
case law of the highest administrative courts indicates that courts are able to use 
their powers of Article 8:72 GALA in increasingly different situations, as will be 
explained in section 4.
Ideally, we would have looked at the activities of the courts of first instance. After 
all, if an administrative judge has to decide whether he will use one of his powers 
to (attempt to) bring about the final settlement of the dispute, it will most likely 
be a judge in first instance. Research that concerns their decisions can provide us 
with valuable insights into the effects of the expanded powers of the administra-
tive courts. However, courts in first instance do not publish all their judgments, 
so it is somewhat difficult to obtain the necessary information concerning their 
use of these powers. As a consequence, we turned to the two most important 
Dutch courts of last resort, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council 
of State (Council of State) and the Central Appeals Court for Public Service and 
Social Security Matters (Central Appeals Court), because they publish all their 
judgments.4
We have analysed a sample of their judgments where they conclude that a decision 
given by a public authority is unlawful and they therefore have to decide whether 
it is possible to (attempt to) bring about final dispute resolution, by using their 
powers of Article 8:72 or Article 8:51a GALA.
4 Council of State: <www.raadvanstate.nl>. Central Appeals Court: <www.rechtspraak.nl>. 
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Our sample consists of 374 decisions given by these two courts, 200 from the 
Council of State (101 from 2007, 99 from 2012),5 215 from the Central Appeals 
Court (115 from 2007, 100 from 2012).6
We will first focus on the Council of State. We distinguish three different deci-
sions. The first decision that has to be taken when the Council of State concludes 
that an administrative body’s decision must be annulled, is whether it is possible 
to allow the legal consequences to stand (Article 8:72(3) GALA). If that is not pos-
sible, the next decision is whether it is possible to let the courts judgment take the 
place of the annulled decision (Article 8:72(4) GALA). If that is not possible either, 
the Council of State has to finally decide whether it will try to bring about the final 
resolution of the dispute by using the so-called administrative loop (Article 8:51a 
GALA). In 2007, the administrative courts did not have the power to take this last 
decision, because Article 8:51a was implemented in 2010.
The first figure shows the results of the two subsequent decisions the Council of 











The figure shows that in 11 of 100 cases, the Council of State decided to allow the 
legal consequences of the annulled decision to stand (the two columns on the left). 
With regard to the remaining 89 cases, it decided in 21 cases that its judgment 
should take the place of the annulled decision (the two columns on the right). 
As a consequence, in 68 of 100 cases in which the contested decision had to be 
annulled, the Council of State did not succeed in bringing about final dispute 
resolution.
5 We excluded the procedures concerning immigration. 
6 We started our search with decisions published at the end of April, and went subsequently a 
week ahead and a week back, until we had collected more than 100 decisions from both courts. 
As a consequence of a more detailed analysis some of them were omitted. 
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The next figure shows the results of the three subsequent decisions the Council of 










The figure shows that in 18 of the 100 cases, the Council of State decided to allow 
the legal consequences to stand (the two columns on the left). With regard to the 
remaining 82 cases (the two columns in the middle), it decided in 33 of them 
that its judgment shall take the place of the annulled decision. With regard to the 
remaining 49 cases (the two columns on the right), the Council of State decided 
to use the administrative loop in 23 cases. As a consequence, in 37 of the 100 cases 
in which the contested decision had to be annulled, the Council of State was not 
able to bring about the final settlement of the dispute.
When we compare the 2007 cases with those from 2012, we see an increase in 
the final settlement of disputes where the Council of State concluded that the 
contested decision had to be annulled from 32% to 63% of cases. The reason for 
this increase is not only the introduction of the administrative loop but also an 
increased use of the two remaining instruments on behalf of the final settlement 
of the dispute.
If we now switch to the Central Appeals Court, the first figure shows the results of 
the two subsequent decisions the Central Appeals Court had to take in 2007 when 
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The figure shows that in 32 of 100 cases, the Central Appeals Court decided to 
allow the legal consequences of the annulled decision to stand (the two columns 
on the left). With regard to the remaining 68 cases (the two columns on the right), 
it decided that its judgment should take the place of the annulled decision in 
11 cases. As a consequence, in 57 of 100 cases where the contested decision had to 
be annulled, the Central Appeals Court didn’t succeed in bringing about the final 
settlement of the dispute.
The next figure shows the results of the three subsequent decisions the Central 









The figure shows that in 24 of 100 cases, the Central Appeals Court decided to 
allow the legal consequences to stand (the two columns on the left). With regard to 
the remaining 76 cases (the two columns in the middle), it decided that its judg-
ment should take the place of the annulled decision in 32 cases. With regard to 
the remaining 44 cases (the two columns on the right), the Central Appeals Court 
decided to use the administrative loop in 20 cases. As a consequence, only in 24 
of 100 cases in which the contested decision had to be annulled, did the Central 
Appeals Court not succeed in bringing about final dispute resolution, only in 76 
did it succeed.
When we compare the figure for 2007 with the one for 2012, we see a signifi-
cant increase in the number of cases where the Council of State and the Central 
Appeals Court reach a final settlement for the dispute. The increase is caused 
partly by the use of the administrative loop but also by an increased use of the 
powers of Article 8:72 GALA.
When we compare the Council of State with the Central Appeals Court, we observe 
that the Central Appeals Court used its powers to bring about the final settlement 
of the dispute in 2007 more frequently than the Council of State did.
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Moreover, the increase of the use of these powers (that can be observed in both 
courts) is more so by the Central Appeals Court than by the Council of State. 
The most striking difference between the two courts can be observed when we 
compare their decision concerning the use of the administrative loop. When they 
conclude that they cannot use the powers of Article 8:72 GALA (in 2012 at the 
Council of State in 49% of cases and at the Central Appeals Court in 44% of 
cases), the Central Appeals Court decides in almost half of the cases to use the 
administrative loop, the Council of State only in one in five cases.
So we can conclude that these two Dutch administrative courts in last instance 
increasingly make use of their powers to (attempt to) bring about the final resolu-
tion of the dispute but that the extent to which they use their powers differs.
What about the district courts? As earlier indicated, their judgement was not 
investigated. However, other research in recent years suggests that these courts 
also make more use of their powers to try to bring about final dispute settlement.7
4. The Increased Use Explained and Analysed
The figures presented in section 3 paint a clear picture. The percentage of cases 
where the courts have tried to bring about final dispute resolution has increased in 
recent years. Although we should emphasise that this development is a reaction to 
complaints regarding the functioning of the system of administrative jurisdiction 
7 P.A. Willemsen, M.C.J. Busscher, N. Groot, P.M. Langbroek & I.L.A. Langerak, Final dispute set-
tlement in numbers. Report of an examination of final dispute settlement in the Utrecht district 
court, Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences, 2009, no. 28E, p. 129-146; A.T. Marseille 
& R.R. van der Heide, De onderbenutting van de mogelijkheden tot finale beslechting door 
de bestuursrechter, JBplus 2008, No. 2, p. 78-92; B.J. Schueler, J.K. Drewes et al., Definitieve 
geschilbeslechting door de bestuursrechter, Boom Juridische uitgevers, The Hague 2007; K.A. van 
der Veer & A.T. Marseille, Besluitvorming na een rechterlijke vernietiging: de achilleshiel van 
het bestuursrecht, NJB 2006, p. 2168-2175; P.A. Willemsen et al, Definitieve geschilbeslechting 
 becijferd, JBplus, 2010/1, p. 32-48.
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in the Netherlands, it also raises some questions. The first question in relation to 
the numbers presented would be: what triggered the increase?
The answer to that question actually seems simple. First, as of 2010 administrative 
judges have an additional instrument to try to bring about final dispute resolution: 
the administrative loop. Second, as of 2008 the case law of the highest administra-
tive courts in the Netherlands has contributed to the increase in the percentage of 
cases where the courts have put effort into bringing about final dispute resolution. 
The highest courts have emphasised the role of the courts on this issue. Until 
2008, their case law indicated that courts could only use the powers mentioned 
in section 2 in cases where the public authority does not have a choice when it 
comes to decision-making once the contested decision has been annulled. Usu-
ally the case law would indicate that using these powers – either to determine 
that the legal consequences of the annulled decision shall be allowed to stand 
(Article 8:72(3) GALA) or to determine that the judgment shall take the place of 
the annulled decision (Article 8:72(4) GALA) – is allowed only in cases where the 
outcome of the new decision-making process is evident and crystal clear. The use 
of the powers was restricted to situations where only one lawful decision (that 
should be taken by the public authority) remained and that it is just a matter of 
efficiency to have the court use these powers.8 However, in its judgment of the 
10th of December 20089 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council 
of State deviated from this existing case law.
The disputed decision concerned the installation of a traffic sign in a small village 
called Hattem in the Netherlands. The legislator had granted the public authority 
wide discretion for taking this decision. The Council of State’s judgement has two 
important aspects.
The Council of State found the lodged appeal well-founded and had decided that 
it would annul the contested decision. It then explicitly considered that ‘when a 
court decides to annul the contested decision, it ought to assess all possibilities 
of final dispute resolution, such as the use of the powers awarded in Article 8:72 
paragraph 3 and 4 of the General Administrative Law Act’. This meant a dras-
tic change in the way courts were to consider their role in bringing about final 
dispute resolution. This is the first aspect that is of importance for answering 
the question of the expanded use of the competences. There is however, an even 
more important reason. The Council of State furthermore explicitly changed 
the existing boundaries that courts had used until then to assess whether or not 
they would use the powers mentioned in Article 8:72 GALA. To bring about final 
dispute resolution, it considered that from now on the use of the discretionary 
powers was not restricted to situations where only one lawful decision remains to 
be taken. The reason: efficiency and effectiveness of administrative jurisdiction. 
8 See as an example Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 28 June 1999, JB 
1999/196.
9 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 8 December 2008, JB 2009/39.
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The Council of State also referred to the independence of the administrative court 
by mentioning the separation of powers. It stated that issues of discretion would 
remain in the hands of the public authority and that the court would only be facili-
tating the efficient bringing about of final dispute resolution. Still, this change in 
the case law is relevant and important.
This judgment and others that were published later,10are examples of the new case 
law on the use of the powers of the court to bring about final dispute resolution. 
The new Article 8:41a of the GALA, which encourages administrative courts to 
put more effort into bringing about final dispute resolution, can be considered 
a sign of support for this new application of the powers of the court. However, 
the case law has triggered other, more fundamental questions. Should the court 
be in charge of final dispute resolution between the parties? What should be the 
exact role of the court in trying to bring about final dispute resolution? How much 
effort, time and money should courts invest in trying to achieve final dispute reso-
lution? This is to a large extent unclear.
One of the important issues that remains concerns the discretion awarded to the 
public authority by the legislator. How will courts deal with the existence of discre-
tion for the public authority on the one hand and the obligation to assess the pos-
sibilities of final dispute resolution on the other? In what way is it ensured that the 
courts do not intervene with the powers of the public authority? These questions 
are important as far as the separation of powers is concerned but also relate to the 
judicial independence and the impartiality of the courts. Another issue that courts 
are confronted with is that final dispute resolution often requires further investi-
gation into the relevant facts. However, the courts do not hold the primary respon-
sibility for gathering and establishing the facts that will lead to a lawful decision. 
It is the public authorities that are best equipped to undertake the investigation 
and renew the contested decision. These issues suggest that it is not always for 
administrative courts to bring about final dispute resolution. Public authorities 
have power and means to do so. The relatively new instrument of course, reflects 
this idea: the administrative loop (Article 8:51a GALA). The legislator introduced 
this instrument assuming it would be helpful in bringing about final dispute 
resolution while guaranteeing the independence of the administrative courts and 
the separation of powers. The task of the administrative court remains to simply 
evaluate the legality of a contested decision. The administrative loop does not have 
any influence on the power of the public authority to decide on the rights and 
duties of the applicant.
Effective remedy
There are disputes in Dutch administrative law where administrative courts are 
generally considered suitable for bringing final dispute resolution about.
10 See for example Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 11 February 2009, AB 
2009/224.
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The General Administrative Law Act explicitly demands a final judgment in cases 
that concern administrative (punitive) fines. Article 8:72a GALA states: “When a 
decision to impose an administrative fine is annulled by the court, it shall order 
that the judgment shall take the place of the annulled decision.” The reason for this 
mandatory use of the power to decide that the judgment will replace the annulled 
decision is said to lie in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) which demands final dispute resolution within reasonable time in cases 
concerning criminal charges, such as an administrative fine. Article 6 ECHR fur-
thermore demands full jurisdiction by the court in establishing the facts of the 
case, in determining the culpability of the offender and in assessing how severe 
the sanction should be to be appropriate.
In cases of government liability for decisions that were annulled by the court and 
were thus proven unlawful, the Dutch legislator has recently proposed a special 
procedure for citizens requesting damages. The essence of this special track is 
essentially a direct request to the administrative court to award damages contrary 
to the appeal procedure that is normally lodged against a decision by a public 
authority.11 Most authors in the Netherlands argue that nothing should stand in 
the way of final dispute resolution in these kinds of disputes on (fault) liability of 
the government. The legislator has therefore devised a special request procedure 
that has to end with a judgment by the administrative court determining the exact 
liability of the government.
Slippery slope?
For some disputes it is not clear whether administrative courts should have the 
obligation to reach final dispute resolution. Strangely enough the Dutch legislator 
did not propose a special procedure for disputes that involve the no-fault liability of 
public authorities for lawful decisions. Disputes concerning the no-fault liability 
of public authorities will have to be brought to court by lodging an appeal against 
a decision of the public authority concerning its own (no-fault) liability.12 The 
administrative court will annul the decision when it is unlawful. The court then 
has to assess the possibilities for final dispute resolution. Although the adminis-
trative court is not obliged to achieve final dispute resolution, most authors trust 
that courts will in general lead the procedure to a judgment on the exact no-fault 
liability of the public authority.13 The court could however, refer the case to the 
public authority to decide in the matter again. Some authors and case law state 
that it is up to the public authority to establish the facts and when that duty of 
care is not properly upheld, the court should refer the case to the public author-
ity. Other authors claim that the issue of awarding damages for no-fault liability 
is, to a certain extent, at the discretion of the public authority and therefore the 
courts should not be obliged to determine that the judgment will take the place of 
11 See Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 32 621, nr. 2 (proposed Article 8:88 GALA).
12 See Parliamentary Papers II 2010/11, 32 621, nr. 2 (proposed Article 4:126 GALA)
13 See B.J. van Ettekoven & R. Ortlep, Zelf in de zaak voorzien en schadevergoeding, O&A 2012, 
p. 2-18
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the annulled decision.14 Until recently there was no case law clarifying this issue. 
Only recently has the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 
seemingly accepted that there is indeed discretion for public authorities in these 
kind of cases.15
The most difficulty we have is with the disputes where it is questionable whether 
the courts are allowed to use their powers to bring about final dispute resolution. 
We can explain this by giving two examples of somewhat older court judgments.
‘Three strikes and you’re out’. These words summed up the main idea in a judg-
ment handed down by the district court in Amsterdam in 1998.16 It decided in 
a case where the public authority had not provided proper reasons for refusing a 
subsidy to a zoo three times in a row. Once the court had annulled the decision 
refusing the subsidy three times, it then decided that it would grant the subsidy 
by deciding that its judgment should take the place of the annulled decision. It 
did so by stating that the public authority would, in a potential future procedure, 
probably not be able to give proper reasons for another refusal. Although this case 
could be considered somewhat older and concerns a verdict by a district court, it 
can serve as an example of what the administrative courts deem appropriate when 
confronted with a public authority that gives poor reasons for a decision several 
times. There are other, more recent examples.17
‘No decision within a reasonable time and you are out’. A second example is provided 
by the District Court of the Hague that based its (unpublished) judgment on the 
idea that justice had to be delivered within reasonable time. In this case an appeal 
was lodged against a decision that concerned the reclaiming of disability benefits. 
The appeal was well-founded and the court considered that because of the long 
period it had taken the public authority to reach a decision on reclaiming the dis-
ability benefits, the court was allowed to determine that its judgment should take 
the place of the annulled decision. It furthermore decided that the sum that was 
reclaimed had to be diminished by 10%.
We think that in both cases the question of whether or not the courts were allowed 
to use the powers of Article 8:72 GALA is worthy of discussion. Although it was 
presumably acceptable for the courts to decide that their judgments were to take 
the place of the annulled decisions, we feel that in general there is only one sound 
reason to do so and that is the situation where only one lawful decision remains 
to be taken (by the public authority) and it is therefore a question of efficiency 
14 See R.J.N. Schlössels, Discretionaire aansprakelijkheidsrecht?, in T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden 
& M.K.G. Tjepkema (eds.), Coulant compenseren? Over overheidsaansprakelijkheid en rechtspoli-
tiek, Kluwer, Deventer, 2012, p. 36-39; also see M.K.G. Tjepkema, Nadeelcompensatie op basis van 
het égalitébeginsel. Een onderzoek naar nationaal, Frans en Europees recht (diss. Leyden), Kluwer, 
Deventer, 2010, p. 424.
15 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 5 December 2012, JB 2013/11.
16 District Court Amsterdam 16 April 1998, JB 1998/153.
17 See Central Appeals Court 24 September 2008, AB 2009/281.
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that the court uses its powers. It is questionable whether this was the case in both 
disputes.
Against the judgment in the second example the public authority lodged an appeal 
and the higher court (the Central Appeals Court) decided that the district court had 
gone beyond its powers.18 In March 2012 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division 
of the Council of State seemingly recognised the point that we are trying to make 
here.19 It stated that when applying the power to decide that the judgment shall 
take the place of the annulled decision any administrative court should have come 
to the conclusion that the public authority would have come to the same decision 
and that this decision would be lawful. This new way of stating the possibilities to 
use the power to bring about final dispute resolution comes suspiciously close to 
the words of the government when introducing the powers: they should only be 
used when one lawful decision remains to be taken and using the powers is an 
efficient remedy. And should not be a first step towards a slippery slope.
5. Final Remarks
The emphasis that both society and the legislator put on final dispute resolution 
leads to a dilemma for administrative courts. The pressure on the courts to bring 
about final dispute resolution is increasing but they are not allowed to jeopardise 
the separation of administrative and judicial responsibilities based on the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. Interfering in the discretionary powers of the public 
authority could be a slippery slope. As a consequence, courts should be alert in 
their efforts to bring about final dispute resolution in administrative disputes and 
claim powers to do so. In any case in which an administrative court achieves final 
dispute resolution, it should be because of efficiency reasons and in situations in 
which either only one lawful decision remains to be taken or it is certain the public 
authority will take the same decision again, but now carefully prepared and – as 
a consequence – lawful. Emphasis on final dispute resolution should never be a 
reason to disregard or change the balance of the separation of powers. The courts’ 
independence from the executive should be respected.
On the other hand one should not forget that in many cases the proceedings in 
court may be helpful to come to the conclusion that only one lawful decision 
remains to be taken. The courts have wide discretion in their efforts to reach the 
point where final dispute resolution by the courts is simply a matter of efficiency. 
The legislator has recently tried to create an incentive for the courts to try to settle 
all disputes where possible by implementing Article 8:41a GALA but it remains 
to be seen what the effects of this provision will be. So far it seems to have more 
of a symbolic function than creating real drive for the administrative courts to 
provide final dispute resolution. In addition, there is a growing awareness that 
18 Central Appeals Court 7 June 2000, JB 2000/229.
19 Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 21 March 2012, AB 2012/233.
218
IV – Independence of Advisory and Complaint Committees and Final Dispute Resolution by Administrative Courts
public authorities are, for the most part, better equipped for achieving final dis-
pute resolution than the courts. We should consider their expertise in establishing 
the facts and their powers in questions of policy. Only when it is more efficient and 
effective for the court to bring about final dispute resolution, rather than to leave it 
to the executive, should the courts be considered legitimate in their action and the 
courts independence from the executive is sufficiently guaranteed.
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